

MEMOIRS

OF THE

HISTORY OF FRANCE

DURING THE REIGN OF

NAPOLEON,

DICTATED BY THE EMPEROR

AT SAINT HELENA

TO THE GENERALS WHO SHARED HIS CAPTIVITY,

AND PUBLISHED

FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

CORRECTED BY HIMSELF.

VOL. IV.

DICTATED TO THE COUNT DE MONTHOLON.

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MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLÉON.

WAR OF ITALY.

CHAPTER XV.

TOLENTINO.

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I.

SIX months had now elapsed since Caracciolo had succeeded Cardinal Zelada in post of secretary of state at Rome. The minister had come to a rupture with France, formed a declared alliance with Austria, was exerting himself with more zeal than success to form a respectable army. He wished to renew the times when the pontifical armies decided the fate of the Peninsula. So urgently

the Camaldolites arrived at the Vatican, and prostrated himself at the feet of the holy father. Napoleon, in passing through Cesena, had particularly noticed this ecclesiastic; and knowing that Pius the VI. reposed great confidence in him, he had charged him to assure his Holiness that his destruction was not aimed at; that the French general revered his person and character; that he might remain at Rome; and that he had only to change his ministers, and send plenipotentiaries to Tolentino to conclude and sign a definitive treaty of peace with the republic. The general of the Camaldolites successfully accomplished this mission: the Pope took courage; dismissed the ridiculous Busca; entrusted the direction of his cabinet to Cardinal Doria, a man who had long been celebrated for the moderation of his opinions; countermanded his departure from Rome, and appointed plenipotentiaries to conclude and sign a definitive treaty of peace.

The instructions of the Directory were against any negotiation with Rome: the Directors thought that an end must be put to the temporal reign of the Pope, in order that it might give no farther trouble; that no case would arise in which the court of Rome would be more evidently in the wrong than on this occasion; that it would be a mere folly to think of a sincere peace with theologians, so violently hostile to the principles

which governed the new republics. The temporal existence of the Pope was undoubtedly incompatible with the happiness of Italy. Experience proved that neither moderation nor good faith were to be expected from that court: but Napoleon thought that he could neither revolutionize Rome, nor unite her territories with the Cispadan Republic, without marching on Naples and overturning the throne. The partisans of liberty in that kingdom were sufficiently numerous to give some uneasiness to the court, but too feeble to afford support and effectual aid to the French army. The Court of Naples felt that the revolution of Rome would produce its fall. But an army of 20 or 25,000 men was requisite for marching on Naples; and this measure was therefore inconsistent with Napoleon's grand project of dictating peace under the walls of Vienna.

VIII.

The van of the French army had passed the Apennines, and was within three days' march of Rome; head-quarters were at Tolentino on the 13th of February. Cardinal Mattei, Monsignor Galeppi, the Duke of Braschi, and the Marquis Massimi, the Pope's ministers plenipotentiary, arrived there the same day. Conférences began on the 14th. Monsignor Galeppi opened the nego-

tiation. This prelate was endowed with a most copious eloquence; he delivered a great number of homilies. But the court of Rome was guilty, and was to be punished; which could only be effected by the cession of the conquered provinces, or by equivalent contributions. The three legations, the duchy of Urbino, the marquisate of Ancona, the provinces of Macerata and Perugino, were conquered. These terms being at length agreed on, the conclusion of the treaty occupied only five days in discussion. Galeppi, who had at first talked of the absolute ruin of the papal finances, found resources as soon as they were wanted for the purpose of redeeming provinces, or diminishing the number of those which the Pope was to cede. The treaty was signed in the form and on the conditions following:—

The General-in-chief Bonaparte, commanding the Army of Italy, and Citizen Cacault, agent for the French Republic in Italy, plenipotentiaries charged with the full powers of the Executive Directory, and his Eminence Cardinal Matter, Monsignor Galeppi, the Duke of Braschi, and the Marquis Massimi, plenipotentiaries of his Holiness,—have agreed on the following articles:—

ARTICLE I There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between the French Republic and Pope Pius VII.

II The Pope revokes all adherence, consent,

and accession, patent or secret, given or entered into by him, to or with the armed coalition against the French Republic; and renounces all treaties of offensive and defensive alliance with all powers and states whatsoever. He engages not to afford to any of the powers in arms against the French Republic, in the present or any future war, any succours of men, ships, military stores, provisions, or money, under any pretence or denomination whatsoever.

III. His Holiness shall, within five days from the ratification of the present treaty, disband his newly levied troops, retaining only the regiments which existed before the armistice signed at Bologna.

IV. No ships of war or privateers belonging to the powers armed against the Republic shall enter or remain in any of the ports or roads of the Ecclesiastical States during the present war.

V. The French Republic shall continue to enjoy, as before the war, all the rights and prerogatives which France enjoyed at Rome; and shall in all respects be treated in the same manner as the most favoured powers, especially with respect to its ambassador or minister, consuls, and vice-consuls.

VI. The Pope wholly and simply renounces all rights which he might claim in the city and territory of Avignon and the county of Venasque,

with its dependencies; and transfers, yields, and abandons the said rights to the French Republic.

VII. The Pope likewise renounces in perpetuity, yields, and transfers to the French Republic, all his rights in the territory known by the name of the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna. No offence shall be offered to the Catholic religion in the said legations.

VIII. The town, citadel, and villages forming the territory of the city of Ancona, shall remain in the possession of the French Republic until a continental peace.

IX. The Pope undertakes, for himself and those who shall succeed him, not to transfer to any persons, whomsoever the titles of lordships attached to the territory by him ceded to the French Republic.

X. His Holiness engages to cause to be paid and delivered to the treasurer of the French army, at Foligno, before the 15th of the current month of Ventôse, (5th March, 1797, old style,) the sum of fifteen millions of livres of France; ten millions of which are to be paid in specie, and the remaining five millions in diamonds and other valuable effects; out of the balance of about sixteen millions which remains due, according to article IX. of the armistice signed at Bologna on the 5th of Messidor, year 4, and ratified by his Holiness on the 27th of June.

XI. For the definitive discharge of what will remain to be paid to complete the performance of the armistice signed at Bologna, his Holiness shall furnish the army with 800 cavalry horses, harnessed, 800 draught horses, oxen, and buffaloes, and other articles the produce of the States of the Church.

XII. Independently of the sum specified in the preceding articles, the Pope shall pay to the French Republic, in coin, diamonds, and other valuables, the sum of fifteen millions of livres Tournois of France; ten millions to be paid in the course of the month of March, and five millions in the course of the month of April next.

XIII. Article VIII. of the treaty of armistice signed at Bologna, concerning manuscripts and works of art, shall be fully executed as speedily as possible.

XIV. The French army shall evacuate Umbria, Perugia, and Camerino, as soon as the tenth article of the present treaty shall be executed and accomplished.

XV. The French army shall evacuate the province of Macerata, with the exception of Ancona, Fano, and their territories, as soon as the first five millions of the sum mentioned in article XII of the present treaty shall have been paid and delivered.

XVI. The French army shall evacuate the ter-

ritory of the town of Fano and the duchy of Urbino, as soon as the second five millions of the sum mentioned in article XII. of the present treaty shall have been paid and delivered, and articles III., X., XI., and XIII. shall have been executed.

The last five millions, forming part of the sum stipulated by article XII. shall be paid, at latest, in the course of April next.

XVII. The French Republic cedes to the Pope all its rights in the different religious foundations in the cities of Rome and Loretto; and the Pope cedes in full property to the French Republic all the allodial estates belonging to the Holy See in the three provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna; and particularly the estate of La Mezzola and its dependencies. The Pope nevertheless reserves to himself, in case of sale, the third of the produce thereof, which is to be remitted to his agents.

XVIII. His Holiness shall cause his Minister at Paris to disavow the murder committed on the body of the secretary of legation Basseville.

His Holiness shall also pay, in the course of the year, the sum of 300,000 livres, to be divided amongst the sufferers on that occasion.

XIX. His Holiness shall cause all persons detained in prison on account of their political opinions to be set at liberty.

XX. On receipt of the ratification of the present treaty, the General-in-chief shall give permission to all prisoners of war taken in his Holiness's service, to return to their homes.

XXI. Until a treaty of commerce shall be concluded between the French Republic and the Pope, the commerce of the Republic shall be re-established and maintained in his Holiness's states, upon the footing of the most favoured nation.

XXII. Conformably to article VI. of the treaty concluded at the Hague, on the 27th of Floreal, year 3, the peace concluded by the present treaty, between the French Republic and his Holiness, is declared common to the French Republic.

XXIII. The French post shall be re-established at Rome, in the same manner as it formerly existed.

XXIV. The school of arts instituted at Rome for all Frenchmen shall be re-established, and continue its proceedings as before the war: the palace belonging to the Republic, in which this school was conducted, shall be restored without dilapidation.

XXV. All the articles, clauses, and conditions of the present treaty, without exception, are obligatory in perpetuity both on his Holiness Pope Pius VI. and on his successors.

XXVI. The present treaty shall be ratified with the least possible delay.

Done and signed at head-quarters at Tolentino, by the above-named plenipotentiaries, on the first of Ventôse, in the 5th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible. (19th February, 1797.)

(Signed,) BONAPARTE—CACCAULT—Cardinal
MATTEI—L. GALEPPI—L. Duca
BRASCHI-ONLSRI—and CAMILLO,
Marquis Massimi.

Napoleon long insisted that the Court of Rome should undertake to suppress the Inquisition. It was represented to him that the Inquisition was no longer what it had been; that it was now rather a tribunal of police than of religious belief; that *autos-da-fé* no longer existed. He appreciated these arguments at their just value; but he gave up this article to gratify the Pope, who attached great importance to it, and explained himself on the subject in his private correspondence. He contented himself with the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, with Romagna, and the occupation of Ancona by a French garrison. This was also in consequence of the principle which had induced him to respect the temporal existence of the Pope. Had he, according to the wishes of the patriots of the Transpadan republic, added to their new state the duchy of Urbino, Ancona, the province

of Ferrara and Macerata, and extended its boundaries to the Tronto and the Apennines, it would have been placed in contact with Naples. A war with that power would infallibly have been the result; it must have taken place, even though France and the Court of Naples had not wished it.

The importance attached by this Court to these stipulations was such, that Prince Pignatelli, its minister, followed the French staff from Bologna; which is a sufficient proof of his apprehensions. This prince was not deficient either in intellect or activity, but he would do any thing to gain information: He was several times caught listening at doors, particularly at Loretto, and during the negotiations of Tolentino; thus exposing himself to be turned out by the porters. The peace stopped the march of the French troops.

IX.

After the signature of the treaty, the General-in-chief entrusted General Victor with the superintendence of its execution, despatched his aide-de-camp, Colonel Junot, with a respectful letter to the Pope, and set out for Mantua. This letter and the answer of his Holiness, which were published, formed a contrast to the language then in general use, and were accordingly remarked.

Mantua had now been a month in the power of

the Republic ; its hospitals were all crowded with the Austrian sick. Napoleon alighted at the ducal palace, where he remained several days. A great number of very fine pictures had been found in this city ; he had them sent to the Museum of Paris. The fine frescoes of the war of the Titans by Titian, in the palace del T, excited the admiration of connoisseurs. The committee of artists presented several plans for removing and transporting them to Paris ; but such an attempt must have exposed these extraordinary works to imminent hazard of loss and destruction. Napoleon had an arsenal of construction established, and directed General Chasseloup, who commanded the engineers, to improve the fortifications. The weak side, at that period, was that towards La Pratella and Pietoli. Works were immediately commenced, and carried on without remission, in order to place it on an equality with the other parts. The General-in-chief gave all proper orders for the armament of the place. He then proceeded to Milan, the centre of the administration and policy of Italy. *Public spirit had there made great progress.*

X.

At the time of the battle of Arcole the French government imagined that Italy was lost, which led it to reflect seriously on the effect that cir-

cumstance was likely to produce on the state of France. People were indignant at the incomprehensible circumstance that the whole burthen, and consequently all the glory, was left to a single army. The Army of Italy also complained loudly, and at length the government began to think seriously of sending succours to its relief. The Directory ordered one division of six regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, from the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, and a similar force from the Army of the Rhine, to pass the Alps, in order to enable the Army of Italy to fight on an equality with the enemy in the expected new contest. This army was then menaced by the forces which were destroyed at Rivoli. The march of these reinforcements was delayed by several circumstances. Meantime the distress to which Mantua was reduced hastened Alvinzi's operations; so that these reinforcements had only just reached the foot of the Alps, when the victories of Rivoli and La Favorite, and the surrender of Mantua, placed Italy beyond the reach of danger. It was not until Napoleon's return from Tolentino that he reviewed his new forces. They were fine troops, in good condition, and well disciplined. The division of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by Bernadotte, had suffered little desertion on its march; that of the Rhine, commanded by Delmas, was weaker, and

had lost more men by desertion. This detachment was estimated at 30,000 men; but its actual strength did not exceed 19,000. The Army of Italy was henceforth equal to any enterprise; and sufficiently powerful, alone, to undertake to force the cabinet of Vienna to renounce its alliance with England.

CHAPTER XVI.

CORSICA.

- I. Historical remarks on Corsica to 1729.—II. War of independence in 1729.—III. Pascal Paoli, 1755.—IV. Treaty of Paris, 1768.—V. Campaigns of 1768 and 1769.—VI. French administration.—VII. Effects of the revolution of 1769.—VIII. The King of England assumes the title of King of Corsica.—IX. The English are driven from the island, 1789.—X. Topographical Description of Corsica.

I.

THE history of Charlemagne is full of obscurities, which the best informed critics have not been able to clear up. It would, therefore, be superfluous to inquire what was passing in Corsica in the time of that prince. Philippini, the author of the most ancient chronicle of that island, lived in the fifteenth century; he was archdeacon of Aleria. Towards the end of the last century, Lampridi wrote a very voluminous history of the revolutions of that country, at Rome. He was a man of talent and an eminent scholar. Several other histories appeared about the same time, in Tuscany and other parts of Italy. We have in

France a great number of writings relating to Corsica, under the titles of Travels, Mémoires, Revolutions, and History. Public curiosity has been excited by the struggle which this people has maintained in order to resist oppression, and to establish its independence.

The Arabs of Africa were long the masters of Corsica. The arms of this kingdom are still a death's head, with a bandage over the eyes, on a white ground. The Corsicans distinguished themselves at the battle of Ostia, where the Saracens were beaten, and obliged to relinquish their views on Rome. There are persons who are of opinion that these arms were then given them by Pope Leo X., in acknowledgment of their valour.

Corsica is thought to have formed part of the donations of Constantine and Charlemagne; but what is more certain is, that this island was included in the inheritance of the Countess Matilda. The Colonnas of Rome pretend that in the ninth century, one of their ancestors conquered Corsica from the Saracens, and reigned as king there. The Colonnas of Itria and Cinerca have been acknowledged by the Colonnas of Rome and the genealogists of Versailles; but the historical fact of the sovereignty of a branch of the Colonna family in Corsica remains, nevertheless, problematical. It appears, however, certain that

Corsica formed the twelfth kingdom acknowledged in Europe; a title which these islanders were proud of, and never would renounce. It was by virtue of this title that the Doge of Genoa wore the royal crown. At the most enthusiastic moments of their zeal for liberty, they reconciled these opposite ideas by declaring the Holy Virgin their queen. Traces of this expedient appear in the deliberations of several councils; amongst others, of that held at the Convent of La Vinso-lasca.

Corsica, like all the rest of Italy, was subjected to the feudal system; every village had its lord; but the affranchisement of the communes was effected there fifty years earlier than the general movement which took place in Italy in the eleventh century. There are still to be seen, on steep rocks, ruins of castles which tradition represents as the refuge of the lords during the war of the communes in the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. The Liamone party, as it was called, and especially the province of La Rocca, had the principal direction of the affairs of the island. But in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the *Pieves*, called *pieves* of the lands of the communes, or of La Castagnichia, were in turn preponderant in the councils or assemblies of the nation.

Pisa was the continental city nearest to Cor-

sica : the *Pisans* began to trade with that island, established factories there, extended their influence by degrees, and at last subjected the whole island to their government. Their administration was mild, and suitable to the wishes and opinions of the islanders, who served them with zeal in their wars against Florence. Their enormous power ended at the battle of La Malaria; and the greatness of Genoa, to which state the commerce of Pisa devolved, arose out of the ruins of the latter city. The Genoese established themselves in Corsica. This was the commencement of the miseries of that country, which thenceforth constantly increased. The senate of Genoa, not having been able to engage the affections of the inhabitants, endeavoured to weaken and divide them, and to keep them in poverty and ignorance.

The picture which the Corsican writers have drawn of the crimes of the administration of the oligarchs of Genoa, is one of the most revolting that the history of man affords; and the antipathy and animosity of these islanders towards the Genoese are also unexampled.

France, although so near Corsica, had never pretended to the government of the island. It has indeed been asserted, that Charles Martel sent one of his lieutenants thither against the Saracens; but this is very apocryphal. Henry II.

sent an army into Corsica under the command of Marshal de Thermes, the famous San Pietro Ornano, and one of the Orsini; but they remained only a few years. Old Andrew Doria, although eighty-five years of age, reconquered this island for his country.

Spain, divided into several kingdoms, and solely occupied in her wars with the Moors, entertained no views on Corsica until a very late period; and was then diverted from them by her wars in Sicily.

II.

The *Pieves* of the lands of the communes Rosmino, Ampugnani, Orezza, and La Penta, were the first that rose against the government of the Senate of Genoa: the other *Pieves* of Castagnichia, and all the other provinces of the island, gradually followed their example. This war, which began in 1729, ended in 1769, in the annexation of Corsica to the French monarchy; the contest having lasted forty years. The Genoese levied Swiss armies, and several times had recourse to the greater powers, taking auxiliary troops into their pay. Thus the Emperor of Germany sent into Corsica first Baron Wachtendorf, and afterwards the Prince of Wurtemberg; and Louis XV. sent Count Boissieux, and afterwards Marshal Maillebois. The Genoëse and Swiss armies suffered

several defeats. Waechtendorf and Boissieux were beaten; the Prince of Wurtemberg and Maillebois both obtained successes and subdued the country; but they left the fire under the ashes, and immediately after their departure the war was renewed, and raged with increased fury. Old Giafferi, the Canon Orticone, a man of address and eloquence, Hyacinth Paoli, Cinnaldi, and Gafforio, were successively at the head of affairs, which they conducted with various degrees of success, but always honourably and under the guidance of the noblest sentiments. The sovereignty of the country resided in a council composed of the deputies of the *Pieres*, which decided on war and peace, and decreed the taxes and levies of militia. There were no paid troops, but the names of all the citizens, capable of bearing arms were inscribed in three rolls in each commune, and they marched against the enemy at the call of their leader. Arms, ammunition, and provisions were provided by each individual.

. It is difficult to comprehend the policy of Genoa. Why so much obstinacy in so burthensome a struggle? She should either have given up Corsica, or satisfied the inhabitants. Had she inscribed the principal inhabitants in her golden book, and adopted the contrary system to that which had proved so unsuccessful, and which

she had never been able to establish, she would have gained the affections of the Corsicans. It has often been said in the senate: "The militia of Corsica are more able to possess themselves of Genoa than you are to conquer their mountains. Acquire the attachment of these islanders by a just government, flatter their ambition and vanity; you will thereby gain a nursery of good soldiers, who will be serviceable in guarding your capital, and preserve factories of great value to your commerce." The proud oligarchy replied: "We cannot treat the Corsicans more favourably than the people of the two *Rivieras*. The Golden Book, then, is to be principally filled with the names of provincial families! This would be a total subversion of our constitution; it is a proposal to abandon the inheritance left to us by our forefathers. The Corsicans are not formidable; all their successes are owing to our errors. By pursuing more prudent measures it will be easy for us to subdue this handful of rebels, who are without artillery, discipline, or order."

The Corsicans, in all their councils, of which they sometimes held several in a year, published manifestoes in which they enumerated their ancient and fresh complaints against their oppressors. Their object was to interest Europe in their cause, and also to rouse the patriotism of the nation. Several of these manifestoes, drawn

up by Orticone, are full of energy, logic, and noble sentiments.

Erroneous notions prevail respecting King Theodore. The Baron Neuhoff was a Westphalian. He landed on the coast of Aleria, with four transports laden with musquets, powder, shoes, &c. The expenses of this armament were defrayed by private individuals and Dutch speculators. This unexpected assistance, arriving at the moment of the greatest discouragement, seemed to have descended from Heaven. The chiefs proclaimed the German baron king, representing him to the people as a great European prince, whose arrival was a pledge of the powerful succours they should soon receive. This artifice had the effect they intended to produce; it operated on the multitude for eighteen months: at length it was worn out, and Baron Neuhoff returned to the Continent. He again appeared several times on the shores of the island with important succours, for which he was indebted to the Court of Sardinia and the Bey of Tunis. This is a curious episode of this memorable war, and shews the resources of every kind possessed by the leading characters of the country.

• III.

In 1755, Pascal Paoli was declared First Magistrate and General of Corsica. He was the

son of Hyacinth Paoli, had been educated at Naples, and was a captain in the service of the king Don Carlos. The *Pieve* of Rostino appointed him deputy to the Council of Alesani. His family was very popular. He was tall, young, handsome, deeply learned, and eloquent. The Council divided into two parties: one of them, that of the most zealous patriots, and most hostile to any accommodation, proclaimed him chief and general. The Moderates set up Matras, the deputy for Fiumorbo, in opposition to him. The two parties came to action: Paoli was defeated, and obliged to shut himself up in the Convent of Alesani. His case appeared desperate; his rival's troops surrounded him. But as soon as the news reached the *Pieves* of the communes, all the peaks of the mountains blazed with fires; the caverns and forests echoed with the mournful sound of the horn, the signal of war. Matras wished to anticipate the formidable militia; he attacked the Convent by assault. With his natural impetuosity he rushed on foremost, and fell mortally wounded. All parties thenceforth acknowledged Paoli. In the course of a few months the Council of Alesani was recognized by all the *Pieves*. Paoli displayed great talents: he conciliated opinions, he governed on fixed principles, created schools and an university, gained the friendship of Algiers and the

Barbarians, created a navy of light vessels, had agents in the maritime towns, and made himself popular amongst their inhabitants. In a naval expedition he possessed himself of Capraja, and drove out the Genoese, who were even apprehensive that the Corsicans would land in the *Riviera*. He did all that it was possible to do under the circumstances of the moment, and with the nation which he ruled. He was on the point of gaining possession of the five ports of the island, when the Senate of Genoa, seriously alarmed; had recourse for the third time to France. In 1764, six French battalions occupied the maritime towns, which, under their protection, continued to acknowledge the authority of the Senate.

These French garrisons remained neutral, and took no part in the war which continued between the Corsicans and Genoese. The French officers openly professed sentiments most friendly to the islanders and hostile to the oligarchs, which completed the alienation of the towns from their cause. The troops were to return to France in 1768: this moment was impatiently expected; it would have left no trace of the authority of Genoa in the island. But the Duke de Choiseul conceived the idea of annexing Corsica to France. This nequisition seemed to him important, as a natural dependence on Provence, calculated to

protect the commerce of the Levant, and to facilitate future operations in Italy. After much hesitation, the Senate consented; and Spinola, its ambassador at Paris, signed a treaty by which the two powers agreed, that the King of France should subdue and disarm the Corsicans, and reign over them, until the Republic should be in a situation to reimburse him the expenses which this conquest might occasion. Now it required above 30,000 men to subdue and disarm the island; and it was necessary to maintain numerous garrisons there for several years. The expenses, therefore, would necessarily amount to a sum which the Republic of Genoa neither could nor would repay.

Both the contracting parties perfectly understood the matter in this sense; but the oligarchs imagined that by this stipulation they were protecting their honour, and avoiding the odium which they would acquire throughout Italy by wantonly giving up part of the territory to a foreign power. Choiseul also perceived in this arrangement the means of deceiving the English, and of retracting, if necessary, without compromising the honour of France. Louis XV. was averse to a war with England.

The French minister had negotiations opened with Paoli: he required him to induce his country to acknowledge itself subject to the king.

according to the wish which had sometimes been manifested by the more ancient councils, to declare itself a province of the kingdom. Wealth and honours were offered to Paoli as the price of this accommodation; and the great and generous character of the minister with whom he was treating could leave him no anxiety on this point. He rejected all these offers with disdain. He convoked the council, and laid before it the critical state of affairs. He did not pretend to conceal the impossibility of resisting the power of France, and stated that he had vague hopes of the intervention of England, but no positive engagement. There was but one cry, *Liberty or Death!* He urged them not to decide rashly, and represented that such a contest was not to be undertaken without deliberation, or from mere enthusiasm. A youth of twenty*, deputed to the council, decided its resolutions by a speech full of energy: he had lately arrived from Rome and Pisa, and was full of the enthusiasm which the reading of the ancients excited in these schools. "Were it sufficient to will liberty, in order to be free, every nation in the world would be free. Yet few have attained the enjoyment of the blessings of liberty, because few have possessed the energy, courage, and virtues necessary for

* Charles Bonaparte, Napoleon's father.—*Ed.*

that purpose." Others added, that they had been forty years in arms, and had seen their fathers and their children perish fighting for the independence of their country ; a blessing which nature had appointed to them in separating them from all other nations. All appeared particularly indignant at the conduct of France, which, after having often acted as mediator in their quarrel with Genoa, with many protestations of disinterestedness, now appeared as a party concerned, and pretended to believe that the government of Genoa had a right to sell the Corsicans like a flock of sheep, and against the tenor of treaties.

Maillebois, in 1738, had raised the Royal Corsican regiment of two battalions, composed entirely of natives. By means of the officers of this regiment, the principal chiefs were sounded. Many of them proved themselves beyond the reach of corruption ; but a few yielded, and took merit to themselves for advancing to meet a yoke which now appeared inevitable. In order to justify themselves and make proselytes, they said : " Our ancestors resisted the tyranny of the oligarchs of Genoa ; we are now freed from them for ever. If Giafferi, Hyacinth Paoli, Gafforio, Orticone, and all the great men who have fallen in defence of our rights, could now see their country become an integral part of the finest monarchy in Europe, they would rejoice, and

cease to regret the blood they have shed. Open your annals; you have always been the sport of Pisa or Genoa, nations really less powerful than yourselves. All the ports of Provence and Languedoc will now be open to you; you will be respected by the Barbarians; you will be envied by Tuscany, Sardinia, and even Genoa. As French, you may shew yourselves proudly in any part of Europe. It is said, that we must acknowledge that Genoa had a right to sell us; but this is incorrect. Treaties concluded between different powers, in the privacy of their cabinets, do not concern us. Let us realize the wishes of the Council of Calca-Sana, and, by a spontaneous movement, request the King of France to admit us into the number of his children: he will grant us this privilege. Beware of the illusions of the passions: you cannot, without betraying the interest of your countrymen, engage in so unequal a struggle. If you insist that the King of France shall conquer you, he will conquer you; but in that case you cannot stipulate for your privileges, or claim your rights. You will be slaves, by those most incontestable laws which rule the world—force and conquest. France is an assemblage of small states: Provence is not governed like Languedoc, nor Brittany like Lorraine. You may therefore unite all the advantages of liberty and independence with

those attached to an union with the most enlightened nation of Europe, and the protection of the most powerful of her kings."

But writings and speeches of this tendency were not calmly and dispassionately attended to by the patriots and the multitude. "We are invincible in our mountains," said they. "We have defended them against the auxiliary armies of Genoa, the Imperial armies, and even those of France. Let us sustain the first shock, and England will intervene. They talk of the advantages we should gain by declaring ourselves the subjects of the King of France; we do not wish for them. We wish to remain poor, but our own masters, governed by our own laws, and not to be the sport of a clerk from Versailles. They talk of stipulating for our privileges; but the French monarchy is absolute, and founded on the principle—*as wills the king, so wills the law*: it can therefore afford us no guarantee against the tyranny of a subaltern.—*Liberty or Death!*"

The priests and monks were the most enthusiastic. The mass of the people, and especially the mountaineers, had no idea of the power of France. Accustomed to fight, and having often repulsed the petty corps of Count Boissieux and Maillebois, nothing that they had seen excited their fears. They imagined that these feeble detachments were the French armies. The Count

was almost unanimously for war; and the people shared the same sentiments.

V.

The treaty by which Genoa ceded Corsica to the King, excited general disapprobation in France. When it was found, from the resolutions of the Council, that it would be necessary to go to war, and to set in motion a part of the power of France against this little nation, all were indignant at the injustice and ungenerousness of this war. The blood which was to flow was wholly imputed to Choiseul; "for what do we want with Corsica?" said the French: "nothing at all. Did it never exist until now? Why, then, is it now thought of for the first time? We have but one interest in the matter; and that is, that England shall not establish herself there. The rest is indifferent to us. But if this war is not prescribed by necessity, it is still less authorised by justice. Genoa herself has no rights; and if she had, she could not transfer them to foreign powers. When Francis the First ceded Burgundy to Charles the Fifth, by the treaty of Madrid, that province immediately rose in arms, declaring that the King of France had no right to alienate it; and this in the sixteenth century!—What! are men to be sold like herds of cattle? Having interfered in the disputes between Genoa

and the Corsicans, let us extend to the oppressed a protection worthy of the king's greatness. Hence the people of Corsica will become attached to France by the ties of gratitude; France will be spared the commission of an unjust act, the expense of a war, and the trouble of guarding a disaffected country for many years, whilst it winces under the hand of its oppressor. Are our finances, then, in too flourishing a state?—or are the taxes which weigh down the people not heavy enough?"

These vain arguments did not stop the proceedings of the cabinet. Lieutenant-general Chauvelin landed at Bastia, with 12,000 men under his command. He published proclamations, notified orders to the communes, and commenced hostilities; but his troops, after sustaining a defeat at the action of Borgo, and being repulsed in all their attacks, were obliged, at the close of the campaign of 1768, to shut themselves up in their fortresses, communicating only with each other by means of a few cruising frigates. The Corsicans thought themselves saved: they had no doubt but that England would interfere. Paoli himself shared this illusion; but the English ministers, alarmed at the fermentation which appeared in the American colonies, did not wish to go to war. They caused a feeble note to be given in at Versailles, and were satisfied with the

still more insignificant explanations which were given. Some clubs in London sent arms and money; the Court of Sardinia and certain societies in Italy afforded some assistance in secret: but these were feeble resources against the formidable armament which was preparing on the coasts of Provence. The cheek which Chauvelin had sustained was a subject of satisfaction throughout Europe, and especially in France, where people had sense enough to conceive that the national honour was totally unconcerned in a struggle with a handful of mountaineers. Even Louis XV. shewed himself in some degree favourable to the Corsicans: he was far from eager to set this new crown on his head; and he could not be induced to give orders for making preparations for a second campaign, until they represented to him how pleased the philosophers would be to see the great king beaten and forced to retreat by a free people. This would materially affect royal authority. Liberty had its fanatics, who would see miracles in the success of so unequal a contest. There was no longer room for deliberation. Marshal de Vaux sailed for Corsica with 30,000 men; the ports of the island were inundated with troops. The inhabitants, however, defended themselves during part of the campaign of 1769, but without any hope of success. The population of Corsica did

not then exceed 150,000 inhabitants. The French forts and garrisons kept 30,000 of them in check, which left about 20,000 men able to bear arms; from which number were to be deducted all those who belonged to the chiefs who had treated with the agents of the French ministry. The Corsicans fought resolutely at the passage of the Golo. Not having had time to cut down the bridge, which was of stone, they made use of the bodies of their dead to form a retrenchment. Paoli, driven to the south of the island, embarked in an English ship at Porto-Vecchio, landed at Leghorn, crossed the Continent, and repaired to London. He was every where received with tokens of the greatest admiration, both by the people and their princes.

VI.

It was, undoubtedly, impossible for the Corsicans to resist the army of Marshal de Vaux. Yet at one moment he had dispersed all his forces: he had deceived himself; he imagined that the country was subdued and disarmed; but in fact none but old men, women, and children remained in the villages, and nothing but old musquets had been given up on the disarming of the people. All the brave men, inured to arms by forty years' civil war, were wandering in the woods and caverns, or on the tops of

the mountains Corsica is so difficult and extraordinary a country, that a San-Pietro, under such circumstances, might have fallen on each body of the French army separately, prevented them from rallying, and compelled them to shut themselves up in the fortresses, which would certainly have forced the Court of Versailles to change its system. But Paoli did not possess the military *coup-d'ail*, promptitude, and vigour requisite for the execution of such a plan. His brother Clement's warlike virtues would have rendered him more capable of it, had he possessed more genius. Four or five hundred patriots followed Paoli and emigrated, a great number abandoned their villages and houses, and kept up a petty war for several years, cutting off the convoys and stragglers belonging to the army. The inhabitants called them the patriots, the French styled them the banditti. The cruelties they committed entitled them to the latter denomination, although they were never exercised upon the inhabitants.

In 1774, five years after the submission of the island, some of the refugees returned into Corsica, and raised an insurrection in Niohi, a *Picre* situate on the highest mountain. Lieutenant-general the Count de Narbonne-Fitzlar, commanding in the island, marched against the mountaineers with the greater part of the garrison.

He disgraced himself by the cruelties he committed. The *maréchal-de-camp*, Sionville, rendered himself odious to the natives; burning the houses, cutting down the olives and chesnut trees, and pulling up the vines belonging not only to the *banditti*, but to their relations to the third degree. The country was struck with terror, but the inhabitants cherished a deep resentment in secret.

The views of the Court of Versailles were, however, beneficent. The Corsicans were allowed provincial states, composed of three orders: the nobility, clergy, and third estate. The magistracy of the twelve nobles, which the Corsicans had always demanded, was restored. This was a Pisan institution, and a kind of intermediate committee of the states, which regulated the affairs of taxes and the internal administration of the province. Once a year, a bishop, a deputy from the nobles, and a deputy from the third estate, were received at court, carrying directly to the king the memorial of the grievances of the country. Encouragement was afforded to agriculture; the African company of *Marséilles* was compelled to acknowledge ancient customs favourable to the Corsican coral fishers. High roads were formed, and marshes drained. It was even attempted to introduce colonies from *Lorraine* and *Alsace*, in order to set models

of cultivation before the islanders. The taxes were not burthensome; schools were encouraged; the children of the principal families were sent to France to be brought up. It was in Corsica that the economists made the experiment of taxation in kind.

In the course of twenty years, from 1769 to 1789, the island was greatly improved. But all these benefits had no effect on the hearts of the inhabitants, who were any thing but French at the time of the revolution. A lieutenant-general of infantry, who was crossing the mountains, entered into conversation with a shepherd respecting the ingratitude of his countrymen. He enumerated the benefits of the French administration. "In your Paoli's time you paid double what you pay now."—"That is true, Signor; but then we gave it, and now you take it." The native wit of these islanders appears on every occasion. Thousands of their repartees might be mentioned; we will take one at random:—Several titled officers who were travelling in Niolo, were saying one evening to their host, one of the poorest inhabitants of the pieve, "What a difference there is between us Frenchmen and you Corsicans; see how we are clothed and maintained." The peasant rose, looked at them attentively, and asked each of them *his* name. One was a marquis, another a baron, and the third a chevalier.

“ Pooh !” said the peasant, “ I should like to be dressed as you are, I own ; but pray are all the French marquisses, barons, and chevaliers ?”

VII.

The Revolution altered the disposition of these islanders ; they became French in 1790. Paoli then left England, where he lived on a pension allowed him by Parliament, which he abandoned. He was well received by the Constituent Assembly, by the National Guard of Paris, and even by Louis XVI. His arrival in the island produced a general rejoicing ; the whole population flocked to Bastia to see him. His memory was wonderful ; he knew the names of all the families, and had been acquainted with the late heads of them. In a few days he obtained a greater influence over the people than he had ever possessed. The Executive Council appointed him a general of division, and gave him the command of the troops of the line in the island. The National Guards had chosen him to command them. The Electoral Assembly nominated him as president. He thus combined in himself every kind of power. This conduct of the Executive Council was not politic, but it must be ascribed to the spirit of that period. However this may be, Paoli faithfully served the Revolution until the 10th of August. The death of Louis XVI. com-

pleted his dissatisfaction. He was denounced by the popular societies of Provenec; and the Convention, which never hesitated for any consideration whatever, summoned him to its bar. He was nearly eighty years of age. This was a mere invitation to lay down his head on the scaffold. He had no resource but to appeal to his countrymen; and he prevailed on the whole island to revolt against the Convénion. The representatives of the people, commissioned to carry the decree into execution, arrived, under these circumstances. All they could do was to preserve the fortified places of Bastia and Calvi, by the aid of a few battalions. If the determination of the measures to be adopted by Corsica had depended on an assembly of the principal families, Paoli would not have succeeded. The excesses which had been committed in France were generally blamed; but it was thought that they would prove transient, and that it would not be expedient, in order to avoid the inconvenience of the moment, to separate from a country which alone could secure the welfare and tranquillity of the island. Paoli was astonished at the little attention he obtained in private conferences. Many of those very individuals who had followed him to England, where they had spent twenty years in cursing France, were now the most refractory. But amongst the

mass of the people there was but one cry when their ancient leader called upon them. The banner of the death's head was instantly hoisted on every steeple, and Corsica ceased to be French. A few months afterwards the English occupied Toulon. After they were forced to evacuate that place, Admiral Hood anchored at San Fiorenzo; he landed 12,000 men, whom he placed under the command of Nelson. Paoli joined them with 6000 men. They surrounded Bastia. La Combe Saint-Michel and Gentili defended the town with the greatest intrepidity, and it did not capitulate until after a siege of four months. Calvi resisted forty days after the opening of the trenches. General Dundas, who commanded an English corps of 4000 men, and was encamped at San Fiorenzo, refused to take part in the siege of Bastia, not choosing to compromise his troops without the special orders of his government.

VIII.

An extraordinary event now took place. The King of England placed the crown of Corsica upon his head, where it was strangely associated with the crown of Fingal. In June 1794, the Council of Corsica, of which Paoli was president, proclaimed that its political connexion with France was for ever broken off; and that the

crown of Corsica should be offered to the King of England. A députation, of which Galeazzi was president, and Filippo of Vescovato, Negroni of Bastia, and Cesari Rocca of La Rocca, members, proceeded to London; and the king accepted the crown. He appointed Lord Gilbert Elliot viceroy. The Council had at the same time decreed a constitution, to secure the liberties and privileges of the country: it was modelled on that of England. Lord Elliot was a man of merit; he had been governor-general of India; but he soon quarrelled with Paoli. The old man had retired amongst the mountains, where he disapproved of the conduct of the Viceroy, who was influenced by two young men, Pozzo di Borgo and Colonna; one of whom was in his service as a secretary, and the other as an aide-de-camp. Paoli was accused of being of a restless character, of not being able to make up his mind to live as a private individual, and of always wanting to act the part of master of the island. Still the influence he possessed there, which was undisputed, the services which he had rendered to England on this occasion, and the respectability of his character and conduct, induced the English ministers to treat him with great indulgence. He had several conferences with the viceroy and the secretary of state; in one of which, piqued by several of the observations that were made, he said, "This is

my kingdom ; I carried on war against the King of France for two years ; I expelled the republicans : if you violate the privileges and rights of the country, I can still more easily expel your troops." A few months afterwards the King of England wrote him a suitable letter, in which he recommended him, from the interest he felt for his tranquillity and happiness, to go and end his days in a country in which he was respected and had been happy. The secretary of state took this letter to him at Ponte-Lechio. Paoli felt that it was an order ; he hesitated : but there were then no signs of the termination of the reign of terror in France. The army of Italy was still in the county of Nice. In declaring war against the English, Paoli would have exposed himself to the hostility of two great belligerent powers. He submitted to fate, and went to London, where he died in 1807. It is due to his memory to state, that in all his letters from England, during the last eight years of his life, he constantly advised his countrymen never to separate from France ; but to share the fortune, good or bad, of that great nation. He left by his will considerable sums to establish an university at Corte.

Had the English wished to preserve their influence in Corsica, they should have acknowledged the independence of the country, esta-

blished Paoli's power, and granted a few trifling subsidies, in order to preserve a kind of supremacy, as well as privileges of anchorage for their squadrons in the principal roads, especially that of San Fiorenzo. They would then have possessed a point of *appui* in the Mediterranean; they might, in case of need, have raised an auxiliary corps of five or six thousand brave men for service in this sea; and the ports of Corsica would have been at their command. The numerous refugees who were in France would gradually have rallied to a national government; and France herself, at the peace, would readily have sanctioned a state of affairs which public opinion had suggested to Choiseul.

IX.

The Corsicans were extremely dissatisfied with the English governors; they neither understood their language, their habitual gloom, nor their manner of living. Men who were continually intemperate, almost always intoxicated, and of uncommunicative dispositions, exhibited a remarkable contrast to their manners. The difference of religion was also a cause of dislike. This was the first time, since the origin of Christianity, that their territory had been profaned by an heretical worship; and every thing they saw confirmed them in their prejudices against the Pro-

testant religion. Its unceremonious worship, and its naked, dismal temples, could not affect southern imaginations; to which the pomp and splendour of the Catholic religion, its beautiful churches, adorned with pictures and frescoes, and its imposing ceremonies, are so highly agreeable. The English scattered gold profusely; the inhabitants accepted it, but without feeling any gratitude towards the givers.

In the mean time Napoleon entered Milan, and took possession of Leghorn, where he collected all the Corsican refugees, and placed them under the command of Gentili. The enthusiasm of the mountaineers was excited to the highest pitch. In a grand entertainment at Ajaccio, young Colonna was accused of having insulted the bust of Paoli. He was incapable of such an action. The insurrection burst out; the inhabitants of Bogognano intercepted the communications between Bastia and Ajaccio, and surrounded the Viceroy, who had marched against them with a body of troops; he was obliged to abandon his two favourites, and expel them from his camp. Disguised, and escorted by their relations, they reached Bastia, by cross roads, before the Viceroy arrived there. Elliot perceived that it was impossible to think of maintaining his ground in Corsica; he sought an asylum, and took possession of Porto Ferrajo. Gentili and all the refu-

gees landed, in October 1796, in spite of the English cruisers. They called for a general rising of the population. All the summits of the mountains were covered with fires during the night; and the hoarse sound of the horn, the signal of insurrection, was heard in all the valleys. The republicans took possession of Bastia and of all the fortresses. The English hastily embarked, leaving many prisoners behind them. The King of England wore the Corsican crown only two years; and it served but to expose the ambition of his cabinet, and to render him ridiculous. This whim cost the British treasury five millions sterling. John Bull's riches could not have been worse employed.

Corsica formed the twenty-third military division of the Republic. General Vaubois had the command of it. In the beginning of 1798, some ill-disposed characters, under a religious pretext, excited a partial insurrection in Fiumorbo. In order to obtain the sanction of a great name for their proceedings, they placed General Giafferi at their head. General Vaubois marched against them, dispersed them, and took their commander prisoner. He was ninety years of age, and entirely governed by his confessor. He had been brought up at Naples, where he had served, and attained the rank of major-general. He had lived eight years in peaceful retirement in his piece.

Vaubois gave him up to a military commission, which condemned him to death, and he was shot. This tragical event drew tears from the Corsicans: he was the son of the famous Giafferi, who had commanded for thirty years in the war of independence; his name was eminently national. This old man ought to have been regarded as imbecile, and the national vengeance should have fallen only on the hypocritical monk his director.

X.

Corsica is situated at the distance of twenty leagues from the coast of Tuscany, forty from that of Provence, and sixty from that of Spain. It belongs, geographically, to Italy; but as that peninsula does not constitute a power, Corsica naturally becomes an integral part of France. The surface of the island is five hundred square leagues in extent; it contains four maritime towns, Bastia, Ajaccio, Calvi, and Bonifacio; sixty-three pieves or valleys; four hundred and fifty villages or hamlets, and three great roads capable of containing the largest fleets; that is to say, San Fiorenzo, Ajaccio, and Porto Vecchio. The island is mountainous; a chain of lofty granite mountains runs through it from the north-west to the south-east, dividing it into two parts: the highest peaks of this range are perpetually

covered with snow. The three principal rivers are the Golo, the Liamone, and the Tavignano. Rivers and torrents gush from the high mountains, and fall into the sea in all directions; towards their mouths there are little plains of a league or two in circuit. The coast towards Italy, from Bastia to Aleria, is a plain twenty leagues in length, and from three to four in width.

The isle is woody; the plains and hills are or may be covered with olives, mulberry, orange, lemon, and other fruit-trees. The sides of the mountains are clothed with chesnut-trees, amidst which there are villages naturally fortified by their position. On the tops of the mountains are forests of pines, firs, and evergreen oaks; the olive-trees are as large as those of the Levant; the chesnut-trees are enormous, and of the largest species: the pines and firs are not inferior to those of Russia in height and bulk; but as top-masts they will not last above three or four years, becoming dry and brittle after that time; whereas the Russian pine always retains its elasticity and pliancy. Oil, wine, silk, and timber are four great branches of exportation proper to enrich this island. The population is under one hundred and eighty thousand souls; it might be five hundred thousand. The country would supply the corn, chesnuts, and sheep necessary to feed them. Before the inva-

sion of the Saracens, all the sea-shore was peopled. Aleria and Mariana, two Roman colonies, were great cities of sixty thousand souls; but the incursions of the Musulmans in the seventh and eighth centuries, and afterwards those of the Barbary powers, drove the whole population into the mountains. Hence the plains became uninhabited, and of course unhealthy.

Corsica is a beautiful country in the months of January and February; but in the dog-days it becomes dry; water grows scarce, especially in the plains; the inhabitants are then very fond of taking up their residences on the sides of the hills, whence they descend into the low grounds in winter, either to graze their flocks, or to cultivate the plains.

San Fiorenzo is designated by nature to be the capital of the island, the point of *appui* for its defence, the centre of all the magazines, and of the administration; its roads being the best and the nearest to Toulon. This point alone ought to be regularly fortified; and coast batteries only ought to be allowed in the other towns. The air of San Fiorenzo is at present unwholesome; not in the roads, but in the spot where the little town is situated: it would not, however, be difficult to dry up the marshes. Part of the population of Bastia, which is only a few leagues distant, would naturally resort to this new town.

Next to San Fiorenzo, Ajaccio is the fittest place for the capital, and the centre of government and defence, because its roads are the second on the Toulon side, and, except San Fiorenzo, the nearest to Toulon. It was from Italian views that Bastia was made the capital, being the town nearest to Italy; but its direct communication with France is subject to difficulties; the ships being obliged to double Cape Corso. Bastia, moreover, has no roads, and its port is only capable of receiving merchant shipping. Fortifications would be useless to any other town than San Fiorenzo or Ajaccio, because it would be impossible to defend them against an enemy who was master of the sea, and because the national guards are sufficient to guard the interior of the island. In case of attack, the troops of the line ought to concentrate themselves in a single maritime place, in order to protract their defence and wait for succours.

The most urgent wants of Corsica are: 1st, A good code of rural laws, to protect agriculture against injuries from the cattle, and to destroy the goats. 2dly, The draining of the marshes, to recall the population gradually to the sea-coast. 3dly, Premiums for the encouragement of planting, and the grafting of olives and mulberry-trees; which ought to be double for plantations by the sea-side. 4thly, A just but severe police; and

a general and absolute disarming, as well with respect to great as small arms, such as stilettoes and poniards. 5thly, Two hundred places exclusively reserved for young Corsicans, in the lyceums, military schools, seminaries, veterinary schools, and schools of agriculture, arts, and trades in France. 6thly, A regular exportation of timber for the use of the navy; and consequently the foundation of towns by the sea-side and at the entrance of the forests; for it ought to be the constant aim of the government to draw the population into the plains.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE TAGLIAMENTO.

I. Plan of the campaign for 1797.—II. Passage of the Piave, (March 12).—III. Battle of the Tagliamento, (March 16).—IV. Retreat of Prince Charles.—V. Action of Gradisca, (March 19).—VI. Passage of the Julian Alps and the Drave, (March 29).—VII. Actions in the Tyrol

I.

THE reverses which the two armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine had sustained in the late campaign, the timid conduct of those two armies during the siege of Kehl and the *l'île-de-pont* of Hunigen, had encouraged the Aulic Council, and rendered it perfectly confident of security on this side. Towards the end of February they detached six divisions of their best troops of the Rhine, amounting to 40,000 men, and ordered four of them into Friuli and two into the Tyrol. Prince Charles, who had lately acquired the most brilliant glory in Germany, took the

command of the Austrian armies of Italy, and advanced his head-quarters to Inspruck on the 6th of February, whence he soon transferred them successively to Villach and Goritz. In the course of February his engineers visited the debouchés of the Julian and Noric Alps. They projected fortifications which they were to construct as soon as the snow should be melted. Napoleon was impatient to anticipate them, and ardently hoped to attack the Archduke and chase him out of Italy before the arrival of the powerful reinforcements which were marching through Germany.

Napoleon's army was composed of eight divisions of infantry and a reserve of cavalry, consisting of the following troops under arms, viz. 53,000 infantry, 3000 artillery serving 120 guns, and 5000 cavalry. The King of Sardinia's contingent amounted to 8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty pieces of cannon. Napoleon had long been negotiating for the purpose of engaging Venice to enter into alliance with France; and the Venetian contingent was to be similar to that of Piedmont. Thus he expected to enter Germany with 70,000 infantry, 9000 cavalry, and 160 pieces of cannon. But the Directory, with the strangest infatuation, refused to ratify the armistice of Bologna, and thus deprived the French army of the Sardinian contingent. The Venetian Senate

refused all proposals of alliance, and even betrayed so hostile a disposition that it became necessary for the French to be on their guard; and thus they were not only disappointed of the Venetian contingent, but obliged to leave 10,000 men in reserve on the Adigo, to secure the rear, and watch the inimical proceedings of the oligarchy of Venice. Napoleon, therefore, had but 50,000 men to enter Germany with; and of these 5000 were cavalry and 2500 artillery. He had thought that the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine would have been united in one army of 120,000 men, and would have marched from Strasburg into Bavaria, passed the Inn, arrived on the Ens, and joined the army of Italy, which, crossing the Tagliamento, the Julian Alps, Carinthia, the Drave, and the Muer, would have directed its march on the Simering; and that the French, thus united to the number of near 200,000 men, would have entered Vienna, whilst an army of observation of 60,000 men guarded Holland, blockaded Erhenbrenstein, Mentz, Mannheim, and Philisburg, and defended the *têtes-de-pont* of Dusseldorf, Kell, and Huningen. But the Directory, persisting in their false principles of war, continued to keep the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine separate; the experience of the last campaign was lost upon them.

There are three high roads from Italy to

Vienna: 1st., that of the Tyrol; 2dly, that of Ponteba or of Carinthia; 3dly, that of Carniola.

The first runs from Verona along the left bank of the Adige as far as Trent, crosses the high chain of the Alps at the pass of the Brenner, sixty leagues from Verona, and thence proceeds, by Salzburg, towards the Danube, and descends that river as far as Vienna, crossing the Ens in its way. By this road it is 170 leagues from Verona to Vienna.

The second road runs through the Vicentine and the Trevisan, passes the Piave, the Tagliamento, the Ponteba, and the Carnic Alps at the pass of Tarwis; whence it descends into Carinthia, crosses the Drave at Villach, runs through Klagenfurth, the capital of the province, meets the Muer, which it follows as far as Bruck, crosses the Simering, and descends into the valley of Vienna. It is 95 leagues by this road from San-Daniele to Vienna.

The Carniolan road crosses the Isonzo at Gradisca, runs towards Laybach, the capital of the province, passes the Drave at Marburg, enters Styria, passes through Gratz, the capital of that province, and joins the Carinthian road at Bruck. It is 105 leagues from Goritz to Vienna by this road.

The Tyrolese road communicates with that of Carinthia by five cross roads. The first, called the Pusterthal, commences at Brixen, turns to

the right, meets one of the tributary streams of the Adige, runs through Lienz and Spital, and joins the road of Carniola, near Villach; it is forty-five leagues in length. The second begins at Salzburg, runs through Rastadt, and likewise goes to Spital, being thirty-two leagues in extent. Four leagues below Rastadt there is a branch from this road which runs along the Muer as far as Scheifling, where it meets the Carinthian road: this branch runs sixteen leagues. The third road begins at Linz on the Danube, passes the Ens near Rotenmann, crosses some high mountains, and after running thirty-six leagues falls into the Carinthian road at Judenburg. The fourth begins at Ens, runs up the Ens twenty leagues, and ends at Leoben, being twenty-eight leagues in length. And the fifth, of twenty-four leagues, begins at Saint-Polten, and runs to Bruck.

The roads of Carinthia and Carniola communicate together by three cross roads. The first commences at Goritz, runs up the Isonzo, through Caporetto and Austrian Chiusa, and joins the Carinthian road at Tarwis, after a course of twenty-one leagues. The second begins at Laybach, crosses the Save and Drave, and runs to Klagenfurth, being seventeen leagues in length. The third leads from Marburg, along the Drave, to Klagenfurth, a distance of twenty-six leagues.

Beyond Klagenfurth the Carinthian and Carniolan roads have no further communication; they proceed in a parallel direction at a distance of twenty-nine leagues from each other, as far as Bruck, where they join.

In the beginning of March the Archduke's army was 50,000 strong; it was behind the Piave, covering Friuli, except 15,000 men, who were in the Tyrol. This army was to be joined in the course of April by six divisions, which had commenced their march from the Rhine; which reinforcement would have made it upwards of 90,000 men. So great a superiority justified the flattering hopes of the cabinet of Vienna. The French army, at the same period, was stationed as follows: the three divisions of Delmas, Baraguay d'Hilliers, and Joubert, and General Dumas' brigade of cavalry, were united in the Italian Tyrol, under the command of Lieutenant-general Joubert, and formed a corps of 17,000 men. The divisions of Massena, Serrurier, Guieux (formerly Augereau,) and Bernadotte, with General Dugua's division of cavalry of reserve, were in junction in the Bassanese and Trevisan countries, having advanced posts along the right bank of the Piave. Victor's division was still on the Apennines; it was expected to reach the Adige in the beginning of April, to form the nucleus of the corps of observation opposed to

the Venetians; it was estimated that the successive arrivals of the French marching battalions, and of the Lombard, Cispadan, and Polish battalions, would increase this corps-d'armée to 20,000 men.

When it was found that the Archduke had arrived at Inspruck on the 6th of February, it was concluded that he would collect all his forces in the Tyrol, and content himself with detaching a division of 6000 men behind the Tagliamento. This would have enabled the six divisions detached from the Rhine to join his army twenty days earlier; he might then have attacked General Joubert, forced him in his positions of the Lavis, and driven him into Italy. In the beginning of February the General-in-chief had informed General Joubert of his danger, and on this hypothesis had ordered him to choose three positions between the Lavis and the line of Torbolo and Mori, where, with his corps-d'armée, he might retard the Archduke's march, and gain eight or ten days, so as to give the divisions which were on the Brenta time to take the Archduke's army in flank, by the gorges of the Brenta.

II.

But the Archduke, abiding by the plan which had been laid down for him by the Aulic Council, had assembled his principal forces in Friuli,

which gave the French army an opportunity of attacking him before the arrival of the divisions of the Rhine, which were still twenty days' march behind. Napoleon consequently fixed his head-quarters at Bassano on the 9th of March. He addressed his army, by means of the order of the day, in these terms: "Soldiers! The taking of Mantua has now put an end to the war of Italy, which has given you eternal claims to the gratitude of your country. You have been victorious in fourteen pitched battles and seventy actions; you have taken 100,000 prisoners, 500 field-pieces, 2000 heavy cannon, and four pontoon-trains. The contributions laid on the countries you have conquered have fed, maintained, and paid the army; besides which you have sent thirty millions to the minister of finance for the use of the public treasury. You have enriched the Museum of Paris with 300 masterpieces of the arts of ancient and modern Italy, which it has required thirty centuries to produce. You have conquered for the Republic the finest countries in Europe. The Transpadan and Cispadan Republics are indebted to you for their liberty. The French flag waves, for the first time, on the shores of the Adriatic, opposite the native country of Alexander, and within twenty-four hours' sail of it. The kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Pope, and the Duke of

Parma are separated from the coalition. You have expelled the English from Leghorn, Genoa, and Corsica—Yet higher destinies await you!!! You will prove yourselves worthy of them!!! Of all the foes who combined to stifle the Republic in its birth, the Emperor alone remains before you. He has now no other policy or will than those of that perfidious cabinet, which, unacquainted with the horrors of war, smiles with satisfaction at the woes of the continent. The Executive Directory has spared no effort to give peace to Europe, and the moderation of its proposals was uninfluenced by the strength of its armies. It has not been listened to at Vienna; there is therefore no hope of obtaining peace, but by seeking it in the heart of the hereditary states. You will there find a brave people. You will respect their religion and manners, and protect their property. It is liberty that you carry to the brave Hungarian nation."

It was necessary to pass the Piave and the Tagliamento in the presence of the Austrian army, and to turn its right, in order to anticipate it at the gorges of Ponteba. Massena marched from Bassano, passed the Piave in the mountains, beat Lusignan's division, pursued him closely, took six hundred prisoners, including General Lusignan, and several pieces of cannon, and drove the wreck of this division beyond the Tagliamento.

taking Feltre, Cadore, and Belluno. Serrurier's division advanced, on the 12th of March, on Asolo, passed the Piave at day-break, marched on Conegliano, where the Austrian head-quarters were, and thus turned all the divisions which defended the lower part of the Piave, which allowed Guieux's division to effect its passage at two in the afternoon, at Ospedaletto, before Treviso. The river is pretty deep at this spot, and a bridge would have been desirable; but the good-will of the soldiers supplied that deficiency. A drummer was the only person in danger, and he was saved by a woman who swam after him. On the same day, Serrurier's division and that of Guieux encamped, with the head-quarters, at Conegliano. Bernadotte's division, which was at Padua, joined on the following day. The enemy had chosen the plains of the Tagliamento for his field of battle; they were favourable to his excellent and numerous cavalry. His rear-guard attempted to make a stand at Sacile, at night, but was overthrown, on the 13th, by General Guieux.

III.

On the 16th of March, at nine o'clock in the morning, the two armies met: The French army with its staff, arrived before Valvasone on the right bank of the Tagliamento; Guieux's divi-

sion forming the left, Serrurier's the centre, and Bernadotte's the right. The Austrian army, nearly equal in force, was drawn up in the same order on the opposite bank. By this position it did not cover the road of the Ponteba. Orskay's column, and the remains of Lusignan's division were no longer able to stop Massena. Yet the Ponteba road was the shortest, and the natural direction to cover Vienna.

This conduct of the Archduke can only be explained by supposing that he feared only for Trieste, the centre of the naval establishments of Austria; or, that his positions were not definitively taken, and that being covered by the Tagliamento, he was in hopes to gain a few days, which would have allowed time for a division of grenadiers on its march from the Rhine, and which had reached Klagenfurth, to reinforce Orskay's division, which was opposed to Massena.

The cannonade began from one bank of the Tagliamento to the other; the light cavalry made several charges on the beach of that torrent. The French troops, seeing the enemy too well prepared, ceased firing, formed the bivouacs, and prepared their mess. The Archduke was deceived by this appearance; he thought that as they had marched all night, they were taking up a position. He fell back, and returned into his camp.

But two hours afterwards, when all was quiet, the French army suddenly got under arms. Duphot, at the head of the 27th light demi-brigade, being Guieux's van, and Murat with the 15th light demi-brigade, Bernadotte's van, each supported by its division, each regiment with its second battalion deployed, and its first and third in column by divisions, at platoon distance, rushed into the river. The enemy flew to arms; but the whole of this first line had already passed in the finest order, and was drawn up in line of battle on the left bank. The cannonade and musquetry began in all directions. The light cavalry attached to these two divisions was on the right and left of the line. General Dugua's division of cavalry of reserve, and Serrurier's division, formed the second line, which passed the river as soon as the first line had advanced a hundred toises from the shore. After several hours' fighting, and different charges of infantry and cavalry, the enemy having been repulsed in the attacks of the villages of Gradisca and Crodipo, and finding themselves turned by a successful charge made by Dugua's division, beat a retreat, abandoning eight pieces of cannon and some prisoners to the victors.

At the commencement of the cannonade, Massena had effected his passage at San-Daniele; he met with little resistance, occupied Osopo, the

key of the Ponteba road, which the enemy had neglected, and Venetian Chiùsa. He was thus master of the gorges of the Ponteba; and he forced the remains of Orskay's division to retreat on Tarwis.

IV.

The Archduke being now unable to retreat by way of Carinthia, because Massena occupied Ponteba, resolved to gain that road by way of Udine, Cividale, Caporetto, Austrian Chiùsa, and Tarwis. He sent forward three divisions and his parks, under the command of General Bayalitsch, in that direction, and marched with the rest of his army by way of Palma-Nuova and Gradisca, to defend the Isonzo and cover Carniola; but Massena was only two days' march from Tarwis. Bayalitsch was six days' march from that place, by the road he took; this manœuvre therefore placed the *corps-d'armée* under his command in jeopardy, as the Archduke soon perceived. He hastened, in person, to Klagenfurth, placed himself at the head of the division of grenadiers which he found there, and took up a position before Tarwis, to oppose the progress of Massena. This general had been delayed two days, but having received orders to march with all possible expedition upon Tarwis, he hastened thither accordingly. He found the Archduke's

forces formed in line, consisting of the remains of Orskay's troops, and the fine division of grenadiers from the Rhine. The action was obstinate; the importance of victory was felt on both sides; for the Austrians knew that if Massena made himself master of the debouché of Tarwis, the three Austrian divisions, which were on their march through the valley of the Isonzo, were lost. The Prince exposed himself to the greatest dangers, and was repeatedly on the point of being taken by the French skirmishers. General Brune, afterwards a marshal of France, who commanded a brigade of Massena's division, behaved on this occasion with distinguished bravery. The Austrians were broken; they had engaged their very last battalion in the action; they could operate no retreat; the remains of their force made for Villach, beyond the Drave, in order to rally there. Massena, being master of Tarwis, occupied that place, facing towards Villach and Austrian Chiusa; in which directions the three divisions which had been ordered to take this route from the field of the battle of the Tagliamento, were expected to debouch.

V.

The day after the battle of the Tagliamento, the Archduke's head-quarters had entered Palma-Nuova, a fortress belonging to the Venetians.

He had established magazines there, but judging that it would be necessary to leave five or six thousand men to guard the place, his artillery not having arrived, he evacuated it. The French left a garrison in it, and secured it from a *coup-de-main*. Bernadotte's division appeared before Gradisca, in order to pass the Isonzo, but found the gates shut, and was greeted with a cannonade. The Governor refused to parley. The General-in-chief then proceeded, with Serrurier, to the left bank of the Isonzo, by the Montefaleone road. It would have occupied too much valuable time to construct a bridge. Colonel Andreossi, the director of bridges, was the first to throw himself into the Isonzo, in order to sound the depth: the columns followed his example; the soldiers passed the river up to the middle in water, under the fire of the musquetry of two battalions of Croats, who were routed. Having thus effected the passage, Serrurier's division proceeded to Gradisca, and arrived opposite that place at five o'clock in the evening. During this march, a brisk fire of musquetry was kept up on the right bank, where Bernadotte was engaged. This general had imprudently attempted to take the place by assault, and had lost upwards of four hundred men; but the excuse for this excessive ardour was the eagerness of the troops of the Sambre and Meuse to distinguish themselves, and to

reach Gradisca before the old troops of the Army of Italy. When the Governor of Gradisca perceived Serrurier on the heights, he capitulated, and surrendered prisoner of war with 3000 men, two standards, and twenty field-pieces, with their teams. Head-quarters were at Goritz the next day. Bernadotte's division marched on Laybach; General Dugua, with 1000 horse, took possession of Trieste. Serrurier marched from Goritz up the Isonzo, through Caporetto and Austrian Chiusa, to support General Guieux, and regain the Carinthian road at Tarwis.

General Guieux had marched from the field of the Tagliamento on Udine and Cividale, and entered the road of the Isonzo at Caporetto: he had had brisk actions every day with Bayalitsch's rear guard, killed a great number of men, made many prisoners, and taken much baggage and artillery, which had forced the enemy to precipitate their march. On reaching Chiusa di Pletz, the Austrians thought themselves safe, for they did not know that Massena had been two days in possession of Tarwis. They were attacked in front by Massena, and in the rear by Guieux. The position of Chiusa, although strong, could not withstand the 4th of the line (called *the impetuous*). This demi-brigade climbed the mountain that commands the left, and thus turning this important post, left Bayalitsch no resource

but to lay down his arms. His baggage, guns, park, and colours, were all taken. The prisoners, however, did not amount to more than 5000, because a great number of men had been killed, wounded, or taken, in different actions, since the battle of the Tagliamento; and many soldiers, natives of Carniola and Croatia, seeing that all was lost, had disbanded themselves in the passes, and endeavoured to reach their villages singly. The French took thirty-two pieces of cannon, four hundred ammunition and baggage waggons, with their teams, four generals, and many persons employed in the civil department.

VI.

Head-quarters were successively fixed at Caporetto, Tarwis, Villach, and Klagenfurth. The army passed the Drave over Villach bridge, which the enemy had not had time to burn. It was now in the valley of the Drave, having passed the Carnie and Julian Alps; it was in Germany. The language, manners, climate, soil, and state of cultivation, were all different from those of Italy. The soldiers were pleased with the hospitality and simplicity of the peasants: the abundance of vegetables, and the quantities of waggons and horses were very useful; in Italy there were only carts drawn by oxen, whose

slow and clumsy labours did not suit the vivacity of the French. The army occupied the castles of Goritz, Trieste, and Laybach. The two Austrian divisions, under Kaim and Mercantin, which had marched from the Rhine, were in position at Klagenfurth, and attempted to defend that place; the former lost from 4 to 500 men, and was repulsed.

Klagenfurth was surrounded with a bastioned wall, which had for ages been neglected; the engineer officers filled the ditches with water, repaired the parapets, demolished the houses built on the ramparts, and established hospitals and magazines of every kind in the place. As a point of *appui*, at the debouché of the mountains, it seemed important. The following proclamation was published in all the provinces, in French, German, and Italian: "Inhabitants of Carinthia, Carniola, and Istria, the French army does not enter your country to conquer it, or to introduce any alterations in your religion, manners, or customs; it is the friend of all nations, and particularly of the brave Germans. Inhabitants of Carinthia, you, I well know, detest as much as we do, both the English, the only gainers by the present war, and your ministry, which is sold to them. Although we have now been upwards of six years at war, it has been against the wish of the brave Hungarians, of the enlightened citizens

of Vienna, and of the honest, worthy inhabitants of Carinthia, Carniola, and Istria. Well, then, in spite of England and the ministers of the court of Vienna, let us be friends. The French Republic possesses the rights of conquest over you; let them be superseded by a contract mutually binding between us. You will not meddle with a war of which you do not approve! You will supply the wants of my army. On my side, I will protect your property, and require no contribution from you. Is not war of itself sufficiently horrible? Do you not already suffer too much, innocent victims of the passions of others? All the taxes you are accustomed to pay to the emperor will serve to indemnify you for the damage necessarily attending the march of an army, and to pay you for what you may supply me with."

This proclamation produced a good effect; it was faithfully observed on both sides. No extraordinary contribution was levied, and the inhabitants gave no occasion for complaint of any kind. Four governments, composed of the richest proprietors, were organized for the four provinces. The English merchandize at Trieste was confiscated. Quicksilver to the value of several millions was found in the imperial warehouses of the mine of Idria.

VII.

Ten days had elapsed since the campaign had been opened on the banks of the Piave and Tagliamento, and in Friuli, whilst in the Tyrol both armies had remained inactive. General Kerpen, who commanded the Austrian corps, was in hourly expectation of the arrival of the two divisions of the Rhine. General Joubert had received no orders to attack; his instructions only directed him to keep the enemy in check, and to maintain his position of the Avisio. But immediately after the battle of the Tagliamento, when the Austrian army was driven entirely out of Italy, when Massena had rendered himself master of the Carinthian road, and when Napoleon had resolved to march by that road with his whole army, he despatched orders to General Joubert to beat the enemy, to whom he was superior, to march up the banks of the Adige, drive General Kerpen beyond the Brenner, and march by facing to the right and by the Pusterthal, along the road that runs by the side of the Drava, to join the army at Spital on the Carinthian road. He ordered him to leave a brigade to defend the Avisio, with directions, in case of being forced, to fall back on Montebaldo, there to wait for the orders of General Kilmaine, who commanded in Italy, and to correspond with General Bullard

at Verona. He knew that when the French army should arrive victorious on the Simering, menacing Vienna, all that might occur in the lower Tyrol would be of secondary importance.

On the 20th of March, as soon as General Joubert had received his instructions, he commenced his movement. The head-quarters of the army were then at Goritz on the Isonzo. General Kerpen encamped, with his principal forces, at Cambra, behind the Avisio, covering Saint-Michael, by which place he communicated with General Laudon, who occupied the right bank of the Adige. Joubert's division passed the Avisio at Segenzano, whilst the divisions of Delmas and Baraguay d'Hilliers passed it over Lavis bridge, and directed their march on Saint-Michael by the road of the right bank. Thus all the French forces were now in a situation to share in the attack of General Kerpen's camp, whilst Laudon's corps, separated from him by the Adige, remained idly looking on. The action was not doubtful. General Kerpen, driven from all his positions, lost half his men and several standards and pieces of cannon; he had 2000 men killed, and 3000 taken prisoners. This battle of Saint-Michael opened the Tyrol. Whilst Baraguay d'Hilliers and Delmas entered Saint-Michael and cut down the bridge, Joubert advanced through the mountains directly on Neu-

marck, took that place after a slight action, passed the bridge, and completely defeated and dispersed the troops under General Laudon, who, with all the force he had been able to collect, was in position between Neumarck and Tramin. In the evening Joubert returned into Neumarck, with 2500 prisoners, and several pieces of cannon.

In the mean time the van entered Bolzano, a rich trading town of great importance, where it captured all the enemy's magazines. The first Austrian division of the Rhine, commanded by General Sporck, had reached Clausen. In the rear of this division General Kerpen rallied the remains of his corps; and, stationed in a position which seemed inexpugnable, he resolved to await his conqueror. On the 24th General Joubert marched against him with the greater part of his corps d'armée. The attack was brisk; the obstacles presented by the nature of the ground appeared at first insurmountable; but the intrepid French fusileers, active as the Tyrolese themselves, climbed the mountains which supported the enemy's right, and thereby compelled him to retreat. General Kerpen, all whose hopes now depended on the junction of the second division which he expected from the Rhine, retreated on Mittenwald, thus leaving the Pusterthal road at General Jou-

bert's command; but the latter conceived that it would be dangerous for him to commence his movement on the right, as he would have had to defile so near the enemy's camp. He attacked him on the 28th of March. A charge of cavalry, under General Dumas, contributed to the success of this action. General Kerpen, now defeated for the third time, evacuated Sterzing and retreated on the Brenner. The alarm spread as far as Inspruck; there was no longer any doubt but that it was General Joubert's intention to march on that place in order to connect his force with the Army of the Rhine. This plan would have been fatal, for the Army of the Rhine was still in cantonments in Alsace. But nothing now remained to prevent Joubert from marching, according to his instructions, by the Pusterthal, to join the grand army on the Carinthian road. On the 2d of April he began his movement, caused Pruncken and Tolbach to be occupied; and as soon as he had ascertained that nothing could now oppose his debouching in the valley, and his movement on Carinthia, *he called in all his posts from the Tyrol.* On the 4th of April his movement was decided. He left a column of 1200 men, under the command of General Serviez, with orders to resume his positions on the Avisio, in order to cover Italy. General Joubert joined the army with 12,000

men; he was encumbered with 7000 prisoners taken in these engagements.

Thus, in less than twenty days, the Archduke's army had been defeated in two pitched battles and several actions, and driven beyond the Brenner, the Julian Alps, and the Isonzo; Trieste and Fiume, the only two ports of the monarchy, were taken. The provinces of Goritz, Istria, Carniola, and Carinthia obeyed the French government; twenty thousand prisoners, twenty standards, and fifty pieces of horse artillery, taken on the field of battle, were the trophies that attested the superiority of the French soldiers. Two of the six divisions, which the Archduke expected from the Rhine, had been defeated. The French head-quarters were in Germany, and not above sixty leagues from Vienna. Every thing tended to indicate that in the course of May the victorious French armies would be in possession of that capital; for Austria had not, in the beginning of March, above 80,000 men left, whilst the French army of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine amounted to upwards of 130,000.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LEOBEN.

- I. The Imperial Court leaves Vienna — II Overtures of peace — III. Action of Neumarek (April 1) — IV. Action of Unzmark — V. Armistice of Judenburg (April 8) — VI. Junction of the divisions of the Tyrol, Carniola, and Carinthia Preliminaries of peace of Leoben (April 18) — VII. Motives which actuated the French — VIII. Of the Armies of the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse; they commence hostilities on the 18th of April, the very day of the signature of the preliminaries of peace

I.

THE news of the battles of the Tagliamento and of Tarwis, of the action of Goritz, and the entrance of the French into Klagenfurth and Laybach, struck the inhabitants of Vienna with consternation. The capital was menaced, and was destitute of all effectual means of resistance. The most valuable effects and important papers were packed up. The Danube was covered with boats, which were transporting goods into Hungary, whither the young archdukes and archduchesses were sent. Amongst these was the Arch

duchess Maria Louisa, then five years and a half old, who was afterwards empress of the French. General discontent prevailed. "In less than a fortnight," said the people of Vienna, "the French will probably be before our walls. The ministry does not think of making peace, and we have no means of resisting this terrible army of Italy."

The armies of the Rhine and Moselle and the Sambre and Meuse were to have opened the campaign, and passed the Rhine on the same day as the army of Italy passed the Piave; and they were to advance as speedily as possible into Germany. When Napoleon sent home an account of the battle of the Tagliamento, he announced that he should pass the Julian Alps in a few days, and enter the heart of Germany; that between the 1st and 10th of April he should be at Klagenfurth, the capital of Carinthia; that is to say, within sixty leagues of Vienna; and before the 20th of April, on the top of the Simering, twenty-five leagues from Vienna; that it was therefore of importance that the armies of the Rhine should put themselves in motion, and that he should be informed of their march. The government, on the 23d of March, wrote to him in answer, complimenting him on the victory of the Tagliamento, stating reasons why the armies of the Rhine had not taken the field, and assuring him that they would march without delay;

three days afterwards, on the 26th of March, the ministers wrote that Moreau's army could not take the field, that it was in want of boats to effect the passage of the Rhine, and that the army of Italy was not to reckon upon the co-operation of the armies of Germany, but on itself alone. These despatches, which reached Klagenfurth on the 31st of March, gave rise to many conjectures. Was the Directory apprehensive that these three armies, comprising all the forces of the Republic, might, if united under the command of one general, render him too powerful? Was it the remembrance of the reverses which the armies of the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse had suffered the year before that intimidated them? Was this strange pusillanimity to be ascribed to a want of vigour and resolution in the generals?—That was impossible. Or was there an intention to sacrifice the Army of Italy, as had been attempted in June 1796, by ordering half the army to be sent against Naples? As Napoleon could no longer calculate on the assistance of these two armies, he was obliged to relinquish all thoughts of entering Vienna; he had not sufficient cavalry to descend into the plain of the Danube; but he thought he might safely advance to the summit of the Simering, and that the most advantageous use he could make of his position was to conclude a peace, which was the general wish of all France.

II.

Within twelve hours from the receipt of the despatches of the Directory, on the 31st of March, Napoleon wrote to Prince Charles in the following terms: "Whilst brave soldiers carry on war, they wish for peace. Has not this war already lasted six years? Have we not killed men enough, and inflicted sufficient misery on the human race? Humanity calls loudly upon us. Europe has laid down the arms she took up against the French Republic. Your nation alone remains; yet blood is to flow more copiously than ever. Fatal omens attend the opening of this sixth campaign. Whatever be its issue, we shall kill some thousands of men on both sides; and after all we must come to an understanding, since all things have an end, not excepting vindictive passions.

"The Executive Directory of the French Republic communicated to his Majesty the Emperor, its wish to put an end to the war which oppresses both nations. The intervention of the court of London opposed this measure. Is there then no hope of arrangement? and must we, on account of the interests and passions of a nation which is a stranger to the horrors of the war, continue to slaughter each other? You, General, whose birth places you so near the throne, and

above those petty passions which often actuate ministers and governments, are you disposed to merit the title of a benefactor to the whole human race, and the saviour of Germany. Do not imagine, Sir, that I mean to deny that it may be possible to save Germany by force of arms: but even supposing the chances of war should become favourable to you, the country would nevertheless be ravaged. For my part, General, if the overture I have now the honour to make to you should only save the life of a single man, I should feel more proud of the civic crown I should think I had thereby merited, than of all the mournful glory that the most distinguished military successes can afford."

On the 2d of April Prince Charles replied as follows:—"Most certainly, General, whilst I carry on war in obedience to the call of honour and duty, I am desirous, as you are, of peace, for the sake of the people and of humanity. Nevertheless, as it does not belong to me, in the functions with which I am entrusted, to inquire into, or terminate the quarrel of the belligerent nations, and as I am not furnished with any powers to treat on the part of his Majesty the Emperor, you will not consider it extraordinary that I do not enter into any negotiation with you, and that I wait for superior orders on this important subject, which is not essentially within my province. But whatever may be the future

chances of war, or whatever hopes of peace may exist, I beg you to rest convinced, General, of my esteem, and particular consideration."

In order to support this overture for negotiation it was important to march forward, and to approach Vienna.

III.

The van was at St. Veit, and the head-quarters at Klagenfurth. On the 1st of April at break of day, Massena advanced on Freisach. In front of the castle he met with the enemy's rear-guard, which covered considerable magazines collected by the Archduke; he attacked them briskly, and entered Freisach pell-mell with them, took all the stores, and continued the pursuit almost as far as Neumarck, where he met with the Archduke with four battalions from the Rhine, those of the Prince of Orange, General Kaim, and General Mercantin, the reserve of grenadiers, and the remains of the old army, in position to defend the gorges of Neumarck. The General-in-chief immediately ordered Massena to join with all his division on the left of the high road; he placed Guieux's division on the heights on the right, and Serrurier's in reserve. At three o'clock in the afternoon the second light infantry of Massena's division charged the enemy's first line, and covered themselves with glory. These troops came from the Rhine, and the sol-

diers used to call them the *contingent*, alluding to the troops of the German princes, which were not considered the best in the world; and the soldiers of the second light infantry, being piqued at this appellation, challenged the old soldiers of the army of Italy to go as fast and as far as themselves; they performed prodigies: Prince Charles exposed himself to the greatest personal danger, but in vain; he was driven from all his positions, and lost 3000 men. The French troops entered Neumarek at night, pell-mell with the Austrians, and took 1200 prisoners, six pieces of cannon, and five standards. Scheiffing, where the third cross road joins the highway, was still twelve leagues off. The Austrian general, being unable to retard the victor's march, had recourse to a stratagem to gain twenty-four hours, and give General Kerpen time to debouch at Scheiffing. He proposed a suspension of arms, in order, as he said, to take into consideration the letter which had been written to him on the 31st of March. Berthier answered, that they might negotiate and fight at the same time; but that there could be no armistice until the French reached Vienna, unless for the purpose of treating for a definitive peace. At day-break the French vanguard commenced its march on the Muer. Strong reconnoitring parties had been sent as far as Muri, to meet Kerpen's corps; Na-

pooleon went thither in person; but that corps had fallen back; its rear-guard, under General Sporck, was slightly harassed. On the 4th and 5th the French head-quarters remained at Scheifling, a castle situate on the banks of the Muer.

IV.

From Scheifling to Knittelfeld, the road runs along the Muer, through formidable defiles. Positions which might have stopped the French army were found at every step. It was of the utmost importance to the Archduke to gain a few days to give Vienna time to make preparations, and to enable the troops, which were hastening with all possible expedition from the Rhine, to arrive and cover that great capital. The same reasons dictated to the French the necessity of accelerating their march by all possible means: On the 3d, the van had a furious engagement with the enemy in the defiles of Unzmarkt; they overthrew the enemy notwithstanding his superiority, drove him from all his positions at the point of the bayonet, and entered Knittelfeld. The loss of the Austrians was considerable; 1500 prisoners and four pieces of cannon were taken. Colonel Carrère, a distinguished officer commanding the artillery of the vanguard was killed; he was much regretted, being a good officer in battle. One of the frigates found at Ve-

nice received his name; it was one of those with which Napoleon sailed from Egypt, when he returned to France and landed at Frejus. On the 6th of April the head-quarters of the army were fixed at Judenburg, the principal town of one of the circles of Carinthia.

V.

After the action of Unzmarkt, the army met with no further resistance; its van reached Leoben on the 7th. Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, Prince Charles's adjutant-general, and Major-general Merfeld, presented themselves at that place under a flag of truce. After a conference with the General-in-chief, they delivered the following note: "General, His Majesty the Emperor and King has nothing more at heart than to contribute to the repose of Europe, and to terminate a war which is ravaging both nations. In consequence of the overtures which you made to his Royal Highness by your letter from Klagenfurth, his Majesty the Emperor has sent us to meet you for the purpose of conferring on this important subject. After the conversation we have just had with you, and persuaded of the sincere wish and intention of both powers to put an end to this disastrous war as speedily as possible, his Imperial Highness desires a suspension of arms for ten days, that he may attain this desirable object

with the greater celerity, and in order to remove all the delays and obstacles which the continuation of hostilities would occasion in the negotiations, so that every thing may concur to restore peace between the two nations."

The French general answered this note the same day in the following terms: "In the military position of the two armies, a suspension of arms is wholly prejudicial to the French army; but if it is to prove a step towards the peace so much wished for, and so necessary to the people, I am happy to consent to your wishes. The French Republic has often testified to his Majesty its desire to put an end to this cruel contest; it persists in the same sentiments, and I doubt not, after the conference I have had the honour of holding with you, but that peace may be made between the French Republic and his Majesty."

The armistice was signed on the 7th, in the evening. It was to last five days. The whole country, as far as the Simering, was occupied by the French army. Gratz, one of the largest towns of the Austrian monarchy, was surrendered with its citadel. General Berthier, at dinner, asked the Austrian commissioners, where they supposed Bernadotte's division to be? "About Laybach," they replied. "And Joubert's?"—"Between Brizen and Mollbach."—"No;" answered he, "they are all in echelons:

the most distant is only a day's march behind." This surprised them much. On the 9th headquarters were at Leoben, and the vanguard reached Bruck, pushing parties forward as far as the Simering. Adjutant-general Leclerc was sent to Paris to acquaint the government with the signature of the armistice. He was a distinguished officer, intrepid in the field of battle, and skilful in official business.

VI.

The General-in-chief had sent his aide-de-camp Lavalette, at the head of a party of cavalry, from Klagenfurth, on the 30th of March, to meet General Joubert. He proceeded as far as Lienz, but General Joubert had not then debouched from the Tyrol. The townsmen, perceiving that the French were but sixty men, took up arms against them; and this detachment was saved only by the coolness and intrepidity of the aide-de-camp who commanded it. One dragoon only was assassinated. A few days afterwards, General Zajonczech, with several squadrons of dragoons, occupied Lienz, and communicated with the corps of the Tyrol. The town was disarmed and the inhabitants punished. On the 8th of April, Joubert arrived at Spital, near Villach, and formed the left of the army. He had the prisoners immediately removed into the rear.

General Bernadotte, having completed the organization of Carniola, received orders to pass the Save and the Muer, and to join the army at Leoben. He left General Friand, with a column of 1500 men, to cover the evacuation of Fiume, and keep Carniola in awe. It was easy to foresee that with so inconsiderable a force he might probably be repulsed; in that case he was to defend the Isonzo, and finally, to throw himself into Palma-Nuova, to complete the garrison of that place. The event proved as had been expected; a body of 6000 Croats attacked him on the 15th of April. Friant's troops, although only one to four, repulsed the enemy, who suffered great loss; but the General saw the necessity of evacuating Fiume; and the armistice of Judenburg found him on the 19th of April at Matera, covering Trieste. These events, exaggerated like those which had occurred in the Tyrol, were reported at Venice, and were the principal cause of the commotions and hostilities which produced the fall of that state.

During the five days of the armistice, from the 7th to the 12th of April, Massena's division established itself at Bruck, at the foot of the Simering, having advanced posts half-way up the mountain. Head-quarters were removed to the Bishop's palace at Leoben. Serrurier's division occupied the important town of Gratz, and began

the necessary works for putting the castle in a state of defence. These five days of rest were extremely necessary and useful. The armistice expired on the 13th; but at nine in the morning Count Merfeld arrived, furnished with full powers to negotiate and sign preliminaries of peace, conjointly with the Marquis de Gallo, ambassador from Naples to Vienna, who enjoyed the favour of the Empress, whose influence over the affairs of the empire was remarkable. A prolongation of the suspension of arms to the 20th of April was signed, and conferences for the negotiation of the preliminaries were opened. On the 16th of April, after long debates, three plans were agreed upon, which were despatched to Vienna, and to which the French plenipotentiary gave his consent. On the 17th the answer of the cabinet of Vienna having been brought by Baron Vincent, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, the patent and secret preliminary articles were drawn up; the secretaries of legation neutralized a country seat, a league from Leoben, where the preliminaries of peace were signed on the morning of the 18th. General Clarke was furnished, as has been stated, with the full powers of the government, but he was then at Turin. It required time for him to reach head-quarters; and as he had not arrived on the 18th, Napoleon took the responsibility on himself, as on many other occa-

sions, and signed the treaty. General Clarke reached head-quarters a few days afterwards. The Austrian plenipotentiaries thought they had done something very agreeable in setting down, as the first article, that the Emperor acknowledged the French Republic. "Strike that out," said Napoleon: "the Republic is like the sun, which shines by its own light; none but the blind can fail to see it." In fact, this acknowledgment would have done mischief, because, if the French people had afterwards wished to create a monarchy, the Emperor might have said that he had acknowledged the Republic. It was stipulated by the preliminaries, that the definitive treaty should be negotiated in a congress to be assembled at Berne, and that the peace of the empire should be the business of another congress, which should be held in a German city. The limits of the Rhine were guaranteed to France. The Oglio was the limit of the states of the house of Austria in Italy, and of the Cisalpine Republic, composed of Lombardy, the Modenese, Bergomasque and Cremasque countries. The city of Venice was to receive the legations of Ferrara and Bologna, and Romagna, as a compensation for the loss of its states of the Terra-Firma. By this treaty the Emperor had Mantua, but the Republic gained Venice. The French armies were enabled to communicate from Milan to Venice by

the right bank of the Po, to debouch on the Piave, and to disregard the lines of the Mincio, the Adige, and Mantua. Nothing now prevented the two Republics from uniting in one, if it suited their convenience. Venice had existed nine centuries, without possessing any territory in Italy, being only a maritime state; and this was the period of her greatest power. The truth is, however, that these arrangements were stipulated in enmity to the Venetians. It was just when General Kilmaine's despatches of the 3d and 5th of April arrived. The army was transported with indignation at the murders which were perpetrating in its rear. An insurrectionary cockade was displayed at Venice, and the English minister wore it in triumph; the Lion of Saint Mark was seen on his gondola; this minister had great influence.

On the 27th of April the Marquis de Gallo presented the preliminaries, ratified by the Emperor, to the General-in-chief at Gratz. The exchange did not take place immediately, because it was necessary to wait for the ratification of the Executive Directory; but as there could be no doubt respecting this ratification, the army evacuated Styria and part of Carniola and Carinthia. Several overtures having been made by the Emperor's plenipotentiaries, the aide-de-camp Le-

marrois carried the answers to Vienna. He was received with distinction; this was the first time since the Revolution that the tri-coloured cockade had been seen in that capital. It was in one of these conferences at Gratz, that one of the plenipotentiaries, authorized by an autograph letter of the Emperor's, offered Napoleon to procure him, on the conclusion of peace, a sovereignty of 250,000 souls in Germany, for himself and his family, in order to place him beyond the reach of republican ingratitude. The general smiled; he desired the plenipotentiary to thank the Emperor for this proof of the interest he took in his welfare, and said, that he wished for no greatness or riches, unless conferred on him by the French people. It is affirmed that he added: "and with that support, believe me, Sir, my ambition will be satisfied."

Adjutant-general Dessolles was despatched to Paris with the news of the opening of the negotiations. General Massena carried the preliminary treaty to the Directory. He was received on the 9th of May in a solemn audience. All the distinguished generals of the Army of Italy had been successively sent to Paris to carry home trophies of victory. Massena alone, who ranked foremost of them, on account of the share he had had in every victory, had not yet been sent.

was an act of justice to connect his name with that grand national fête, since it was the result of the intrepidity and valour of the French armies

VII

The situation of the Army of Italy was prosperous, the musters of the 16th of April stated 38,500 infantry, 4500 cavalry, total 43,000 men, and 120 pieces of cannon. These forces were assembled on one spot, and ready to post themselves on the Simerning in a single march. The losses they had suffered since the opening of the campaign were but trifling. The fortresses of Palma-Nuova, Klagenfurth, and Gritz, were victualled and armed, numerous magazines of all kinds were collecting in them. The French soldiers were animated with the utmost courage and alacrity, at the action of Neumarch a third only of Massena's division was engaged, and proved sufficient to overthrow the *élite* of the Austrian troops, although advantageously posted. The Archduke's army, on the contrary, was discouraged, he had now scarce any of the troops of his old army of Italy. The six divisions from the Rhine had been successively attacked, and suffered severe loss, they were considerably diminished. Napoleon might have entered Vienna at once, but this would have produced no good

effect; it would have been difficult for him to maintain his ground there, for the armies of the Rhine had not taken the field, and had moreover declared themselves unable to do so. The councils and the Directory were at variance; there was even a difference amongst the directors themselves; the government was devoid of strength; public spirit was a nullity in France; the finances were in a deplorable state. The Army of the Rhine was unpaid, and in the greatest penury. One of the principal obstacles to its passing the Rhine, was the total inability of the treasury to supply Moreau with the 30 or 40,000 crowns he wanted for the purpose of organizing his pontoon train. Regiments raised in La Vendée for the Army of Italy, and increased to 4000 men by the incorporation of various corps, arrived at Milan only 900 or 1000 strong; three-fourths of the men having deserted on the march. The government had no system for making the deserters rejoin, and recruiting the armies.

In the first conferences the Austrian plenipotentiaries consented to the cession of Belgium, and to the line of the Rhine; but they demanded indemnities, and when it was proposed to give them indemnities in Germany, for instance in Bavaria, they immediately added that, in that case, Venice must also be guaranteed in its

existing constitution, and the aristocracy of the Golden Book confirmed, as Austria would never, under any pretence, permit the Italian Republic to extend itself from the Alps and Apennines to the Isonzo and the Julian Alps. But this was strengthening the most active and constant enemy of the French Republic; an enemy, who, apprized of his danger by recent events, was thenceforth likely to have no other policy than that of combining more closely with Austria, and making common cause with that power, which, in fact, would have made an offensive and defensive league with the Venetian oligarchy against the democratic Italian Republic. This was increasing the power of Austria by the addition of Bavaria and of the territory of Venice. In the instructions given by the Directory to General Clarke, as already stated in Chapter XIII, he had been authorized to sign much less advantageous conditions. Peace was the will of the people, the government, and the legislative body: Napoleon therefore signed the preliminaries.

VIII.

Hoehe had just been promoted to the command of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse; he was a young man full of talent, bravery, and ambition. He had a superb army under his com-

mand, which he acknowledged to amount to 80,000 men under arms : he felt himself able to conduct it, and his heart swelled with impatience at the news he was constantly receiving from the Army of Italy. By every courier he sent, he entreated the Directory to allow him to enter Germany. The troops shared his ardour ; even the inhabitants, informed by their correspondents of Napoleon's rapid march on Vienna, and the retrograde movement of the Austrian armies of the Rhine, enquired why the French of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine remained inactive and lost so much valuable time.

On the 18th of April Hoche passed the Rhine at the bridge of Neuwied, whilst Championnet, who had marched from Düsseldorf, arrived at Uckerath and Altenkirchen. Kray commanded the Austrian army. Hoche attacked him at Heddersdorf, took several thousand prisoners, some cannon and colours, and forced him to fall back on the Maine. On the 22d of April, Hoche arrived before Frankfort, when General Kray's staff transmitted to him despatches from General Berthier, informing him of the signature of the treaty of Leoben. He immediately concluded an armistice, and advanced his head-quarters to Friedberg, occupying the Nidda and Wetzlar. Moreau was at Paris, soliciting pontoons to pass the Rhine at Strasburg ; but as soon as Desaix,

who commanded the Army of the Rhine, *ad interim*, found that Hoche was engaged with the enemy, he constructed a bridge on the 20th of April, at six o'clock in the morning, at the village of Kilstett, several leagues below Strasburg. On the 21st, at two o'clock in the morning, the army passed the Rhine. Moreau, who had posted with all possible speed from Paris, found himself at the head of the army just as Sztarray, who had collected 20,000 men and twenty pieces of cannon, was attacking it. The action was hot; the Austrians were completely beaten; they left a number of prisoners and twenty pieces of cannon in the power of the conquerors. All the equipages of the Austrian chancery were taken. Amongst these was Klinglin's waggon, which contained Pichegru's correspondence with the Prince of Condé, which Moreau kept secret for four months without communicating it to the government. After this victory the army marched up the Rhine and took Kehl. The van had arrived beyond Offenbach, in the valley of the Kintzig, on the 22d, when a courier from the Army of Italy brought the news of the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben. Moreau put a stop to hostilities, and concluded an armistice with Sztarray.

Hostilities did not commence on the Rhine until eight hours after the treaty of Leoben had

been signed; and Napoleon received the intelligence seven days after the signature of that treaty. Why was not the campaign recommenced five days sooner, or at least why had the Directory written that the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine was not to be reckoned upon? But the affairs of the war were conducted without energy or talent; the administration was corrupt, and never produced any satisfactory result. By one of the clauses of the constitution of year III, the treasury was made independent of the government; an idea equally false and disastrous, and the most absurd that could have been found out by the metaphysics of our modern legislators! This alone was sufficient to endanger the existence of the Republic.

CHAPTER XIX.

VENICE.

- I. Description of Venice.—II. The Senate.—III. Conduct of the *Proveditores Mocenigo and Foscarelli*.—IV. *Factions; Brescia; Bergamo*.—V. Difficulties attending the affairs of Venice.—VI. Conferences of Goritz, on the 20th of March.—VII. Verona.—VIII. Mission of the *Aide-de-camp Junot* to the Senate; Declaration of war of Palma-Nuova.—IX. Entrance of Venice by the French; Revolution of that capital.—X. Revolution of the Terra-Firma States; the colours taken from the Venetians and in the last days of the campaign, forwarded to Paris.

I.

VENICE, founded in the fifth century by the inhabitants of Friuli and the Paduano, who sought refuge in the lagoons from the incursions of the barbarians, at first occupied the sites of Heraclea and Chiozza. The patriarch of Aquilea afterwards established himself at Grado with his clergy, on occasion of the Arian schism. Grado became the capital. In the earliest times Padua gave laws and consuls to the Venetians. In 697, they first named a doge of their own

Pepin, king of France, constructed a flotilla at Ravenna, and compelled the Venetians to retire to Realto and the sixty isles which surround that place, where they found themselves defended by the lagoons from the resentment of that prince; and this is the present situation of Venice. In 830 the body of St. Mark the Evangelist was transported thither from Egypt; and he became the patron of the republic. In 960 the Venetians were masters of Istria and the Adriatic. The kings of Hungary disputed the possession of Dalmatia with them. In 1250, in conjunction with the French, they took Constantinople. They possessed the Morea and Candia until the middle of the seventeenth century. Italy has always been the prey of revolutions and has often changed masters; but Venice, still independent and free, never submitted to a foreign power, but always contrived to elude the yoke of the rulers of the peninsula.

Venice is the best situated commercial port in all Italy. Merchandize from Constantinople and the Levant arrives there by the shortest road, crossing the Adriatic; whence it is dispersed through Upper Italy, as far as Turin, by the Po; and throughout Germany, by going up the Adige as far as Bolzano, and thence by the high roads to Ulm, Augsburg, Munich, and Nuremberg. Venice is the sea-port of the Upper Da-

nube, the Po, and the Adige. Nature has destined this spot to be the entrepôt of the Levant, of Italy, and of Southern Germany. Before the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, Venice carried on the trade with India by Alexandria and the Red Sea; and she therefore struggled to intercept the navigation of the Portuguese. She equipped a considerable fleet in the Red Sea, and established an arsenal, watering places, and magazines near Suez; the remains of them are still seen at the fountains of Moses. But the Portuguese beat these fleets, which had been constructed at vast expense: and the anarchy which prevailed in Egypt completed the work of closing this road against the commerce of India.

The lagoons are formed by the waters of the Piave, the Brenta, and the Livenza; they communicate with the sea by three great channels, the Chioggia, the Malamoco, and the Lido.

After the abolition of the democracy in 1200, the sovereignty resided in the aristocracy of several hundred families inscribed in the Golden Book, which contained the names of 1200 persons entitled to vote in the grand council. The population of the states of the Republic consisted of three millions of individuals dispersed around Venice in rich countries and fertile plains: the Bergamasco, Brescian, Cremasco, Vicentine, Paduano, Polesine, Trevisano, Bassanese, Cadorese,

Bellunese and Friul, in the Terra Firma of Italy; Istria, Dalmatia, and the mouths of the Cattaro, on the shores of the Adriatic; and lastly, the Ionian islands. On the north the Venetian territory was bounded by the upper ridge of the Julian Alps, from the Adda to the Isonzo. This chain of mountains is everywhere impracticable for carriages; it forms the frontier towards Germany; it can only be passed by three outlets—the high roads of the Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carniola.

In 1796 this republic was much reduced; it was but the shadow of its former self. Three generations had succeeded each other without engaging in war. These unworthy descendants of the Dandolos, Zenos and Morosinis, trembled at the sight of a gun. During the war of the succession, and those of 1733 and 1740, they had submitted with base resignation to the insults and outrages of the Austrian, French, and Spanish armies.

The Venetian navy consisted of a dozen ships of 64 guns, as many frigates, and a great number of small vessels, sufficient to overawe the Barbarians, rule the Adriatic, and defend the lagoons. The army, 14,000 strong, was composed of Italian regiments, recruited in the Terra Firma, and of Sclavonians raised in Dalmatia—brave men and wholly devoted to the republic. The latter had

the advantage of being strangers to the language and manners of the Terra Firma.

The families of the Golden Book alone had any share in the administration; they composed exclusively the senate, the councils, the forties, and other magistracies. This rendered the nobles of the Terra Firma discontented: amongst these were many rich, illustrious, and great families, which, thus subdued and deprived of all power, lived unnoticed, and entertained a strong jealousy of the supreme nobility. They were descended partly from the ancient Condottieri, the ancient *Podestas*, and other personages who had acted distinguished parts in the republics of their cities, and whose ancestors, after having long opposed the enterprises of the Venetians, had at length fallen victims to their policy. The jealousy and hatred with which the nature of the government inspired them, were thus strengthened by historical resentments carefully perpetuated. The people of the Terra Firma were in general discontented, the greater part of them making common cause with the nobility. The noble Venetians, however, who had property and establishments in almost all the provinces, had their partisans also. The clergy possessed no credit or influence in this republic, which had freed itself as far as possible from the temporal influence of the Pope at a very early period.

II.

In 1792 the combined powers invited Venice to take part in the war. It does not appear that any serious discussions took place in the senate on this occasion: there was an unanimous vote for neutrality. This republic was so distant from the theatre of war, that it thought itself unconcerned in the affairs of France. When the Count de Lille took refuge at Verona, the senate did not grant him permission to remain there, until it had obtained the consent of the committee of public safety, which preferred Verona to any other place for the residence of this prince.

When the French troops marched towards Oneglia, in 1794, it was thought that Italy was threatened with an invasion, and several powers held a congress at Milan. Venice refused to appear there, not because she approved of the principles of the French, but as fearing to place herself at the mercy of Austria, and unwilling to deviate from that base and enervated policy which she had for several generations followed. But when Napoleon arrived at Milan, and Beaulieu fled, struck with consternation, beyond the Minicio, occupying Peschiera, where he stationed his right, in hopes of defending that line, great anxiety and alarm prevailed in the senate. The immense space which had previously separated

Venice from the struggle between democracy and aristocracy had now been traversed; the wars of principles and cannon were now raging in the bosom of the state. Stormy discussions accordingly took place in the councils, in which three different opinions were maintained by their respective adherents.

The young oligarchs wished for an armed neutrality: they advised that strong garrisons should be thrown into Peschiera, Breseia, Porto Legnago, and Verona; that these places should be declared in a state of siege; that the army should be increased to 60,000 men; that the lagoons should be put in a state of defence and covered with gun-boats; that a squadron should be fitted out to guard the Adriatic; and that in this formidable attitude the republic should declare war against the first power that should violate her territory.

The partisans of this opinion went still further. "If our last hour is come," said they, "it is less disgraceful to die in arms. By defending the territory, we shall prevent the French ideas from gaining ground in the great cities of the Terra Firma: the more respect we are in a condition to insist on from both the hostile parties, the more we shall obtain. If, on the contrary, our gates are peaceably opened, the war of the two powers will be established on the territories of

the republic, and from that moment the sovereignty is lost to the prince. His first duty is to protect his subjects: if their fields and property become a prey to the war, the wretched people will lose all esteem and respect for the authority which abandoned them. The germs of discontent and jealousy which already exist will be thrown into a violent ferment, and the republic will expire unregretted."

The partisans of the old policy maintained that it would be best to take no decisive measures; but to temporize, gain time, and watch the course of events. They confessed that all the dangers pointed out really existed; that the ambition of Austria and the principles of France were both to be dreaded: but they insisted that these evils were temporary; that the troubles apprehended might be avoided by means of circumspection and patience; that the French were of a conciliable disposition, easily won over by caresses; that an influence might be gained over the minds of their leaders, and their good will might be acquired by liberal behaviour towards them; that in the present state of men's minds an armed neutrality must lead to war, which was above all things to be avoided; that Providence had placed the capital in a position which secured it from all insult; and that patience, moderation, and time, were weapons to be relied on.

Battaglia said, "The republic is certainly in danger. On one side, the French principles are subversive of our constitution; on the other, Austria aims at the destruction of our independence. Between these two evils, one of which is inevitable, let us take care to choose the least. In my opinion Austrian despotism is the worst. Let us augment the Golden Book; let us inscribe in it the names of such of the nobles of the Terra Firma as merit that honour: we shall thus conciliate our own subjects, and there will be no opposition amongst ourselves. Let us garrison our fortresses, fit out our fleets, raise our army, and hasten to meet the French general and offer him an offensive and defensive alliance. This may, perhaps, lead to a few slight alterations in our constitution, but we shall preserve our independence and liberty. An armed neutrality is talked of. Two years ago this plan would have been the best; it would have been just, because equal towards both the belligerent parties; and it was possible, because there was then time to make preparations accordingly. But you cannot now refuse the French what you have permitted or tolerated on the part of the Austrians; this would be declaring war against the French army, when it is victorious and will be at Verona in eight days, and without even being assured of Austria; but for the next two months that

power can do nothing for you. What will become of the republic, during those two months, attacked by an enemy equally enterprising and active? This is of all possible schemes the worst; it is rushing into the midst of the danger instead of avoiding it.

“The second plan which has been proposed to you, that of patience and time, is little better than the former. Political circumstances are no longer the same; times are much altered; the present crisis resembles none of those over which the prudence of our ancestors triumphed. The French principles are in every head; they are propagated in various forms; they are an overwhelming torrent which has burst its banks, and which it would be vain to attempt to stop by patience, moderation, and pliancy. The measure I propose to you is the only one that can save us; it is simple, noble, and generous. We are able to offer the French a contingent of 10,000 men, reserving sufficient forces for the defence of our fortresses. They will soon take Mantua and carry the war into Germany. The first step being taken, all the rest will be easy; because all the parties by which the state is divided will go on unanimously together: our independence will be secured; we shall save the grand foundations of our constitution. Austria has no influence over our

subjects; and she has no fleets, whilst we know not from one hour to another, but that signals may be made from the Lido of the appearance of the Toulon fleet."

This opinion excited the passions of all parties and struck all judicious minds, but it gained but few votes. Aristocratical prejudices prevailed over the interests of the country. This resolution would have been too noble for degenerate men incapable of elevated notions.

III.

The proveditore Mocenigo received Napoleon at Brescia in a magnificent style: he made protestations of the good will of the senate towards France. Splendid fêtes were given, which formed connexions between the officers of the army and the principal families. Every noble endeavoured to become the particular friend of a French general. At Verona, the proveditore Foscarelli imitated this example; but the haughtiness of his character was incompatible with dissimulation: he could ill disguise his secret sentiments. He was one of the senators who were most hostile to modern ideas: he had not dared to protest against the entrance of the French into Peschiera, because they succeeded Beaulieu's troops there; but when he was asked by the French for the keys of the

arsenal, in order to line the ramparts with artillery, and when steps were taken to arm the galleys, he complained of this violation of the neutrality of the republic. On Napoleon's arrival at Peschiera, this proveditore endeavoured to dissuade him from marching on Verona; he even went so far as to threaten to close the gates and fire the cannon. "It is too late," said the general; "my troops have entered the place; I am obliged to take up my line of defence on the Adige, during the siege of Mantua. You would not be able to oppose the passage of the Austrian army with your 1500 Slavonians. Neutrality consists in having the same weight and measure for all parties. If you are not my enemies, you must grant or allow me what you have granted, or at least tolerated, in my enemies."

These various discussions being reported to the senate, determined it to recall Foscarelli, and to appoint Battaglia in his stead, conferring on him the dignity of proveditore-general of all the provinces beyond the Adige, including Verona. He was a pliant, well-informed man, of agreeable manners, and sincerely attached to his country, quite an enthusiastic admirer of the French of times past, and preferring even republican France to Austria. The theatre of war gradually extended over the whole of the Venetian possessions; but it was always the Austrians who first entered

new territories. Beaulieu occupied Peschiera and Verona; Wurmser threw himself into Bassano, and marched through Vicenza and Padua; Alvinzi and the Archduke Charles occupied Friuli, Palma Nuova, and the most easterly parts of the republic.

IV.

A strong agitation was manifested in the Terra Firma; discontent spread with rapidity. The inveterate animosity that was entertained against the oligarchy was strengthened by the charm of the new opinions. Italy was generally regarded as lost to the Austrians, and the fall of the aristocracy appeared the necessary consequence. Napoleon constantly endeavoured to moderate this feeling, which was supported by the general disposition of the army. When he returned from Tolentino, wholly occupied with his scheme of marching on Vienna, he found it necessary to pay immediate attention to this state of affairs, which in some measure embarrassed him. The irritation had continued to increase: Breseia and Bergamo were in a state of insurrection. The Fenaroli, Martinengo, Lecchi, and Alessandri families, some of the principal and wealthiest in the Venetian states, were at the head of the insurgents. The municipal authorities of these two cities possessed great power; they were entrust-

ed with the public money, disposed of the revenues, and appointed officers. Although the lion of St. Mark was still to be seen there, it was more out of deference to the French general, than in token of submission to the sovereignty of Venice. Continual and violent attacks on the Venetian nobility were heard in all companies, and kept the press employed. The injustice of their supremacy was passionately urged by all possible means. "What right has Venice," said the disaffected, "to govern our cities? Are we less brave, enlightened, opulent, or noble than the Venetians?" The pride of the senators was severely wounded at seeing subjects who had for so many ages submitted to their yoke, forgetting their immense superiority, and comparing themselves to their masters. Every thing announced the approach of a violent concussion. Battaglia, in his dispatches to the senate, concealed the outrages of the Brescians as much as possible, and softened the rage and violence of the senate in the eyes of the latter. Constantly anxious to conciliate, in all his numerous communications with the General-in-chief, he endeavoured to interest him in the welfare of the republic.

V.

It would have been dangerous to leave in the rear of the army three millions of individuals

abandoned to disorder and anarchy. Napoleon was well aware that he had no more influence over the friends of France than over the senate itself:—he could restrain them from action, but not from speaking, writing, and directly provoking the government in a multitude of details of administration to which he was a stranger. To disarm the patriots of Brescia and Bergamo, to declare for the senate, proscribe the partisans of innovation, and throw them into the dungeons of Venice, would have ensured him the hatred of the popular party without gaining the affection of the aristocracy; and could so base a policy have entered into his calculations, it would infallibly have ended, as in the time of Louis XII., in raising the whole population against us. To induce the senate to enter into an alliance with France, and to modify its constitution to the satisfaction of its Terra Firma subjects, was the best, and indeed the only eligible plan. This was accordingly the constant object of Napoleon's endeavours. Whenever he gained a new victory, he repeated this proposal, but always in vain.

A third course presented itself, namely, to march on Venice, to occupy that capital, to effect by force the political alterations which circumstances made indispensable, and to confide the government to the partisans of France. But

it was impracticable to march on Venice whilst Prince Charles remained on the Piave; the first thing to be done was, therefore, to beat the Austrian army and expel it from Italy: and supposing this to be effected, it was a question whether it would be advisable to lose the fruits of victory, and defer the passage of the mountains, for the purpose of bringing back the war to the neighbourhood of Venice; which would give the Archduke time to reconnoitre, obtain reinforcements and create new obstacles. It was under the walls of Vienna that peace was to crown the victories of the French. Venice was, moreover, a place of great strength, defended by her lagoons, her armed vessels, and 10,000 Slavonians; and being mistress of the Adriatic, she could easily receive fresh troops: besides, her walls contained the moral strength of all those sovereign families which would be called upon to fight for their political existence. Who could say how much inestimable time the French army might lose by this enterprize? And if the contest should happen to be prolonged, who could foresee the effects of a stout resistance on the rest of Italy?

This new war was sure to meet with many impediments at Paris. The senate had a very active minister there; the legislative body opposed the directory, and the directors were divided

In vain would you reckon on the support of the Archduke; I shall have driven his armies from Italy in less than eight days. There is, however, one way of extricating your republic from the unfortunate situation in which it is placed. I offer it the alliance of France; I guarantee its possessions in the Terra Firma, and even its authority in Brescia and Bergamo; but I require it to declare war against Austria, and to furnish me a contingent of 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon. I think it would be right to inscribe the principal families of the Terra Firma in the Golden Book; but I do not make this a condition *sine quâ non*. Return to Venice, get the senate to deliberate, and come back to sign a treaty, which is the only means of saving your country." Pesaro acknowledged the wisdom of this plan. He departed for Venice, promising to return in less than a fortnight.

On the 11th of March the French army put itself in motion to pass the Piave. As soon as this intelligence reached Venice, orders were despatched to arrest fourteen of the principal inhabitants of Bergamo, and bring them before the Council of Ten. The leaders of the patriotic party, having timely warning from a Venetian commissary devoted to their interest, intercepted the courier, arrested the *providitore* himself,

raised the standard of revolt, and proclaimed the liberty of Bergamo. The deputies whom they sent to the French head-quarters, reached them on the field of the Tagliamento. This event embarrassed Napoleon, but was irremediable. The people of Bergamo had already entered into a confederation with Milan, the capital of the Lombard republic, and Bologna, the capital of the Transpadan republic. A similar revolution took place a few days afterwards at Brescia: the 2000 Sclavonians who were there were disarmed; the proveditore Battaglia was respected, but sent to Verona. The Venetian general Fioravanti advanced against the insurgents, occupied Salò, and menaced Brescia; the Milanese general Lahoz marched to meet him, defeated him, and drove him from Salò.

Pesaro returned to head-quarters, according to his promise; he found them at Goritz. The Archduke had been defeated on the Tagliamento; Palma-Nuova had opened its gates; the French flag waved at Tarvis beyond the Isonzo, and on the summit of the Julian Alps. "Have I kept my word?" said Napoleon. "The Venetian territory is covered with my troops; the Austrians are flying before me. In a few days I shall be in Germany. What does your Republic mean to do? I have offered the alliance of France; is it accepted?"

"Venice," replied Pesaro, "rejoices in your triumphs; she knows that she cannot exist but by means of France; but, faithful to her ancient and wise policy, she wishes to remain neutral. In the days of Louis XII. and Francis I., her armies were of some importance in the field of battle. But now that whole nations are in arms, of what value can our aid be to you?"

Napoleon made a last effort, but failed. As Pesaro took his leave, he said to him: "Well, as your republic is resolved to remain neutral, I consent to it; but let her cease her armaments. I leave sufficient forces in Italy to render me master there. I am marching on Vienna. Things that I might have forgiven at Venice, when I was in Italy, would be unpardonable crimes when I am in Germany. Should my soldiers be assassinated, my convoys harassed, and my communications interrupted in the Venetian territories, your republic would cease to exist. She would have pronounced her own sentence."

VII.

General Kerpen had imitated the movement of Joubert, who had commenced operations on the 20th of March; he had abandoned the Tyrol, and advanced, by Salzburg and Rottenmann, into the valley of the Meur, where he was in hopes of joining the Archduke; but being anticipated at

Scheifling by the rapid march of the French, he repassed the mountains, and did not operate his junction until he arrived in the plain of Vienna. General Laudon, left by him to guard the Tyrol with only 2000 men, troops of the line, contrived to collect 10,000 Tyrolese militia, who, discouraged by so many defeats, had dispersed themselves. This reinforcement gave him a great numerical superiority over the little corps of observation which Joubert had ordered to cover the Trent road. General Serviez had about 1200 men; he evacuated the two banks of the Avisio on the approach of the enemy, and retreated on Montebaldo. Laudon occupied Trent. Being master of the whole Tyrol, he inundated Italy with proclamations. He circulated reports in Venice, Rome, Turin, and Naples, that the French had been defeated several times. "The Tyrol had been the tomb of Joubert's troops; Napoleon had been beaten on the Tagliamento; the imperial armies had gained brilliant victories on the Rhine; he was debouching from Trent into Italy with 60,000 men, to cut off the retreat of the wreck of the army which the Archduke was pursuing; finally, he called on Venice and all Italy to take up arms and rise against the French."

On this intelligence the Venetian oligarchy no longer kept any terms. The French minister

endeavoured in vain to convince the senate that it was digging a pit into which it must necessarily fall; he denied the alleged reverses of Joubert in the Tyrol; and those which it was pretended, with equal falsehood, that the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine had sustained. He proved that they had not yet begun hostilities; he went so far as to communicate the plan of the campaign, from which it appeared that Joubert's leaving the Tyrol was a concerted movement; that he was marching by Carinthia on the Pusterthal; and that, instead of being lost, he had accomplished his object. Pesaro gave no credit to these communications; he was too eagerly desirous of the defeat of the French. At the same time the Court of Vienna used every endeavour to excite the passions of the enemies of France. It was of essential importance to Austria to raise insurrections in the rear of the French army.

The corps of reserve left at Palma-Nuova, the garrison of Osopo, and the prudence of the provveditore Moeenigo*, maintained order in Friuli: perhaps too the inhabitants, being less remote from the theatre of operations, were better informed of the state of affairs.

The levy *en masse* of the Veronese had long been prepared: more than 30,000 peasants

* Not the Moeenigo who had been provveditore at Brescia.

had received arms, and awaited only the signal for slaughter; 3000 Venetian and Sclavonian troops had been sent to Verona to garrison the town. The proveditore Emili, who was devoted to the senate, had a conference with Laudon: he informed him of the weakness of the French garrison; and the moment he thought himself certain of the assistance of the Austrian troops, he gave the signal of revolt. On the 17th of April, Tuesday in Easter week, after vespers, the tocsin sounded; the insurrection broke out at the same time in the city and in the country; the French were massacred on all sides; and the fury of the people carried them so far as to murder four hundred sick in the hospitals. General Balland shut himself up in the castles with the garrison. The artillery of the forts, the fire of which he directed against the city, induced the Veronese authorities to demand a parley; but the rage of the multitude opposed this measure. A reinforcement of 2000 Sclavonians, sent from Vicenza by the proveditore Foscarini, and the approach of the troops commanded by the Austrian General Nieperg, increased the madness of the people, who revenged the mischief done to the city by the bombardment, by slaughtering the garrison of Chiusa, which had been obliged to capitulate to the levy *en masse* of the mountaineers.

General Kilmaine, the chief commandant of Lombardy, made dispositions for the relief of General Balland,* on the first intelligence he received of the insurrection of the Veronese. On the 21st his first columns appeared before Verona. Generals Chabran, Lahoz, and Chevalier, after several engagements, succeeded in investing Verona in the course of the 22d. On the 23d the signature of preliminaries of peace with Austria became known to the insurgents, who, at the same time, heard that Victor's division had marched from Treviso, and was rapidly approaching. They were now seized with consternation; their dejection was equal to their former fury; they requested to be allowed to capitulate, and accepted on their knees the conditions which General Balland imposed upon them. They gave hostages, and order was universally restored.

The French were entitled to terrible reprisals; the blood of their brethren in arms, basely murdered, was still running in the streets; yet no revenge was taken; three inhabitants only were delivered up to the tribunals; a general disarming was effected, and the peasants were sent home to their villages.

The oligarchs, no less blind at Venice, suffered the crew of a French privateer, which, being pursued by an Austrian frigate, had taken refuge under the batteries of the Lido, to be murdered before their eyes. The French minister protested

against this violation of the law of nations, and demanded justice on the assassins. The senate laughed both at his representations and his threats, and passed a decree granting rewards to such of its satellites as had participated in the murder of Captain Laugier and his sailors.

VIII.

When Napoleon heard of the outrages and murders which were taking place in the rear of the army, he sent his aide-de-camp Junot to Venice, charging him to present to the senate the following letter, dated at Judenburg, the 9th of April. "Throughout the Terra Firma the subjects of the most Serene Republic are in arms; their rallying cry is *Death to the French!* Several hundred of the soldiers of the army of Italy have already fallen their victims. In vain you affect to disclaim assemblages of mobs which you yourselves collected. Do you then imagine that because I am at a distance, in the heart of Germany, I shall not be able to enforce respect to the soldiers of the first nation in the world? Do you think that the legions of Italy can leave unpunished the assassins who are covered with the blood of their brethren in arms? There is not a Frenchman living who would not feel his courage and strength increased three-fold by the commission to fulfil this vengeance. Did you think this was the age of Charles VIII.?

But minds are greatly changed in Italy since that period."

Junot had orders to read this letter to the senate himself, and to express the extreme indignation of the Commander-in-chief; but terror already prevailed in Venice; all illusion had vanished. It was known that the armies of the Rhine had not commenced hostilities; that Joubert was at Villach with his forces; that Victor was approaching Verona; that the French were already on their march for the lagoons; and finally, that Napoleon, victorious in every battle, had spread terror as far as Vienna; that he had just granted an armistice to the Archduke; and that the Emperor had sent to him to solicit peace.

The French minister Lallemand presented Junot to the senate; and that officer fulfilled his mission with all the plain bluntness of a soldier. The senate humbled itself, and endeavoured to find excuses. The friends of liberty now raised their heads, foreseeing their approaching triumph. A deputation of senators was sent to Gratz, to the General-in-chief, to offer all the reparation he might require, and, above all, to bribe every one who might seem to have any credit with him: but all was unavailing.

At the same time the senate despatched couriers to Paris, and placed considerable sums at the disposal of its minister there, in hopes of gaining

the leaders of the Directory, and getting such orders sent to the General of Italy as might save the republic. This intrigue succeeded at Paris: by the distribution of ten millions in bills of exchange, the minister of Venice obtained the despatch of the orders he solicited; but it was found that these orders were not authenticated with all the legal forms. Some despatches, intercepted at Milan, enabled Napoleon to baffle the whole plot; he had in his hands the account of the sums distributed at Paris, and he annulled, of his own authority, all that had been done.

On the 3d of May he published, from Palma-Nuova, his declaration of war against the republic of Venice, grounding it on the principle of repelling force by force. His manifesto was conceived in the following terms:—

“Whilst the French army is in the defiles of Styria, having left Italy and its principal establishments far behind, where only a few battalions remained, this is the line of conduct pursued by the government of Venice.

“It takes the opportunity of Passion Week to arm 40,000 peasants, adds ten regiments of Slavonians to that force, forms them into several corps-d’armée, and posts them at different points to intercept the communications of the army. Extraordinary commissions, musquets, ammunition of all kinds, and artillery, are sent from the

city of Venice, to complete the organization of the different corps. All who received the French in a friendly manner in the Terra Firma are arrested; whilst those who are distinguished by an outrageous hatred of the French name, obtain the favours and entire confidence of the government; and especially the fourteen conspirators of Verona, whom the proveditore Priuli had caused to be arrested three months ago, as convicted of having plotted the slaughter of the French.

“ In the squares, coffee-houses, and other public places of Venice, the French are insulted; they are called Jacobins, regicides, and atheists; and at length they are expelled from the city, and forbidden ever to return.

“ The people of Padua, Vicenza, and Verona are ordered to take up arms, to second the different corps-d'armée; and, in short, to begin these new Sicilian Vespers. It is ours, say the Venetian officers, to verify the proverb that *Italy is the tomb of the French*. The priests in their pulpits preach a crusade; and in the states of Venice, priests never say any thing but what is dictated by the government. Pamphlets, perfidious proclamations, and anonymous letters are printed in various towns, and begin to work upon the minds of the people; and in a state in which the liberty of the press is not allowed—in a government as much dreaded as secretly abhorred,—

authors and printers write and print only what is wished by the senate.

“ At first every thing seems to favour the treacherous scheme of the government ; French blood flows in all directions. On every road the convoys, couriers, and all belonging to the army, are intercepted.

“ At Padua a chief of battalion and two other Frenchmen are murdered ; at Castiglione di Mori, several soldiers are disarmed and murdered ; on the high roads from Mantua to Legnago, and from Cassano to Verona, upwards of 200 French are murdered.

“ Two battalions, on their way to join the army, are met at Chiari by a Venetian division, which opposes their progress. An obstinate action commences, and our brave soldiers force a passage over the bodies of their enemies. At Valeggio there is another engagement ; and at Dezenzano they are again obliged to fight. The French are in all these cases few in number, but they are accustomed to disregard the numbers of their enemies.

“ On the second holiday of Easter, at the ringing of the bell, all the French in Verona are murdered : the assassins spare neither the sick in the hospitals, nor those who are convalescent and walking in the streets ; they are thrown into the Adige, after receiving a thousand stabs of stilet-

toes. Upwards of four hundred soldiers are thus massacred. During eight days the Venetian army besieges the three castles of Verona; the cannon it plants against them are taken by the French at the point of the bayonet; the city is set on fire; and the corps of observation, which comes up during these transactions, completely routs these cowards, taking 3000 prisoners, amongst whom are several generals.

“The house of the French consul at Zante is burnt down. In Dalmatia, a Venetian man-of-war takes an Austrian convoy under her protection, and fires several shots at the sloop *La Brune*. The Republican ship *Le Libérateur d'Italie*, carrying only three or four small guns, is sunk in the port of Venice by order of the government. The young and lamented Lieutenant Langier, her commander, finding himself attacked both by the fire of the fort and that of the admiral's galley, being within pistol-shot of both, orders his crew under hatches. He alone mounts on deck, amidst a shower of grape-shot, and endeavours to disarm the fury of these assassins, by addressing them; but he falls dead on the spot. His crew betake themselves to swimming, and are pursued by six boats manned by troops in the pay of the republic of Venice, who kill several of the French with axes, as they are endeavouring to save their lives by swimming

towards the sea. A boatswain, wounded in several places, weakened, and bleeding profusely, is fortunate enough to make the shore, and clings to a piece of timber projecting from the harbour castle; but the commandant himself chops off his hand with an axe.

“Considering the abovementioned grievances, and authorized by title XII. article 328 of the Constitution of the Republic, and seeing the urgency of the occasion, the General-in-chief requires the Minister of France to the republic of Venice to depart from the said city;

“Orders the different agents of the Venetian republic in Lombardy and the Venetian Terra Firma, to depart within twenty-four hours;

“Orders the different generals of division to treat the troops of the republic of Venice as enemies; and to pull down the lion of Saint Mark in every town of the Terra Firma. To-morrow, in the order of the day, each of them will receive particular instructions respecting further military operations.”

On reading this manifesto, the weapons fell from the hands of the oligarchs, who no longer thought of defending themselves. The Grand Council of the aristocracy dissolved itself, and restored the sovereignty to the people. A municipal body was now entrusted with the supreme power. Thus these haughty fam-

so long been treated with the utmost consideration, and to whom an alliance had been offered with so much sincerity, fell without offering the least resistance. In their last agonies they in vain supplicated the court of Vienna; they made fruitless applications to it to include them in the suspension of arms, and in the negotiations for peace. That court was deaf to all their entreaties; it had its views.

IX.

On the 16th of May, Baraguay d'Hilliers entered Venice at the call of the inhabitants, who were threatened by the Slavonians. He occupied the forts and batteries, and hoisted the tricoloured flag in Saint Mark's Place. The partisans of liberty immediately met in popular assembly. The aristocracy was destroyed for ever; the democratic constitution of twelve hundred was proclaimed. Dandolo, a man of hot, impetuous temper, an enthusiast in the cause of liberty, a very worthy man, and one of the most distinguished advocates, was placed at the head of all the affairs of the city.

The lion of Saint Mark and the Corinthian horses were carried to Paris. The Venetian navy consisted of twelve sixty-four-gun ships, and as many frigates and sloops. These were manned and sent to Toulon.

Corfu was one of the most important points of the republic. General Gentili, the same who had reconquered Corsica, proceeded to Corfu with four battalions and a few companies of artillery, on board of a squadron composed of Venetian ships. He took possession of this place, the key of the Adriatic; as well as of the five other Ionian islands, Zante, Cerigo, Cephalonia, Saint Maura (anciently Ithaca), &c.

separate republics. It was on this system that the Cispadan and Transpadan republics had begun. They adopted the principles of the French Revolution; they abolished convents, but respected religion and the property of the secular priests; constituted national domains, and suppressed feudal privileges. The *élite* of the nobility and great proprietors formed themselves into squadrons of hussars and light horse, under the title of the Guard of Honour; the inferior classes formed battalions of national guards. The colours of these new republics were those of Italy.

Notwithstanding the extreme vigilance of Napoleon to prevent abuses and peculation, there were more disorders of this kind committed on this occasion than at any other period of the war. The country was divided between two very hostile factions: the passions of the people were here peculiarly ardent and daring. At the time of the surrender of Verona, the *Mont-de-Piété* of that city, containing property to the value of seven or eight millions, was plundered. Bouquet, a commissary of the war department, and Andrieux, a colonel of hussars, were accused of being the authors of this robbery, the atrocity of which was increased by other crimes committed both before and after it, in order to keep it concealed. All that was found in the houses of the accused was

restored to the city, which, nevertheless, suffered a very considerable loss.

General Bernadotte carried the colours taken from the Venetian troops, and the remainder of those which had been taken at Rivoli and in Germany from Prince Charles's army, to Paris. He presented these trophies to the Directory, a few days before the 18th of Fructidor.

These frequent presentations of colours were at this period very useful to the government, for the disaffected were silenced and overawed by this display of the spirit of the armies.

CHAPTER XX.

NEGOTIATIONS IN 1797.

- I. Head-quarters at Montebello.—II. Negotiations with the Republic of Genoa.—III. With the King of Sardinia.—IV. With the Pope.—V. With Naples.—VI. The Cispadan and Transpadan Republics; they form the Cisalpine Republic.—VII. Negotiations with the Grisons and the Valteline.

I.

MONTABELLO is a castle situate a few leagues from Milan, on a hill which commands the whole plain of Lombardy. The French head-quarters remained there during the months of May and June. The daily assemblage of the principal ladies of Milan to pay their court to Josephine; the presence of the Ministers of Austria, the Pope, the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, the Republics of Genoa and Venice, the Duke of Parma, the Swiss Cantons, and of several of the German princes; the attendance of all the generals, of the authorities of the Cisalpine Republic, and the deputies of the towns; the great number of couriers going and returning every hour to and from Paris, Rome, Naples, Vienna, Florence, Venice, Turin,

and Genoa; and the style of living at this great castle,—induced the Italians to call it *the Court of Montebello*. It was, in fact, a brilliant court. The negotiations for peace with the Emperor, the political affairs of Germany, and the fate of the King of Sardinia, of Switzerland, Venice, and Genoa, were here settled. The Court of Montebello made several excursions to lake Maggiore, the Borromean islands, and the lake of Como; taking up its temporary residence in the different country-houses which surround these lakes. Every town and village was eager to distinguish itself, and to testify its homage and respect to the *liberator of Italy*. These circumstances made a strong impression on the diplomatic body.

General Serrurier carried the last colours taken from the Archduke to Paris, and presented them to the Directory. “This officer,” said Napoleon in his letter, “has displayed in the last two campaigns equal talent and *civism*. It was his division that gained the victory of Mondovi, contributed so materially to that of Castiglione, and took Mantua. It also distinguished itself at the passage of the Tagliamento, at the passage of the Isonzo, and especially at the taking of Gradisca. General Serrurier is severe to himself, and sometimes towards others: he is a rigid supporter of discipline, regularity, and the virtues most ne-

cessary to the maintenance of social order. He disdains intrigue, and has consequently found enemies amongst men who are always ready to prefer the charge of *incivism* against those who wish to maintain the dominion of the laws. I think he would be very fit to command the troops of the Cisalpine Republic. I entreat you to send him back to his post as soon as possible." Serrurier was well received at Paris; the frankness of his character met with general approbation there. He made a journey in his native department of the Aisne. He had always been very moderate in his revolutionary principles. But on his return from France he appeared a very warm and decided supporter of the republic, being highly incensed at the prevalent spirit of disaffection which he had observed.

At the moment of the entrance of the French army into Venice, the Count d'Entraigues escaped from that city. He was arrested on the Brenta by the troops of Bernadotte's division, and sent to the head-quarters at Milan. Count d'Entraigues was a native of the Vivarais. As a deputy of the *noblesse* to the Constituent, he was an ardent patriot in 1788 and 1789; but at the commencement of the Assembly (he was nephew to M. Saint-Priest) he changed sides—emigrated, became one of the principal agents of the foreigners, and a complete go-between in political

intrigues. He had been two years at Venice, apparently attached to the English legation, but in fact as the minister of the counter-revolution, and heading all the plots of *espionage* and insurrection against the French army. He was suspected of having had an important share in the massacres at Verona. Generals Berthier and Clarke examined his portfolio, drew up a *procès-verbal* of all the papers found, marked them, and sent them to Paris. The French Government, in answer, ordered that d'Entraigues should be brought before a military commission, and tried according to the laws of the Republic; but in the interval he had made interest with Napoleon, who had seen him several times. Fully aware of the danger of his situation, he did all in his power to please the man who was master of his fate, made unreserved communications, discovered all the intrigues of the time, and compromised his party more than it was necessary to do. He succeeded, and obtained permission to reside in the city on his parole, and without a guard. Some time afterwards he was allowed to escape into Switzerland. So little was he attended to, that it was not discovered that he had broken his parole, until six or seven days after his departure from Milan. Soon afterwards he published and circulated throughout Germany and Italy a kind of pamphlet against his benefactor, describing the horrible dungeon in

which he had been confined, and the tortures he had suffered, the boldness he had displayed, and the dangers he had braved in making his escape. This excited great indignation at Milan, where he had been seen in all companies, in the public walks and theatres, enjoying the greatest liberty. Several members of the diplomatic body participated in the feelings of the public, and published declarations to this effect.

II.

The Republic of Genoa, during the three wars of the successions of Spain, Parma, and Austria, had formed part of the belligerent forces; its little armies had then marched with the troops of the French and Spanish kingdoms. In 1747 the people had driven the Austrian garrison, commanded by the Marquis de Botta, out of Genoa; and had afterwards sustained a long and obstinate siege against the armies of Maria Theresa. In the eighteenth century Genoa maintained a sanguinary war against Corsica. National animosities occasioned continual skirmishes between the people of Piedmont and the Genoese. This continuance and concurrence of military events had kept up a spirit and energy in the citizens of this republic, inconsiderable as it was in population and territory, which rendered its composition wholly different from that of the Republic of Venice.

The Genoese aristocracy had accordingly withstood the storm, preserved their freedom and independence, and suffered neither the Allied Powers nor France, nor the popular party, to intimidate them. The Republic had maintained the constitution which Andrea Doria had given it in the sixteenth century, in all its original purity.

But the proclamation of the independence of the Cispadan and Transpadan Republics, the abdication of the aristocracy of Venice, the establishment of a popular government throughout the Venetian territories, and the enthusiasm which the victories of the French excited, had given such a preponderance to the popular party, that a change in the constitution became indispensable. France thought she could place no confidence in the aristocracy; but it was desirable that the revolution should take place without her open interference, and merely through the progress and force of public opinion. Faypoult, the French minister at Genoa, was an enlightened man, moderate in his principles, and of an irresolute character; which was an advantageous circumstance, as matters stood, since he was more inclined to repress than to excite the enthusiasm of the revolutionary party.

Mén who watched the progress of events expected a crisis about the end of August, conceiving that the aristocracy would be unable to

prolong its resistance beyond that period. The revolutionists of the Morandi club, impatient at the slow progress of the revolution, and probably excited by secret agents from Paris, drew up a petition requiring the abdication of the aristocracy and the proclamation of liberty. A deputation waited on the Doge with this petition. He did not seem averse to comply with the wishes of the public; he even named a junta of nine persons, four of whom were of the plebeian class, to propose alterations in the constitution to him.

The three state inquisitors, or supreme censors, who were the leaders of the oligarchy and the enemies of France, beheld this state of affairs with dissatisfaction. Being themselves convinced that the aristocracy had but a few months to exist, if they permitted events to take their course and did not find means to direct them, they called in the aid of fanaticism, by which they hoped to obtain that of the inferior corporations. They knew that if they could but excite the enthusiasm of the colliers and porters, they should acquire sufficient strength to overawe the other citizens of every class. They made use of the confessional and the pulpit, of preachers in the squares and public places, of miracles, of the exposing of the Host, and even of prayers of forty hours, to entreat God to avert from the Republic the storm which threatened it: but by this imprudent

conduct they drew upon themselves the very calamities they sought to avoid. The Morandists, on their side, were not inactive; they declaimed, printed, excited the people against the nobles and priests by a thousand expedients, and continually made proselytes. It was not long before they found a favourable opportunity, and took up arms. On the 22d of May, at ten o'clock in the morning, they took possession of the principal gates, especially those of the arsenal, Saint Thomas, and the port. The terrified inquisitors gave the signal to the colliers and porters, who, led by their syndics, advanced with shouts of *Viva Maria!* to the-armoury, and declared for the aristocracy. In a few hours 10,000 men were thus armed and organized for the defence of the Prince. The French minister, alarmed at their vociferations against the Jacobins and the French, went to the palace, and used his endeavours to reconcile these hostile parties. Perceiving the preparations of the oligarchy and the numbers of their defenders, the patriots became sensible of their weakness. They had reckoned on the aid of the citizens, who might have turned the scale by declaring in their favour; but the citizens were intimidated by the fury of the colliers, and shut themselves up in their houses. The patriots, thus deceived in their expectations, perceived no means of safety but in mounting the

French cockade, which, they hoped, would overawe the oligarchs: but this had nearly proved fatal to the French families settled at Genoa. The conflict now began, and the patriots were beaten and driven from their posts. During the night of the 23d they kept possession of the gate of St. Thomas, but lost it on the 24th at daybreak. The triumphant oligarchy issued orders that every one should wear the Genoese cockade, and suffered the houses of the French to be pillaged; several of them were thrown into dungeons. The minister Faypoult only escaped insult through a guard of honour of 200 men which the Doge sent him. The naval commissioner Menard, a prudent man, who had particularly abstained from all interference in the troubles of the times, was dragged by the hair as far as the light-house fort; the consul La Chaise had his house plundered; all that was French was exposed to outrage and assassination. The citizens were indignant, but so much afraid of the victors that they durst not stir. Between the 23d and 29th, the minister Faypoult presented several notes on this subject, but obtained no satisfaction. At this juncture, admiral Bruëys, returning from Corsica with two men-of-war and two frigates, came in sight of the port. The Doge objected to the entrance of this squadron, under the pretext that its presence would irritate the populace, and

provoke them to all sorts of excesses against the French families. Faypoult had the weakness to yield to these arguments, and sent orders to Brueys to make for Toulon.

When it was observed in the senate by moderate men that this conduct was extremely imprudent, the oligarchs replied, that the French, who were engaged in negotiations with Austria, would not dare to march a body of troops against Genoa; that the prevailing opinion at Paris was unfavourable to democratical ideas; that they knew that Napoleon himself disapproved of the principles of the Morandi club, and that he would consider twice before he exposed himself to the censure of his government and of the Clichy party, which ruled the legislature.

All these fallacious hopes were defeated. No sooner was Napoleon informed of the events which had taken place, and the shedding of French blood, than he despatched his aide-de-camp Lavalette to Genoa, and required of the Doge that all the French who had been arrested should be immediately placed at the disposal of the French minister; and that the colliers and porters should be disarmed, and the inquisitors arrested; declaring, at the same time, that the heads of the patricians should be responsible to him for the lives of the French, and that all the magazines and property of the Republic should

answer for their property. He ordered the minister Faypoult to quit Genoa and repair to Tortona, with all the French who might think proper to follow him, unless these arrangements were carried into execution within twenty-four hours. The aide-de-camp Lavalette arrived at Genoa on the 29th of May, at half after four o'clock; and at six he was introduced to the senate, which, after hearing his speech, and being acquainted with his letter to the Doge, promised to give an answer the same evening. In fact, the French were immediately set at liberty and taken to the house of the Embassy, amidst an immense concourse of people, who seemed gratified at their release. The citizens and the real people, encouraged by what Napoleon had done, and by his assurances of protection, roused themselves, and loudly demanded the disarming of the assassins of the oligarchy. That very evening 4000 muskets were brought back to the arsenal. Strong debates took place in the petty council; the aristocracy was in the minority. A division of French troops was entering Tortona. Genoa, besieged by land and sea, would soon have been reduced to obedience; it is even probable that the sight of the French troops would have sufficed to give the citizens and the mass of the third estate strength enough to shake off the yoke of the aristocracy.

The answer of the senate was not, however, satisfactory; it was a middle course. Faypoult resolved to depart. Lavalette was to remain at Genoa, to protect the French. When the French minister demanded his passports, the Doge assembled the senate, which alone was authorized to deliver them. The senate now took into deep consideration the situation in which it appeared that the Republic would shortly be placed. After some discussion, they adopted a resolution to coincide sincerely in the views of the General-in-chief. It was resolved, first, that a deputation, composed of Cambiaso the Doge, Serra, and Carbonari, should immediately proceed to Montebello; secondly, that the three inquisitors should be put in a state of arrest; and thirdly, that the colliers and porters should be disarmed.

In consequence of this resolution, the French minister remained at his post, which tranquillized the populace. The colliers and porters, who had only acted under the orders of the government, and who had, in reality, no interest in the affair, became very tractable as soon as submission was sincerely resolved on.

On the 6th of June, the deputies from the senate signed a convention at Montebello, which put an end to Doria's constitution, and established the democratical government at Genoa. This convention was conceived in these terms :

“ The French Republic and the Republic of Genoa, wishing to confirm the union and harmony which have always existed between them, conceiving that it is necessary for the happiness of the Genoese nation that it should resume the deposit of its sovereignty, the two states have agreed on the following articles :

“ Article I. The government of the Republic of Genoa acknowledges that the sovereignty resides in the whole body of the citizens of the Genoese territory.

“ II. The legislative power shall be confided to two representative councils, one composed of three hundred, and the other of one hundred and fifty members. The executive power shall be delegated to a senate of twelve members, with a doge for their president. The doges and senators shall be nominated by the two councils.

“ III. There shall be a municipality in each commune, and an administration in each district.

“ IV. The mode of electing all the authorities, the limits of the districts, the portion of authority entrusted to each body, the organization of the judicial power and of the military force, shall be regulated by a legislative committee, which shall be empowered to prepare the constitution and all the organic laws of the government, taking care to do nothing contrary to the Catholic religion ; to secure the consolidated debts, to pre-

serve the free port of the city of Genoa, and the bank of Saint-George; and to take measures for providing, as far as may be practicable, for the support of the existing poor nobility. This committee is to complete its task within one month from the day of its formation.

“ V. The people being restored to the full possession of their rights, every kind of privilege and particular organization incompatible with the unity of the state is necessarily annulled.

“ VI. The Provisional Government shall be entrusted to a committee of government composed of twenty-two members, under the presidency of the present Doge, who shall be installed on the 14th of this present month of June, 26 Prairial, year V. of the French Republic.

“ VII. If any of the citizens who shall be called upon to compose the Provisional Government of the Republic of Genoa, shall refuse these functions, they shall be considered as indifferent to the welfare of their country, and condemned to a fine of two thousand crowns.

“ VIII. When the Provisional Government shall be formed, it shall determine the regulations necessary for the forms of its deliberations. Within a week from its installation it shall appoint a legislative committee for the purpose of drawing up the constitution.

“ IX. The Provisional Government shall pro-

vide for the just indemnities due to the French who were plundered on the 3d and 4th of Prairial (May 22d and 23d).

“ X. The French Republic, wishing to give a proof of the interest it takes in the welfare of the people of Genoa, and desirous to see them united and free from factions, grants an amnesty to all the Genoese of whom it has reason to complain, either in consequence of the events of the 3d and 4th of Prairial, or of the various occurrences which have taken place in the imperial fiefs. The Provisional Government will employ itself with the most anxious solicitude in extinguishing all faction, uniting all the citizens, and convincing them of the necessity of rallying in defence of the public liberty; and for this purpose grants a general amnesty.

“ XI. The French Republic will grant the Republic of Genoa its protection, and, if necessary, the aid of its armies, to facilitate the execution of the articles hereinbefore contained, and to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic of Genoa.”

The people triumphed with that extravagance which distinguishes the spirit of party and the southern nations; they committed excesses, burned the Golden Book, and broke the statue of Doria to pieces. This outrage on the memory of that great man displeased Napoleon; he required

the Provisional Government to restore this statue. The exclusionists, however, got the upper hand, and the constitution was influenced by their predominance; the priests were rendered discontented, and the nobles were exasperated, being excluded from all functions. This constitution was to be submitted to the approbation of the people on the 14th of September; it was printed and posted in all the communes. Several of the country cantons declared they would not accept it; the priests and nobles were actively endeavouring, on all sides, to induce the peasants to revolt: insurrections broke out in the valleys of Polcevera and the Bisagno. The insurgents possessed themselves of the *Eperon*, the *Tenaille*, and the bastion of the light-house which commands the port. General Duphot, who had been sent to Genoa to organize the troops of the Republic, whose effective force amounted to 6000 men, was required by the Provisional Government to fight in its defence. He expelled the insurgents, and retook the walls and forts. On the 7th tranquillity was restored in both valleys, and the peasants were disarmed.

This news was a disappointment to Napoleon. He was then wholly occupied in the negotiations with Austria; he had not been able to pay particular attention to the affairs of Genoa; but he had recommended that the nobles should be con-

reconciled and the priests satisfied. He suspended the publication of the constitution; he made all the alterations required by the clergy and the nobles; and, thus purged from the anarchical spirit that pervaded it, it was carried into execution by general assent. He was partial to Genoa, and would have proceeded thither in order to reconcile and unite all parties; but important events followed each other so rapidly, that they prevented his fulfilling this intention. After the treaty of Campo Formio, just as he was leaving Italy, he wrote the following letter from Milan to the Genoese government, on the 11th of November 1797:—

“ I am going to justify the confidence which you, citizens, have placed in me.—You feel it necessary to diminish the expenses of the administration in order to avoid the necessity of overburthening your people.—It is not enough to do nothing against religion; it is necessary to avoid giving the slightest grounds of disquiet to the most timorous minds, or the least pretence to the ill-disposed. *To exclude all the nobles from public functions would be a shocking piece of injustice: you would be doing what they have done.*—The freedom of the port is an apple of discord which has been thrown amongst you.—The city of Genoa ought

to owe the freedom of its port to the will of the Legislative Body.

“ Why is the Ligurian nation already so much altered? Fear and terror have succeeded its first transports of fraternity and enthusiasm. The priests were the first to rally round the tree of liberty; they were the first who told you that the morality of the Gospel is purely democratical; but men in the pay of your enemies, men who in all revolutions are the immediate auxiliaries of tyranny, have taken advantage of the errors—the crimes, if you will—of a few priests, in order to write against religion; and the priests have withdrawn. Proscriptions have been declared against whole bodies of men, and this has but increased the number of your enemies.—Whenever the people of any state, but particularly of a small state, accustom themselves to condemn without hearing, and to applaud speeches merely because they are passionate: when they call exaggeration and fury, virtue; and equity and moderation, crimes; the ruin of that state is at hand. Rest assured, that, wherever my duty and the service of my country may lead me, I shall look upon any opportunity of being useful to your Republic as one of the most fortunate moments of my life. It will give me great satisfaction to hear that the people of Genoa are united and prosperous.”

The Council of Five Hundred at Paris was then debating on a motion made by Sieyès, tending to expel all the nobles from France, on giving them the value of their property in manufactured goods. This advice, given by Napoleon to the Republic of Genoa, appeared to be addressed in fact to the French Republic, which at all events profited by it; for this violent and terrific plan, which caused universal alarm and disorder, was abandoned, and was no more heard of.

Not a single French battalion had passed beyond Tortona. The Genoese revolution was effected entirely by the influence of the third estate; and but for the plots of the inquisitors and the Morandi club, it would have been effected without any disturbance or commotion, and without even the indirect intervention of France.

III.

The King of Sardinia was in a false position. The following treaty, negotiated by Napoleon at Bologna, and signed at Turin by Clarke, might be said to exist and not to exist:---

“The Executive Directory of the French Republic and his Majesty the King of Sardinia, wishing by all means in their power, and particularly by a closer union of their respective interests, to contribute to effect, as speedily as possible, a

peace which is the object of their wishes, and which may secure the repose and tranquillity of Italy, have resolved to enter into a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive; and for this purpose have given full powers in manner following; that is to say: The Executive Directory of the French Republic, to citizen Henri Jacques Guillaume Clarke, general of division in the armies of the French Republic; and his Majesty the King of Sardinia, to the chevalier D. Clement Damian de Priocca, knight grand cross of the orders of Saint Maurice and Saint Lazarus, principal secretary of state to his Majesty for the department of foreign affairs, and regent of that of internal affairs; who, after exchanging their respective powers, have agreed on the following articles:

“ART. I. There shall be an offensive alliance between the French Republic and his Majesty the King of Sardinia, until a continental peace. At that period this alliance shall become merely defensive, and shall be established on terms suitable to the reciprocal interests of the two powers.

“II. It being the principal object of the present alliance to hasten the conclusion of peace and secure the future tranquillity of Italy, it shall be carried into execution, during the present war, solely against the Emperor of Austria, who is the only continental power that impedes the attainment of this truly desirable object. His Majesty

the King of Sardinia will remain neutral with respect to England and the other powers still at war with the French Republic.

“ III. The French Republic and his Sardinian Majesty mutually guarantee, by all means in their power, their present possessions in Europe during the continuance of the present alliance. The two powers shall unite their forces against their common foreign enemies, and shall give no direct or indirect assistance to the domestic enemies of each other.

“ IV. The contingent of the troops which his Sardinian Majesty is to furnish, in the first instance and in consequence of the present alliance, shall be 8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 40 pieces of cannon. In case the two powers should think it necessary to increase this contingent, the augmentation shall be settled and regulated by commissioners furnished with the full powers of the Directory and of his Sardinian Majesty for that purpose.

“ V. The contingent of troops and artillery shall be taken and join at Novara, in manner following: 500 cavalry, 4000 infantry, and 12 pieces of heavy artillery by the 30th of the present month of Germinal, 19th April (old style), and the remainder within fifteen days next following.

“ This contingent shall be maintained at the expense of his Sardinian Majesty, and shall be

under the command of the General-in-chief of the French army in Italy.

“The mode of service for this contingent shall be settled by a particular convention drawn up with the approbation of the said general.

“VI. The troops which shall form the said contingent shall participate, in proportion to their numbers present under arms, in the contributions to be imposed on the conquered countries, reckoning from the day on which this contingent shall join the army of the Republic.

“VII. The French Republic promises to procure for his Sardinian Majesty, at the general or continental peace, all the advantages which circumstances may enable it to obtain.

“VIII. Neither of the two contracting powers shall conclude any separate treaty of peace with the common enemy; nor shall any armistice be entered into by the French Republic with the armies covering Italy, without including his Sardinian Majesty therein.

“IX. All contributions laid on the states of his Sardinian Majesty, not yet acquitted or discharged, shall cease immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

“X. The supplies which from the same period shall be furnished in the states of his Majesty the King of Sardinia to the French troops and the prisoners of war taken to France, as well as se

which have been furnished pursuant to particular agreements for that purpose, and which have not yet been paid or compensated for by the French Republic in consequence of the said agreements, shall be rendered in kind to the troops forming the contingent of his Sardinian Majesty; and in case the supplies to be so rendered should exceed the occasions of the contingent, the balance shall be discharged in money.

“XI. The two contracting powers shall forthwith appoint commissioners empowered to negotiate in their names a treaty of commerce, conformably to the terms agreed upon in the seventh article of the treaty of peace, concluded at Paris between the French Republic and his Majesty the King of Sardinia: in the mean time the posts and commercial relations shall be re-established without delay, as they existed previously to the war.

“XII. The ratifications of the present treaty of alliance shall be exchanged at Paris with the least delay possible.

“Done and signed at Turin, the 16th of Germinal, year V. of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

(Signed)

H. CLARKE.

CLEMENT DAMIAN.”

The Directory did not openly declare its intentions, but it was evident that it would not ratify this treaty. Napoleon, on the other hand, per-

sisted in regarding this ratification as indispensably necessary. He justly thought it highly important to add to his army a division of good veteran Piedmontese troops, whose valour he esteemed. Considering himself as personally engaged to the Court of Sardinia, he used all means in his power to guarantee the interior tranquillity of the King's dominions. The Piedmontese malcontents nevertheless increased in numbers daily; they took up arms, and the revolutionists were defeated. This situation was extremely delicate; it excited the resentment of the French and Italian Jacobins in the highest degree; and when the royalists had triumphed at Turin, the arrests and oppressive proceedings in which they indulged gave rise to innumerable complaints addressed to head-quarters.

At the end of September, when the Directory signed the ultimatum for the negotiations of Campo Formio, they intimated to Napoleon their perseverance in the determination not to sign the treaty of alliance with Sardinia. The minister of exterior relations, in communicating the intentions of the Directory, suggested to Napoleon the expediency of having the Sardinian soldiers enticed to desert by the Italian recruiting agents; which would enable him, said the minister, to obtain the 10,000 men of the Piedmontese contingent without incurring any obligation to the Court of Turin.

But the establishments, which constitute the strength of troops, could not be enticed to desert: besides, an operation of this kind could not be accomplished without a great loss of time, and it was necessary to take the field immediately. This conduct of the Directory was one of the causes which determined Napoleon to sign the peace of Campo Formio, without attending to the ultimatum of the French government of the 29th of September, which could not, in his opinion, be inserted in the protocol without producing a rupture. But the Directory at last perceived the importance of reinforcing the army of Italy with the 10,000 men of the Piedmontese contingent; they determined on ratifying the treaty of Turin, and sent it on the 21st of October to the Legislative Body; but it was now too late, for peace with Austria had been signed on the 17th at Campo Formio.

Thus, after Napoleon's campaigns in Italy, the King of Sardinia retained his throne, weakened indeed by the loss of Savoy and the county of Nice, and by that of his fortresses, part of which had been demolished, and the remainder were in the power of the French, who placed garrisons in them; but he had gained the immense advantage of being in alliance with the Republic which guaranteed the integrity of his estates. This prince, however, did not deceive himself with re-

spect to the situation in which he stood: he knew that he owed the preservation of his throne solely to Napoleon, and that the apparent alliance of the Directory was far from sincere. He had a presentiment of his approaching fall. Surrounded on every side by the French, Ligurian, and Cisalpine democracies, he had also to contend with the power of public opinion amongst his own subjects: for the Piedmontese loudly called for a revolution, and the Court already looked to Sardinia as a place of refuge.

IV.

The Court of Rome, at first, faithfully abided by the treaty of Tolentino; but soon afterwards yielded to the influence of Cardinal Busca and Albani, recommenced its levies of troops, and had the imprudence to bid open defiance to France, by sending for General Provera to command its troops. It also refused to acknowledge the Cisalpine republic. The victorious attitude of France, and the threats of her ambassador, soon put an end to this empty affectation of independence. Provera remained but a few days at Rome, and departed once more for Austria. The Cisalpine Republic, seizing in this opportunity to get possession of some of the provinces of the Holy See, declared war against the Vatican. Persecuted by the approaching storm which threatened the

these feeble, rash old men fell on their knees, and gave the Cisalpine Directory every satisfaction it could require.

If this conduct presents no traces of the ancient policy which for so many centuries distinguished the Vatican, it is because that government was worn out. The temporal power of the Pope was no longer predominant; it was drawing towards its end, as the sovereignty of the ecclesiastical electors of the empire had terminated.

V.

The Court of Naples was governed by the Queen, a woman of remarkable strength of mind, but all whose ideas were as disorderly as the passions which agitated her bosom. The treaty of Paris of the 10th of October, 1796, had made no alteration in the disposition of this Cabinet, which continued to raise troops and excite anxiety during the whole of the year 1797; yet no treaty could be more favourable to Naples than this, which was worded as follows:—

“The French Republic and his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, being equally actuated by a wish to substitute the advantages of peace for the calamities inseparable from war, have appointed the persons hereinafter named, that is

to say—The Executive Directory, citizen Charles Delacroix, minister of exterior relations; and his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, the Prince di Belmonte Pignatelli, his gentleman of the chamber and minister plenipotentiary to his Catholic Majesty,—to negotiate in their names the clauses and conditions proper to restore good understanding and friendship between the two powers; who, having exchanged their respective powers, have agreed on the following articles:—

“ART. I. There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between the French Republic and his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies. Consequently all hostilities shall definitively cease from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

“In the mean time and until that period, the conditions stipulated by the armistice, concluded on the 17th of Prairial, year IV. (4 June, 1796), shall continue in full force and effect.

“II. Every act, engagement, or anterior convention entered into by either of the contracting parties, which may be contrary to the present treaty, shall be revoked, and regarded as null and as not having taken place: consequently neither of the two powers shall be at liberty, during the present war, to supply the enemies of the other

with any aid, in troops, ships, arms, military stores, provisions, or money, under any pretext or denomination whatsoever.

“ III. His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies shall observe the most scrupulous neutrality towards all the belligerent powers; he consequently engages to prohibit indiscriminately all ships-fitted out for war, belonging to the said powers, exceeding four at the utmost, from entering his ports, according to the known rules of the abovementioned neutrality. All supplies of stores or goods known by the description of contraband shall be refused to them.

“ IV. Entire safety and protection against all persons whomsoever shall be granted in the ports and roads of the Two Sicilies to all French merchantmen, whatever may be their numbers; and to all the ships of war of the Republic, not exceeding the number stated in the preceding article.

“ V. The French Republic and his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies mutually engage to take off the sequestrations from all effects, revenues, and goods, seized, confiscated, or detained from the citizens and subjects of both powers in consequence of the present war, and to admit them respectively to the exercise of such actions and rights as may belong to them.

“ VI. All prisoners made on both sides, in-

cluding sailors and seamen, shall be mutually restored within one month from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, on paying the debts they may have contracted during their captivity: the sick and wounded shall continue to be taken care of in the respective hospitals, and shall be restored immediately upon their recovery.

“VII. His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, in order to give a proof of his friendship to the French Republic, and of his sincere desire to maintain perfect harmony between the two powers, consents to cause to be set at liberty every French citizen who may have been arrested and may be detained in his states on account of his opinions with respect to the French revolution: all their effects and property, moveable and immoveable, which may have been sequestered or confiscated on the same account, shall be restored to them.

“VIII. From the motives in which the foregoing article originated, his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies engages to make all convenient searches in order to discover, by means of the tribunals, and to abandon to the severity of the laws, the persons who stole the papers belonging to the last minister of the French Republic, at Naples in 1793.

“IX. The ambassadors or ministers of the two

contracting powers shall enjoy, in the respective states, the same prerogatives and precedence as they enjoyed before the war, except those which were attached to them as family ambassadors.

“ X. Every French citizen, and all those who shall compose the households of the ambassador or minister, and of the consuls and other accredited and recognised agents of the French Republic, shall enjoy, in the states of his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, the same freedom of worship as is enjoyed by the individuals of those nations, not being Catholic, which are most favoured in this respect.

“ XI. A treaty of commerce between the two powers shall be negotiated and concluded with as little delay as possible, upon the basis of mutual advantage, and upon such terms as shall secure to the French nation benefits equal to those which are enjoyed by the most favoured nations in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Until the execution of such treaty, commercial and consular relations shall be mutually re-established in the state in which they stood before the war.

“ XII. Conformably to the sixth article of the treaty concluded at the Hague on the 27th of Floreal, year III. of the Republic (May 16, 1795), the peace, friendship, and good understanding sti-

pulated by the present treaty between the French Republic and his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, shall take place between his said Majesty and the Batavian Republic.

“XIII. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged within forty days at furthest from the day of the signature thereof.

“Done at Paris, the 19th of Vendemiaire, year V. of the French Republic one and indivisible, answering to the 10th of October, 1796 (old style).

(Signed)

CHARLES DELACROIX.

The Prince di BELMONTE PIGNATELLI.”

When Napoleon was in the Marches, menacing Rome, Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, the Neapolitan minister, who was at head-quarters, shewed him, in confidence, a letter from the Queen, informing him that she was about to order 30,000 men to march to cover Rome. “I thank you for this confidential communication,” said the General, “and in return I will make you a similar one.” He rang for his secretary, ordered him to bring the papers relating to Naples, took out a despatch which he had written to the Directory in the month of November 1796, before the taking of Mantua, and read as follows: “The difficulties arising from Alvinzi’s approach would not prevent me from sending 6000 Lombards and Poles to punish the Court of Rome; but as it

is probable that the King of Naples might send 30,000 men to defend the Holy See, I shall not march on Rome until Mantua shall have fallen, and the reinforcements you announce shall have arrived, in order that, in case the Court of Naples should violate the treaty of Paris, I might have 25,000 men disposable to occupy its capital and compel it to take refuge in Sicily." In the course of the night Prince Pignatelli despatched an extraordinary courier, doubtless for the purpose of informing the Queen of the manner in which her insinuation had been received.

Ever since the treaty of Paris the Neapolitan legations had generally behaved with more hostility and arrogance towards the French than during the war; and the ambassadors of Naples often had the temerity to say openly that the peace would not be of long duration. This rash and foolish conduct did not prevent the Court of Naples from indulging in dreams of ambition. During the conferences of Montebello, Udine, and Passeriano, the Queen's envoy tried to obtain the islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, and Santa Maura, the Marches of Maccrata, Ferrara, and Ancona, and the duchy of Urbino. He even went so far as to express her wish to enrich herself with the spoils of the Pope and the Republic of Venice; and the Queen expected to gain these acquisitions through the patronage of France.

and particularly by the intervention of Napoleon. The Court of Naples survived the peace of Campo Formio, and might have remained tranquil and prosperous amidst the storms which agitated Europe and Italy, had it been directed by sound policy.

VI.

It was found necessary to yield to the wishes of the people of Lombardy, and form them into a democratical and independent state under the title of the Transpadan Republic, comprising all the left bank of the Po, from the Mincio to the Ticino. The Cispadan Republic was on the right bank of the Po, from the states of Parma (which it did not include) to the Adriatic. The constitution of the Cispadan state had been decreed in a congress of the representatives of the nation, and submitted to the people for acceptance, who had voted its establishment by an immense majority, and it had been carried into execution at the latter end of April. The nobles and priests had succeeded in getting themselves elected to all public situations; the citizens accused them of not being well affected towards the new order of things; the discontent was general. Napoleon felt the necessity of giving these two republics a definitive organization.

Immediately after the refusal of the Court of Vienna to ratify the convention signed at Mon-

tebello, with the Marquis de Gallo, which contained the terms of the definitive peace, Napoleon created the Cisalpine Republic. This was composed of the Cispadan and Transpadan Republics; whereby four millions of inhabitants were united under the same government, composing a mass of force calculated to have a powerful influence on subsequent operations. But the authorities of the Cispadan state obstinately objected to an union which was repugnant to all their prejudices. The Governments of Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara, considered the necessity of uniting under one government as a great hardship. The spirit of locality every where opposed the junction of the people on the two banks of the Po; and the attempt to effect this fusion by the consent of the people would probably have failed, but for the hopes they were led to form that it was but a prelude to the union of all the nations of the peninsula under a single government. The secret inclination of all the *Italians* to form a single great nation prevailed over all the petty passions of the local administrations. Two peculiar circumstances strengthened this motive. Romagna, which the Pope had ceded by the treaty of Tolentino, had proclaimed itself independent under the title of the Emilian Republic, having declined an union with the Cispadan on account of its antipathy to Bologna; but this republic ardently embraced the idea of form-

ing part of the Cisalpine Republic, the formation of which it solicited by several petitions. In the mean time Venice and the Terra Firma states, uneasy at the secrecy of the preliminaries, voted in the popular assemblies the formation of the Italian Republic. These two circumstances removed all difficulties. The spirit of locality gave way to public spirit; private interests yielded to the good of the community; the amalgamation was decreed by general consent.

The new republic took the name of Cisalpine. Milan was its capital. This excited some disapprobation at Paris, where there were some persons who would have had it called the Transalpine Republic. But as the Italians fixed their hopes upon Rome, and the union of the whole peninsula in a single state, the denomination of Cisalpine was that which flattered their passions, and which they insisted on adopting, not daring to call this state the Italian Republic.

By the treaty of Campo Formio the Cisalpine Republic obtained the addition of that part of the states of Venice which was situated on the right bank of the Adige; which, added to the acquisition of the Valteline, gave it a population of 3,600,000 souls. These provinces, the richest and finest in Europe, composed ten departments. They extended from the mountains of Switzerland to the Tuscan and Roman Apennines, and from the Ticino to the Adriatic.

Napoleon would willingly have given the Cisalpine state a different constitution from that of France. With this view he had desired to have some celebrated publicist, such as Sieyes, sent to him at Milan; but this idea did not please the Directory: they required the Cisalpine Republic to adopt the French constitution of 1795. The first Cisalpine Directory was composed of Serbelloni, Alessandri, Paradisi, Moscati, and Containi, leaders of the French party in Italy. Serbelloni was one of the greatest lords in Lombardy. On the 30th of June they were installed in the palace of Milan. The independence of the Cisalpine Republic had been proclaimed on the 29th in the following terms:—

“ The Cisalpine Republic had for many years been subject to the sway of the house of Austria. The French Republic had succeeded to the latter by right of conquest, which it henceforth renounces, and leaves the Cisalpine Republic free and independent. Acknowledged by France and by the Emperor, it will speedily be recognised by all Europe. The Executive Directory of the French Republic, not content with having employed its influence and the victories of the Republican armies in securing the existence of the Cisalpine Republic, extends its solicitude still farther; and convinced, that, if liberty is the first of blessings, a protracted revolution is the most

terrible of calamities, gives the Cisalpine people its own constitution, which is the result of the knowledge of the most enlightened nation in the world. The Cisalpine people is therefore on the point of exchanging a military for a constitutional government. In order to effect this transition without any shock, without anarchy, the Executive Directory has deemed it expedient to appoint, for this time only, the members of the Government and Legislative Body; so that the people will not appoint to vacant places, conformably to the constitution, until after the expiration of a year. No republic has existed in Italy for many years. The sacred fire of liberty has been extinguished, and the finest part of Europe has been subjugated by foreigners. It belongs to the Cisalpine Republic to convince the world, by its prudence, its energy, and the organization of its armies, that modern Italy has not degenerated, but is still worthy of liberty.

“The General-in-chief Bonaparte, in the name of the French Republic, and in consequence of the above proclamation, nominates as members of the Directory of the Cisalpine Republic, Citizens Serbelloni, Alessandri, Moscati, and Paradisi: the fifth member shall be appointed without delay. These four members will be installed tomorrow at Milan.”

A general federation of the national guards and

the authorities of the new Republic took place at the Lazaretto of Milan. On the 14th of July 30,000 national guards or deputies from the départements took an oath of fraternity, and swore to employ their utmost efforts to revive the liberty of Italy, and make her once more a nation. The Cisalpine Directory appointed its ministers and executive authorities, constituted its military establishment, and governed the Republic as an independent state. The keys of Milan and of all the fortresses were delivered by the French to the Cisalpine officers. The army left the states of the Republic, and went into cantonments in the territory of Venice. From this period may be dated the first formation of the Italian army, which afterwards became numerous, and acquired a great share of glory.

The manners of the Italians underwent an immediate change; a few years afterwards they were no longer the same people. The cassock, which was the fashionable dress for youth, gave place to regimentals; instead of passing their time at the feet of women, the young Italians now frequented the riding and fencing-schools, and fields of exercise; the children no longer played at *chapel*; they had regiments armed with tin guns, and imitated the occurrences of war in their games. In the comedies, and the street farces, there had always been an Italian,

represented as a very cowardly though witty fellow, and a kind of bullying captain,—sometimes a Frenchman, but more frequently a German—a very powerful, brave, and brutal character, who never failed to conclude with caning the Italian, to the great satisfaction of the applauding spectators. But such allusions were now no longer endured by the populace; authors now brought brave Italians on the stage, putting foreigners to flight, and defending their honour and their rights, with the approbation of the public. A national spirit had arisen : Italy had songs at once patriotic and warlike ; and the women contemptuously repulsed those men who affected effeminate manners in order to please them.

VII.

The Valteline is composed of three valleys ; the Valteline properly so called, the Bormio, and the Chiavenna ; its population is 160,000 souls ; its inhabitants profess the Roman Catholic religion, and speak Italian. It belongs geographically to Italy ; it borders the Adda down to its discharge into the lake of Como, and it is separated from Germany by the Higher Alps. It is eighteen leagues in length, and six in breadth. Chiavenna, its capital, is situate two leagues from the lake of Como, and fourteen leagues from Coire, which is seventeen leagues from Bormio. The Valteline

was anciently part of the Milanese. Barnabas Visconti, Archbishop and Duke of Milan, in 1404, gave these three valleys to the church of Coire. In 1512, the Grison Leagues were invested with the sovereignty of the Valteline by Sforza, upon certain conditional statutes which the Dukes of Milan were to guarantee. The people of the Valteline thus found themselves subject to the three Leagues, most of the inhabitants of which speak German and are protestants, and are separated from the Valteline by the high chain of the Alps.

There is no condition more dreadful than that of a nation which is subject to another nation. It was thus that the Lower Valais was subject to the Upper Valais, and the *Pays de Vaud* to the canton of Berne. The unfortunate people of the Valteline had long complained of the oppressions they suffered, and the humiliating yoke to which they were subjected. The Grisons, poor and ignorant, used to come to enrich themselves in the Valteline, the inhabitants of which were richer and more civilized. The lowest peasant of the Leagues considered himself as much superior to the richest inhabitant of the Valteline, as a sovereign to his subjects. Unquestionably, if there be any situation which justifies insurrection and demands a change, it is that in which the Valteline groaned.

In the course of May 1797 the people of the three valleys revolted, took up arms, drove out their pretended sovereigns, unfurled the Italian tri-coloured flag, appointed a provisional government, and addressed a manifesto to all powers, setting forth their grievances, and the resolution they had adopted to regain by force of arms the rights of which no people can be deprived. They sent the deputies Juidiconni, Planta, and Paribelli, men of merit, to Montebello, to claim the execution of their statutes, which had been violated by the Grisons in every point.

Napoleon was reluctant to interfere in questions which might affect Switzerland, and which, in that point of view, were of general importance. But having, nevertheless, had the documents relating to this business examined in the archives of Milan, he found that the Milanese Government was in fact invested with the right of guaranteeing the statutes ; and as the Leagues also solicited his assistance to compel the people of the Valteline, their subjects, to return to subordination and obedience, he accepted the office of mediator, and appointed both parties to appear before his tribunal in the course of the following July, to defend their respective rights. In this interval the Leagues implored the intervention of the Helvetic body. Barthelemy, the French minister at Berne, solicited strongly in their favour. At

length, after many intrigues on both sides, Napoleon, previously to giving a final decision, invited both parties, by way of suggestion, to come to an amicable arrangement; and proposed to them, as a mode of reconciliation, that the Valteline should form a fourth League equal in every respect to the three former. This suggestion deeply wounded the pride of the Grison peasants. *How could it be imagined that a peasant who drinks the water of the Adda could be the equal of one who drinks the water of the Rhine?* They were highly offended at so unreasonable a proposal as that of equalizing catholic peasants who spoke Italian and were rich and enlightened, to protestant peasants who spoke German and were poor and ignorant. The leading characters amongst them did not share these prejudices, but were misled by avarice. They found the Valteline an important source of revenues and riches, which they could not make up their minds to abandon. They intrigued at Paris, Vienna, and Berne. Promises were held out to them; they were advised to gain time; and they were blamed for having provoked and agreed to the mediation. They declined conciliatory measures, and sent no deputies at the period fixed for discussing the execution of the statutes before the mediator, in opposition to the deputies of the Valteline.

Napoleon gave judgment by default against the Leagues; and as the arbitrator chosen by both parties, and as representing the sovereign of Milan, who was pledged to the performance of the statutes of the Valteline, pronounced his decision in these terms, on the 19th of Vendemiaire, year VI. (10th October, 1797):—

“ The people of the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio revolted against the laws of the Grisons, and declared themselves independent in Prairial last. The government of the Republic of the Grisons, after having used all means in its power to reduce its subjects to obedience, resorted to the mediation of the French Republic, in the person of General Bonaparte, to whom they sent Gaudenzio Planta as their deputy.

“ The people of the Valteline, on their side, having also required the same mediation, the General-in-chief assembled the respective deputations at Montebello, on the 4th of Messidor (June 22); and, after a conference of considerable length, accepted in the name of the French Republic the proposed mediation. He wrote to the Grisons and the Valtelines, requiring them to send their deputies to him as soon as possible.

“ The people of the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio, punctually sent the deputies demanded.

“ Several months elapsed, and the Grison

government sent no deputies, notwithstanding the reiterated requests of Citizen Comeyras, resident of the Republic at Coire.

“On the 6th of Fructidor last (23d August), the General-in-chief, considering the anarchy that prevailed in the Valteline, had a letter written to the Grison government, giving it notice to send its deputation before the 24th of Fructidor (10th September).

“The 19th of Vendemiaire (10th October) is arrived, and no deputies from the Grisons have appeared.

“They have not only failed to appear, but there is no room to doubt that, in contempt of the mediation accepted by the French Republic, the Leagues have prejudged the question, and the refusal to send deputies arises from deep intrigues.

“In consequence whereof, the General-in-chief, in the name of the French Republic:

“Considering, 1st, That the good faith, honourable conduct, and confidence of the people of the Valteline, Chiavenna and Bormio, towards the French Republic, claim a similar return from the latter, as well as its assistance;

“2dly.—That the French Republic, in consequence of the demand made by the Grisons, is become the mediatrix, and, as it were, the arbitress, of the fate of the people;

“ 3dly.—That it is beyond doubt that the Grisons have infringed the statutes they were bound to observe towards the people of the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio ; and that, consequently, the latter have regained the rights which Nature gives to all mankind ;

“ 4thly.—That a people cannot be subject to another people, without an infraction of public and natural rights ;

“ 5thly.—That the wishes of the inhabitants of the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio are decidedly in favour of their union with the Cisalpine Republic ;

“ 6thly.—That a conformity of religion and language, the local peculiarities, the nature of the communications, and the course of commerce, also justify this incorporation of the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio with the Cisalpine Republic, from which, moreover, these three countries were in former times severed ;

“ 7thly.—That, since the decree of the communes which compose the three Grison Leagues, the course which the mediator might have adopted, of organizing the Valteline as a fourth Grison League, stands rejected ; and that, consequently, the Valteline has no refuge from tyranny, except in an union with the Cisalpine Republic ;

“ Determines, by virtue of the power with which the French Republic is invested, by the

demand made of its mediation by the Grisons and Valtelines, that the people of the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio are at liberty to unite themselves with the Cisalpine Republic."

The question was now decided. The unfortunate inhabitants of the Valteline were now transported with joy and enthusiasm; the Grisons were frantic with rage and mortification. Immediately after this award, the Valteline and Cisalpine people negotiated and effected their incorporation. The Grisons then perceived their error. They wrote to Napoleon that their deputies were setting out to appear before him and defend their rights, thus pretending to be ignorant of what had occurred. He informed them, in reply, that it was too late; that his judgment had been pronounced on the 10th of October; that the Valteline was already united with the Cisalpine Republic; and that the question was now settled for ever.

The justice thus done to this petty nation made a strong impression on all generous minds. The principles on which Napoleon's sentence was founded echoed throughout all Europe, and aimed a mortal blow at the usurpation of the Swiss cantons, which held more than one people in subjection. It might have been expected that the aristocracy of Berne would have been sufficiently warned by this example, to feel that the

moment for making some concessions to the enlightened state of the age, to the influence of France, and to justice, had arrived. But prejudices and pride never listen to the voice of reason, nature, or religion. An oligarchy yields to nothing but force. It was not until several years afterwards that the inhabitants of the Upper Valais consented to look upon the inhabitants of the Lower Valais as their equals; and that the peasants of the *Pays de Vaud* and Argovie forced the oligarchs of Berne to acknowledge their rights and independence.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE EIGHTEENTH OF FRUCTIDOR.

- I. Of the Executive Directory.—II. Public spirit.—III. Religious affairs.—IV. New system of weights and measures.—V. The Factions which divide the Republic.—VI. Conspiracy against the Republic, headed by Pichegru.—VII. Napoleon defeats this conspiracy.—VIII. Eighteenth of Fructidor.—IX. Law of the nineteenth of Fructidor.

I.

THE apparent advantages attendant on the form of government prescribed by the constitution of 1795, placed it at first very high in public opinion. A council of five magistrates, having responsible ministers for the execution of its orders, was likely to have sufficient leisure to give all business mature deliberation: the same spirit, the same principles were to be transmitted uninterruptedly from age to age; there were no more regencies or minorities to fear. But these visionary ideas were soon dispelled; disadvantages of every description, the inevitable results of the amalgamation of five separate interests, the jarring of the passions and opposite characters of five individuals, were soon perceived. Men

now perceived all the difference that exists between an individual created by nature, and an artificial being which has neither heart nor soul, and inspires neither confidence, love, nor veneration.

The five directors divided the palace of the Luxembourg amongst themselves, and settled there with their families, which they brought into notice. Hence arose five little city courts, placed side by side, and disturbed by the passions of the women, the children, and the servants. The supreme magistracy was degraded ; the men of 1793 and the elevated classes of society were equally shocked. The spirit of the constitution was violated. A director was neither a minister, a prefect, nor a general ; he was but a fifth part of a whole. He ought never to have attracted public attention but when in council. His wife, children, and servants ought not to have seemed to know that he was a member of the government ; the director should have remained a private citizen. But the Directory should have been surrounded with all the pomp, etiquette, and splendour which become the supreme magistracy of a great nation. This splendour should have been that of power, and not that of a court. The director going out of office would then have perceived no alteration in his domestic condition, and would have suffered no privation.

It was from this feeling that the constitution had allowed him only the moderate sum of 100,000 francs for his appointments, and that the expenses of ceremony for the Directory were stated in the budget at five millions, under the title of *House Expenses*. A salary of 100,000 francs was therefore sufficient; but it should have been secured to the Director for life, which would have rendered it fair to require a director going out of office never more to fill any public situation, and would have secured his independence.

II.

The Republic was disunited. One party had confidence in the constitution of 1795; another would have had a president at the head of the government; a third regretted the constitution of 1793. Lastly, the emigrants, the remains of the privileged classes, ardently wished for a counter-revolution: but this last party was composed only of a few individuals. The emigrants were dying of want in foreign countries; and the three first-mentioned parties comprised the whole population of France. Many people would have wished to have the Directory composed of persons who had taken no part in public affairs since the 10th of August.

The five directors had voted for the death of the King: it had been expected that they would

employ all those of their colleagues in the convention who had not been re-elected to the councils ; but this was not the case. The title of a *Conventional* soon became a cause of dislike, and shortly afterwards a ground of proscription. The state police took measures to expel them from Paris, and compel them to withdraw to their place of domicile. The men of 1793 had at first appeared disposed to attach themselves to the car of a government composed of men who had all been violent Jacobins ; but the proceedings of the Directory displeased them ; they did not find that simplicity of manners which flattered their passions ; they were enraged at the appearance of a court ; and being accustomed to respect no consideration whatever, to observe no bounds, they indulged freely in all kinds of sarcasms. This exasperated the Directory, which took severe measures against them. Being thus driven to extremities, they conspired together to deliver themselves from the yoke of the *five gentlemen* of the Luxembourg. They now remembered that Rewbell had shut up the Jacobins' meeting ; that Barras had marched against them on the 9th of Thermidor ; and that La Reveillere Lepaux was one of the seventy-three : Carnot, alone, was irreproachable in their opinion.

The party which wished for the government of a president would have sincerely attached them-

selves to the Directory, had the latter appeared to place confidence in them: but, on the contrary, they were designated as enemies on the very first opportunity. This party was therefore disaffected, and became inimical, if not to the Republic, at least to the administration.

The Directory endeavoured to gain partisans in the privileged classes, but without success. These shewed no respect whatever for persons destitute of the advantages of birth, and of all personal claims to distinction.

The armies, however, rallied round a government founded on the principles for which they had been fighting for five years, and which secured them more stability and consideration.

Thus the two extreme parties came forward again: the men of 1793, because they were persecuted; and the privileged classes, because they were courted.

Soon afterwards the Directory adopted the fatal system of policy known by the name of *bascule* (sec-saw): this was founded on the principle of equally keeping down both parties; so that when either of them compromised itself and incurred the severity of government, the other was always visited by the same act and at the same moment, even when it had on that occasion seconded the intentions of the ruling party. A general sense of the injustice, absurdity, and immorality of

of rest. The Directory went farther still; and prohibited the people, under correctional penalties, from working on the *decadi*, and from resting on the Sunday; employing the peace-officers, gendarmes, and commissaries of police to enforce the execution of these absurd regulations. The people were thus tormented and exposed to penalties and vexations for matters which have nothing to do with order and social interest. The public voice appealed in vain to the rights of man, the dispositions of constitutions, the laws which guaranteed liberty of conscience, and the right of every one to do whatever injures neither the state nor any other individual. It is difficult to conceive the hatred which this conduct excited against a government which thus tyrannized over the citizens in all the affairs of life, in the name of liberty and the rights of man.

IV.

The want of uniformity in the French weights and measures is an inconvenience which has always been felt; it has several times been noticed by the states-general. The Revolution was expected to remedy this evil. The law on this subject was so simple that it might have been drawn up in the course of twenty-four hours, and adopted in practice throughout France in less than a year. The system of weights and measures used in the

city of Paris ought to have been rendered common to all the provinces. The government and artists had for centuries used this system; and by sending standards into all the communes, and obliging the administrations and tribunals to admit no other weights or measures, the benefit would have been produced without effort, without difficulty, and without coercive laws. But geometers and algebraists were consulted upon a question which was wholly within the province of administration. They thought that the unity of weights and measures ought to be deduced from natural principles, in order to secure its adoption by all nations. They conceived that it was not sufficient to confer a benefit on 40,000,000 of people: they wished the whole world to participate in it. They found that the metre was an aliquot part of the meridian; this they demonstrated and proclaimed in an assembly composed of French, Italian, Spanish, and Dutch geometers. A new system of unity of weights and measures was thenceforth enacted, which neither agreed with the regulations of public administration, with the tables of dimensions used in all arts, nor with those of any of the existing machines. There was no real advantage to be expected from the extension of this system to the world in general. Besides, this scheme was impracticable; it would have been

opposed by the national spirit of the English and Germans. Gregory VII., indeed, reformed the calendar, and rendered it common to all Europe; but this was because that reformation was connected with religious ideas, and was not effected by a nation, but by the power of the church. But in the new system, the good of the present generation was sacrificed to abstractions and vain hopes; for in order to make an ancient nation adopt a new system of weights and measures, all the regulations of government, and all the calculations of the arts, must be altered; an undertaking the immensity of which startles the understanding. The new system of weights and measures, whatever it be, has an ascending and descending scale which does not agree in simple numbers with the scale of the system of weights and measures which has for ages been used by the government, by men of science, and by artists. The translation from one nomenclature to the other cannot be made; because what is expressed by the simplest figure in the one, would become a compound cypher in the other. It is therefore necessary to increase or diminish by some fractions, so that the matter or weight expressed in the new nomenclature may be expressed in simple cyphers. Thus, for instance, a soldier's ration is expressed by twenty-four ounces in the old nomenclature: this is a very

simple number; but when translated into the new one, it becomes seven hundred and thirty-four grammes, and two hundred and fifty-nine thousandths. It is therefore evident that it must be increased or diminished, to make it seven hundred and thirty-four, or seven hundred and thirty-five grammes. All the dimensions and lines that compose architectural works, all the tools and measures used in clock-making, jewelry, paper-making, and all the arts, all instruments and machines, had been invented and calculated according to the ancient nomenclature, and were expressed by simple numbers, which could only be translated by five or six figures. All was therefore to begin again.

The *savans* conceived another idea, wholly unconnected with the benefit of the unity of weights and measures; they adopted the decimal numeration, taking the metre for unity, and suppressed all complex numbers. Nothing can be more contrary to the organization of the mind, the memory, and the imagination. A fathom, a foot, an inch, a line, or a point, are fixed portions of extension, which the imagination conceives independently of their reciprocal relations: if, therefore, the third of an inch be demanded, the mind immediately acts, and divides the extent called an inch into three parts. But by the new system, the operation which the mind had to per-

form was not to divide an inch into three parts, but to divide a metre into one hundred and eleven parts. The experience of all ages had so completely established the difficulty of dividing a space or a weight into a greater number of parts than twelve, that a new complex name had been given to each of these divisions. If the twelfth of an inch were required, the operation was already performed; it was the complex number called a line. Decimal numeration applied to all the complex numbers as well as to unity; and if a hundredth part of a point or of a line was the quantity required, a hundredth was written: by the new system, if it is wished to express a hundredth part of a line, it is necessary to refer to its relation with the metre, which leads to an infinite calculation. The divisor 12 had been preferred to the divisor 10, because 10 has but two factors, 2 and 5; whilst 12 has four, viz. 2, 3, 4, and 6. It is true that decimal numeration, generalized and exclusively adapted to the metre as unity, facilitates the labours of astronomers and calculators; but these advantages are far from compensating the disadvantage of rendering thought more difficult. The first object of every method ought to be to assist the conception and imagination, to facilitate recollection, and to increase the power of thought. Complex numbers are as old as man, because they are as inherent

in the nature of his organization, as it is in the nature of decimal numeration to adapt itself to every unity, to every complex number, and not to one unity exclusively.

Finally, they made use of Greek roots, which farther multiplied difficulties ; for these denominations, although they might be useful to the learned, did not suit the people. The weights and measures were one of the principal affairs of the Directory. Instead of leaving time to work the change, and merely encouraging the new system by all the power of example and fashion, they made compulsory laws, and had them rigorously executed. Merchants and citizens found themselves harassed about matters which were in themselves indifferent ; and this increased the unpopularity of a government which placed itself above the wants and the reach of the people, infringing their usages, habits, and customs with all the violence that might have been expected from a Greek or Tartar conqueror, who, with the staff in his hand, insists upon obedience to all his commands, which are dictated only by his own prejudices and interests, to the total exclusion of those of the vanquished. The new system of weights and measures will be a subject of embarrassment and difficulties for several generations ; and it is probable that the first learned commission employed to verify the measure of

the meridian will find it necessary to make some corrections. Thus are nations tormented about trifles!

V.

The elections to the Legislative Body brought men into public business who were of a contrary opinion to the Directory; the natural consequence of its false policy and bad administration. General Pichegru, deputy from the Jura to the Five Hundred, was named by acclamation president of that council; (his connexions with foreigners were then unknown;) Barthelemy was appointed to the Directory in the place of Letouroeur. These two nominations were highly approved by the public. Pichegru was then the most renowned general of the Republic; he had conquered Holland. Barthelemy was the minister who had negotiated the peace with the King of Prussia and the King of Spain.

The Directory divided into two parties: Rewbell, Barras, and La Reveillere, formed the majority; Carnot and Barthelemy the minority.

The ministry was changed. Benezech, minister of the interior, and Cochon l'Apparaut, minister of police, were implicated in the discoveries of Duverne de Presle. Petiet and Truguet adhered to the moderate party in the councils; they had contributed to restore to their country a great

number of emigrants, whose presence gave umbrage. Not all the eminent services which the minister Petiet had performed in the war department,—nor even the merit of having been the first, since the Revolution, who had rendered a clear and exact account of the expenses of his administration,—could save him from the displeasure of the factious; although he was then, as throughout his long career of administration, remarkable for extraordinary integrity. He left no fortune at his death, and his children inherited nothing but the esteem which he had so honourably acquired. Ramel and Merlin were the only ministers retained. Three parties were formed in the councils: the determined republicans, who sided with the majority of the Directory, excepting as far as their particular affections were concerned;—the partisans of the princes and of foreigners; of which party Pichegru, Willot, Imbert Colomès, Rovere, and two or three more, were the only persons in the secret;—and the Clichy clubbists; amongst whom were several highly respectable and well-meaning men, but ignorant of affairs, discontented, and enemies to the directors, the conventionals, and the revolutionary government.

The *Clichy* party represented themselves as wise, moderate, good Frenchmen. Were they republicans? No. Were they royalists? No. They were for the constitution of 1791, then? No.

For that of 1793 ? Still less. That of 1795, perhaps ? Yes and no. What were they, then ? They themselves did not know. They would have consented to such a thing, *but* —; to another, *if* —. What gave them life and activity was the applauses they obtained in the saloons, and the praises resulting from their successes in the tribunes. They voted with the royalist committee without knowing it ; they were astonished, when convinced, after their fall, that Pichegru, Imbert Colomès, Willot, De La Haye, &c. were conspirators ; and that all those five harangues and grand speeches which they had pronounced were acts of conspiracy, in furtherance of the policy of Pitt and the princes. Nothing could have been farther from their thoughts ; they had not courage enough to conspire. Carnot and many of the Clichy club have since proved by their conduct that they were far from intending to contrive any plot against the Republic. Carnot was misled by his hatred of the Thermidorians ; his feelings had been deeply wounded, ever since the 9th of Thermidor, by the general opinion, which attributed all the blood shed on the scaffold to the Committee of Public Safety ; he stood in need of the respect of the world. He was influenced by those who ruled the tribunes, and the public prints.

The great majority of the writers of those

journals were against the Directory, the Convention, and the Revolution. Some of them endeavoured by these sentiments to purchase oblivion of the crimes they had committed during the reign of the revolutionary government, whose agents they had been; and several were in the pay of the treasury of London. The Directory did not oppose journal to journal, press to press, and pen to pen; whether they were not sensible of the importance of such measures, or whether they were unable or unwilling to make the necessary pecuniary sacrifices. They did not profit by the example of the English government, which not only kept in pay and profusely distributed morning, evening, weekly, monthly, and yearly papers, but even furnished them with extracts of such despatches as public curiosity was interested in. The Cabinet of St. James's deceives foreigners when it disclaims these wretched scribblers with such disdain, and loads them with so much contemptuous language; this contempt is all affected; the fact is, that it pays and directs them, and that its archives are open to them.

The tribune of the Council of Five Hundred and that of the Ancients, and almost all the public prints, were full of vociferations against the government and the revolution; against the laws respecting emigration, the sale of national property, and public worship; against the embezzle-

ments of government, and the enormous taxation. National property ceased to sell; those who had purchased it were alarmed; the emigrants returned; the priests raised their heads. General Pichegru was the soul of this plan of counter-revolution. The Directory went on in a precarious manner, amidst this tempest.

VI.

Pichegru, born in Franche-Comté, was admitted at the age of eighteen into the military school at Brienne, in the capacity of *maître-de-quartier*. His plan was to enter into the convent of Vitri, to pass his noviciate there; but he was dissuaded from this scheme, and entered the Metz regiment of artillery, in 1789. He was a serjeant in that regiment when the Jacobin society of Besançon appointed him to the command of a battalion of volunteers. In 1793 the representative Saint-Just promoted him to the rank of a general-in-chief. He conducted the campaign of 1794 successfully, and conquered Holland. In 1795 he commanded the Army of the Rhine, during which period his treasouable practices began. He had a criminal understanding with the enemy's generals, and concerted his operations with them. The Armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and Rhine, had orders to operate a combined movement, in order to unite at Mentz; he frustrated this manœuvre by

leaving the majority of his forces on the Upper Rhine. Some time afterwards the line of contravallation which he occupied on the left bank of the river, before Mentz, was forced by Clairfait, who possessed himself of all his field artillery. He retired with the remains of his troops into the lines of Weissemburg. These events, with other circumstances, excited suspicions of his fidelity. The government was alarmed: in the beginning of 1796 it deprived him of the command of the army, and offered him an embassy to Sweden. Pichegru refused this, and retired into Franche-Comté, where he continued his correspondence with the enemy. When appointed to the Council of the Five Hundred by the electoral assembly of the Jura, he thought the moment had arrived for effecting the triumph of the foreigners' party. He was called, in private company, the French General Monck.

In the course of April, Duverne and the Abbé Brottier were apprehended, brought before the tribunals, and condemned. Duverne de Presle made important discoveries: a corner of the veil which covered France was now lifted up. In the mean time, d'Entraigues' portfolio reached Paris. All the papers in it had been indorsed and numbered by General Clarke and General Berthier. They contained circumstantial particulars respecting Pichegru's conduct. Fauche Borel, a book-

seller at Neuschâtel, was the principal actor in this plot. In several long conversations which Napoleon had with the Count d'Entraigues, he penetrated the mystery of the intrigues which excited and kept up agitation in France, encouraged the hopes of foreign powers, and had an unfavourable effect on the negotiations with Austria.

VII.

The signal had been given to the party: all the journals were full of censures, calumnies, and harangues against the General of the Army of Italy; they depreciated his successes, vilified his character, calumniated his administration, threw out suspicions respecting his fidelity to the Republic, and accused him of ambitious designs. From the journals these slanders ascended to the tribune, in which he was denounced for the war he had undertaken against Venice, for his political conduct towards Genoa, and for the award he had given in favour of the Valteline against the Grison leagues. They went so far as to deny the massacre of the French in the Venetian States, and even that of Verona, as well as the infringement of neutrality towards the sloop *Libérateur d'Italie*, which had been fired upon in the port of Venice by the Admiral's galley and the batteries of the Lido fort.

The Parisian journals soon became the subject

of conversation in the camps. "What!" said the soldiers, "are the men who call themselves our representatives become the panegyrists of our enemies? The Venetians have shed French blood; and instead of avenging it, they accuse us, not of having shed it ourselves, but of having excited acts of revenge! Are they ignorant that we are here a hundred thousand bayonets, all unexceptionable witnesses? These enemies of the Republic having neither been able to conquer nor to purchase our general, are endeavouring to assassinate him juridically; but they will not succeed; they shall never reach him without first marching over our bodies."

The Italian artists published engravings in which they represented the Clichy deputies as making common cause with the Slavonians. The soldiers grew so enthusiastic that they were quite enraged when they read the Parisian journals.

On the festival of the 14th of July, the General-in-chief, previously to reviewing the army, had addressed it in the order of the day as follows:—"Soldiers! this is the anniversary of the 14th of July. You see before you the names of our companions in arms who have fallen in the field of honour in defence of the liberty of their country. They have set you a noble example; you owe your entire devotion to the Republic, and to the

welfare of thirty millions of Frenchmen; you owe it to the glory of the French name, to which you have added new lustre by your victories.

“ I well know, soldiers, that you are deeply affected at the calamities which threaten our country. But our country cannot be in real danger. The same men through whose means she has triumphed over all Europe combined against her, are still there. We are separated from France by mountains; but you would pass them with the rapidity of the eagle, were it necessary, in order to maintain the constitution, defend liberty, and protect the government and the republicans. The government, soldiers, watches over the deposit of the laws which is entrusted to its care. Whenever the royalists shew themselves, that moment is their last. Dismiss all anxiety; and let us swear by the manes of the heroes who have fallen by our side for liberty—let us swear on our colours, war against the enemies of the Republic and of the constitution of the year III!”

This was the spark that kindled the conflagration. Each division of cavalry and infantry drew up its address; the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates voted and signed them. These addresses evinced the violent agitation that prevailed. General Berthier sent them to the Directory and the Councils. The people recovered themselves; the Armies of the Sambre

and Meuse, and the Rhine, shared the same sentiments. A total alteration in the disposition of the public immediately took place. The majority of the Directory appeared lost; the Republic was in danger.

Hoche marched a division of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse upon Paris, under pretext of the expedition to Ireland. The Council of the Five Hundred was highly displeased at the conduct of the military in infringing the constitutional circle. Hoche left the capital; his only refuge was his own head-quarters.

Under these critical circumstances a powerful party invited Napoleon to overthrow the Directory, and seize the reins of government himself. The enthusiasm which the conquest of Italy had excited in France, and the devotion of the army which had acquired so many laurels under his command, seemed to smooth all obstructions. Had ambition been the guide of his life, he would not have hesitated: what he afterwards did on the 18th of Brumaire, he might have done on the 18th of Fructidor; but the independence, power, and prosperity of France were then, as throughout his life, the principal objects of his thoughts. When victorious at Arcole and Rivoli, he was as far from thinking it was in his power to secure these grand objects at that time, as he afterwards was at Paris, after his disasters, from the moment

when the Legislative Chamber abandoned him. In 1797, as in 1815, the ferment of revolutionary ideas misled the leaders of faction and deluded the multitude; the same men who had overturned the throne of Louis XVI. directed public opinion, and fancied themselves destined to save the Revolution. Napoleon resolved to support the Directory, and for that purpose sent General Augereau to Paris: but had the conspirators gained the day, contrary to his expectations, every thing was arranged for his making his entrance into Lyons at the head of 15,000 men within five days after receiving intelligence of their triumph; whenc, marching on Paris, and rallying all the republicans and those interested in the Revolution, he would have passed the Rubicon, like Cæsar, at the head of the popular party.

VIII.

On General Augereau's arrival, he was appointed by the Directory to the command of the seventeenth military division. On the 18th of Fructidor, (Sept. 4,) at day-break, the peace-officers went to the houses of the directors Barthelemy and Carnot. They seized the former; but the latter, who had been warned of his danger, fled to Geneva. At the same moment the Directory had Pichegru, Willot, fifty deputies to the Coun-

cil of the Ancients and Council of Five Hundred, and one hundred and fifty other individuals, most of whom were journalists, arrested. The same day the Directory addressed a message to the legislature, communicating the conspiracy which had been formed against the Republic, and laying before it the papers found in d'Entraigues' portfolio, and the declarations made by Duverne de Presle. The law of the 19th of Fructidor condemned to deportation two directors, fifty deputies, and one hundred and forty-eight individuals; the elections of several departments were annulled; several laws were repealed; new measures of public safety were decreed; the nomination of Carnot and Barthelemy to the Directory was revoked, and they were replaced by Merlin and François de Neufchâteau. Thus the schemes of the enemies of the Republic were defeated.

The public was equally astonished and incredulous. It was supposed that d'Entraigues' papers and Duverne's discoveries were forged; but all doubt ceased when the following proclamation appeared from Moreau to his army, dated from his head-quarters at Strasburg, the 23d of Fructidor (Sept. 9, 1797):—

“Soldiers! I have this instant received the proclamation of the Executive Directory, dated the 18th of this month (Sept. 4), informing France that Pichegru has rendered himself un-

worthy of the confidence with which he has so long inspired the whole Republic, and the armies in particular. I have also been informed that several military men, too confident in the patriotism of that representative, and considering the services he had rendered to the state, doubted this assertion. I owe it to my brethren in arms and fellow-citizens to inform them of the truth. It is but too true that Pichegru has betrayed the confidence of all France. I informed one of the members of the Directory, on the 17th of this month (Sept. 3), that a correspondence with Condé and other agents of the Pretender had fallen into my hands, which left no doubt of these treasonable acts. The Directory has summoned me to Paris, requiring, no doubt, more complete information respecting this correspondence. Soldiers! be calm, and dismiss all anxiety respecting the state of affairs at home: depend upon it, that the government will keep down the royalists, and vigilantly maintain the republican constitution which you have sworn to defend."

On the 24th of Fructidor (September 10) Moreau wrote as follows to the Directory:—"I did not receive your order to come to Paris until a very late hour on the 22d, when I was ten leagues from Strasburg. Some hours were necessary for me to make arrangements for my departure, to secure the tranquillity of the army, and to

apprehend several persons compromised in an interesting correspondence which I shall myself deliver to you. I send you subjoined a proclamation which I have issued, which has had the effect of convincing many incredulous persons; and I confess I found it difficult to believe that a man who had done his country such important services, and had no interest in betraying it, could have been guilty of such infamous conduct. I was thought to be a friend of Pichegru's; but I have long ceased to esteem him. You will see that no one was in greater danger than myself, for the whole scheme was founded on the expected reverses of the army which I commanded: its courage has saved the Republic."

On the 19th of Fructidor (September 5) Moreau had written to Barthelemy as follows:—

"Citizen Director,—You will recollect, no doubt, that on my last visit to Bâle, I informed you that at the passage of the Rhine we took a waggon from General Klinglin, containing two or three hundred letters of his correspondence: those of Wittersbach formed part of them, but were the least important. Many of these letters are in cypher, but we have found out the key to them: the whole are now decyphering, which occupies much time. No person is called by his real name in these letters, so that many Frenchmen who are in correspondence with

Klinglin, Condé, Wickham, D'Enghien, and others, are not easily discovered. We have, nevertheless, such indications, that several are already known. I had determined not to give publicity to this correspondence, since, as peace might be presumed to be at hand, there seemed to be no danger to the Republic: besides, these papers could have afforded proofs against but few persons, as no one is named in them. But seeing at the head of the parties which are now doing so much mischief to our country, and in possession of an eminent situation of the highest confidence, a man deeply implicated in this correspondence, and intended to act an important part in the recall of the Pretender (the object to which it relates), I have thought it my duty to apprise you of the circumstance, that you may not be duped by his pretended republicanism; that you may watch over his proceedings, and oppose his fatal projects against our country; since nothing but a civil war can be the object of his schemes.

“ I confess, Citizen Director, that it is with deep regret that I inform you of this treason; and the more so, because the man I denounce to you was once my friend, and would certainly have remained so still, had I not detected him. I speak of the representative of the people, Pichegru. He has been too prudent to commit any

thing to writing; he only communicated verbally with those who were intrusted with this correspondence, who carried his proposals and received his answers. He is designated under several names, that of Baptiste amongst others. A brigadier-general named Badouville was attached to him, and is mentioned by the name of *Coco*. He was one of the couriers whom Pichegru and the other correspondents employed; you must frequently have seen him at Bâle. Their grand movement was to have taken place at the beginning of the campaign of the year IV.: they reckoned on the probable occurrence of some disasters on my taking the command of the army; which, as they expected, discontented at its defeat, would call for its old commander, who, in that case, was to have acted according to circumstances and the instructions he would have received. He was to have 900 louis for the journey which he took to Paris at the time of his discharge; which circumstance accounts, in a natural way, for his refusal of the Swedish embassy.

“ I suspect the Lajolais family of being concerned in this plot. The confidence which I have in your patriotism and prudence alone determined me to give you this intelligence. The proofs are as clear as day, but I doubt whether they are judicial. I entreat you, Citizen Di-

rector, to have the goodness to assist me with your advice on this perplexing occasion. You know me well enough to conceive how dear this disclosure costs me; nothing less than the danger which threatened my country could have induced me to make it. The secret is confined to five persons; General Desaix, General Regnier, one of my aides-de-camp, and an officer employed in the secret service of the army, who is constantly employed in pursuing the clue of information afforded by the decyphered letters."

The letters found in Klinglin's waggon were soon afterwards published, in April 1797; Moreau, Desaix, and Regnier alone had been acquainted with their contents. Proofs of Pichegru's treachery soon poured in from all quarters; he became the object of public execration. The persons condemned were embarked at Rochefort and transported to Guiana.

IX.

When Napoleon was informed of the law of the 19th of Fructidor, he was deeply afflicted, and loudly declared his dissatisfaction. He reproached the three directors with not having known how to act with moderation in the hour of victory. He thought it right that Carnot, Barthelemy, and the fifty deputies should be deprived of their functions, as a measure of pub-

lic safety, and placed under inspection in one of the towns of the interior of the Republic. He would have had Pichegru, Willot, Imbert Colomès, and two or three more only, brought to trial, and condemned to expiate on the scaffold the treasonable crime which they had committed, and of which government possessed the proofs; but there he would have stopped. He was shocked to see men of great talent, such as Portalis, Tronson Ducoudray, and Fontanes, patriots like Boissy d'Anglas, Dumoulard, and Muraire, and supreme magistrates, as Carnot and Barthelemy, condemned, without information or trial, to perish in the marshes of Sinamari. What! inflict the punishment of transportation on a multitude of journalists, who merited only contempt and the disgrace of a correctional punishment! This was renewing the proscriptions of the Roman triumvirate; it was acting in a more cruel and arbitrary manner than Fouquier Tinville's tribunal; for he at least heard the accused, and he condemned them only to death! The armies, and the whole mass of the people, were for the Republic. Nothing but the danger of the state could have justified such a flagrant piece of injustice, such a violation of equity and of the laws.

The conspirators wished to effect the destruction of the Republic by means of the Legislative Body; to render the Directory unpopular, by the

powerful agency of the national tribune; to impede its proceedings by the authority of the legislature; to compose a Directory of men of weak characters, or devoted to the party; and, lastly, to proclaim the counter-revolution as the only remedy for the calamities which afflicted the country.

The three directors, intoxicated with their victory, saw only their own triumph in that of the Republic. The Councils appointed Merlin and François de Neufchâteau to succeed Carnot and Barthelemy; they did not convoke the electoral assemblies in order to fill up the vacancies, but remained in an imperfect state, without respectability or independence. It was difficult to conceive what advantage they proposed to themselves from such an attack on the constitution—such a disregard of public opinion. Did these three men, unsupported by the prepossessions attendant on ancient greatness, or even by the honours of victory, pretend to set themselves up as kings of France, and to govern of their own authority, without the aid of the law, or the concurrence of the Legislative Body? The acts of the 22d of Floréal in the following year, and those which took place two years afterwards on the 30th of Prairial, were the consequences of this illegal and impolitic conduct. In Fructidor, the government attacked the legislature; on the 22d of

Floreal the legislature and the government violated the sovereignty of the people, by refusing to receive the deputies nominated by electoral assemblies which had been declared legal, as members of the Councils. Lastly, on the 30th of Prairial the Councils infringed the rights, the prerogatives, and the liberty of the government. The events of these three days were subversive of the republican system, and annihilated the constitution of 1795.

In the month of October 1796, the Cabinet of St. James's, alarmed at the pecuniary sacrifices which it would be necessary to require from the English in order to maintain the war against France, had determined on peace. Lord Malmesbury had exchanged his powers as plenipotentiary with Charles Lacroix, minister of exterior relations, at Paris; but, after several conferences, this plenipotentiary having communicated his ultimatum, which required the retrocession of Belgium to the Emperor, the negotiations were broken off. The preliminaries signed at Leoben induced the English to renew them. Austria herself had renounced Belgium; and the possession of this province could no longer occasion any difficulty. Lord Malmesbury came to Lisle. Pitt was now desirous of peace, in consequence of the failure of his financial plans. The Directory appointed Letourneur, Pleville-le-Peley, and

Maret, afterwards Duke of Bassano, as plenipotentiaries. The choice of the latter gave satisfaction at London; Pitt was acquainted with his pacific inclinations, and esteemed his character, having treated with him in 1792 for the preservation of Louis XVI. and the maintenance of peace. Lord Malmesbury, on his side, wished to efface the impression of his failure at Paris the preceding year, and to crown his long political career with new success. The plenipotentiaries on both sides being actuated by good faith, a favourable issue was anticipated. These important negotiations, which were proceeding at the same time in the north of France and in Italy, could not be unconnected with each other. Clarke was instructed to correspond with Maret. A peace concluded with England would have removed many difficulties at Campo-Formio, and it was on the point of signature, at Lisle, on terms more advantageous to France and her allies than those of the treaty of Amiens, when the events of the 18th of Fructidor took place. Maret was recalled. Treillard and Bonnier, the new plenipotentiaries, demanded the restoration of all that England had conquered from France, Spain, and Holland. Lord Malmesbury, astonished at this singular demand, replied that he had orders to negotiate on terms of mutual compensation. The French ministers gave him twenty-four hours to accede

to their demand, and desired him, in case he persisted in declining to explain himself, to return to London for fresh instructions and more extensive powers. On the 17th of September he quitted Lisle. The French plenipotentiaries carried their irony so far as to pretend to expect his return to Lisle, and to wait for him there. On the 5th of October, Lord Malmesbury notified to them, from London, that England would send no more plenipotentiaries to France, unless her negotiator were first furnished with some guarantee that would secure his independence, and the respect due to his character. The Directory was as clearly in the wrong, in the second negotiation, as right in the first, both in substance and form. It was just, when France was preserving part of her conquests on the Continent, that England should likewise retain part of hers. In forgetting the respect due to the character of an ambassador, the Directory forgot its own dignity.

Some time after the 18th of Fructidor, a law was enacted relating to the public debt, by which it was ordained that the third of the capital should be inscribed in a new book, and the interest paid at five per cent; that the other two-thirds should be reimbursed in *bons de deux tiers*, and that domains should be pledged for their liquidation: but every year the laws of the budget withdrew the pledge, and thus prolonged the im-

morality and misery of this bankruptcy. At length the *bons de deux tiers* were reduced to two per cent. It would have been less odious to leave the capital untouched, and merely to reduce the interest.

Napoleon was of opinion that the preservation of public faith was of the utmost importance, and to be preferred to every other consideration, that it was desirable to extinguish the debt by charging it upon all national domains whatsoever, including those under sequestration, and to pursue this measure with such energy as to effect the operation in three years. He thought the principle ought to be established, at the same time, as a constitutional law sanctioned by the people, that one generation cannot be pledged by another generation, and that the interest of a loan can only be demanded during the first fifteen years. This would have been a preservative against the abuse of this resource, and would have protected future generations against the cupidity of the present.

At the period of the 18th of Fructidor, the aide-de-camp Lavalette had been several months at Paris, as a mediator between the General of the Army of Italy, the majority of the Directory, the minority, and the different parties into which the Councils and the capital were divided. A fortnight after the 18th he was molested by the government: he was a man of a mild character and

moderate opinions; he set off precipitately for Milan, and sought the protection of his general.

One of Napoleon's first cares, on obtaining the consulate, was to annul the law of the 19th of Fructidor; to recall to their country a great number of individuals respectable for their talents and the services they had performed, and who were, in consequence of a few imprudent acts, persecuted and comprised in the proscription of Fructidor. Pichegru, Willot, Imbert Colomès, and a few others of that stamp, were alone excepted. Carnot, Portalis, Barbé Marbois, and Benezech, were afterwards his ministers, and entrusted with portfolios. Barthelemy, Lapparent, Pastoret, Boissy d'Anglas, and Fontanes, became senators: the latter was even president of the Legislative Body, and grand master of the University. Simeon, Muraire, Gau, Villaret Joyeuse, Dumas, and Laumont, were appointed to the Council of State; Vaublanc, Duplantier, &c. were prefects.

The government was daily losing in public opinion. The Council of Five Hundred, alarmed at the general discontent, aggravated the evil instead of providing a remedy for it. They thought that revolutionary measures alone could save them: they had the rashness to order all the nobles to quit France. There were great numbers of this class, not only in the constituted authorities, but

even in the armies. It was partly for the purpose of giving advice to France that Napoleon wrote on the 11th of November to the provisional government of Genoa that remarkable letter which produced so great an effect in Paris, and in which he said : “ To exclude the nobles from all public functions would be a most flagrant piece of injustice; in committing which you would be acting as they have done.”

CHAPTER XXII.

PEACE OF CAMPO-FORMIO.

I. Exchange of the ratifications of the preliminaries of Leoben (May 24.)—II. Conferences of Montebello; conferences of Udine previous to the 18th of Fructidor.—III. Conferences of Passeriano.—IV. After the 18th of Fructidor, the French government is no longer desirous of peace.—V. Motives which determine the French plenipotentiary to sign the treaty of peace.—VI. Interest and policy of Napoleon.—VII. Extravagant pretensions of the Imperial plenipotentiaries; threats; movements of the armies.—VIII. Signature of the treaty of peace of Campo-Formio (Oct. 17.)—IX. Of General Desaix and General Hoche.—X. Napoleon leaves Italy, and proceeds to Paris, passing through Rastadt.

I.

THE exchange of the ratifications of the preliminaries of Leoben took place on the 24th of May at Montebello, between Napoleon and the Marquis de Gallo. A question of etiquette arose for the first time: the Emperors of Germany did not give the Kings of France the alternative; the Cabinet of Vienna was apprehensive that the Republic would not acknowledge this custom, and that the

other powers of Europe, following the example of the French, would force the holy Roman empire to descend from the sort of supremacy it had enjoyed ever since the time of Charlemagne. It was in the first ecstasies of the Austrian minister, at the acquiescence of France in the customary etiquette, that he renounced the idea of the congress of Berne, consented to a separate negotiation, and agreed not to open the congress of Rastadt for preserving the peace of the empire until July then next. In a few days the plenipotentiaries had agreed on the following terms as the basis of a definitive treaty: first, the boundary of the Rhine for France; secondly, Venice and the boundary of the Adige for the Emperor; and thirdly, Mantua and the boundary of the Adige for the Cisalpine Republic. The Marquis de Gallo declared that his next courier would bring him powers *ad hoc* to sign the treaty of peace on these terms; Napoleon and General Clarke had been invested with the necessary powers ever since the 6th of May. The conditions were more favourable to France than the Directory had expected: the peace might therefore have been considered as concluded.

Clarke was a captain in the Orleans dragoons when the Revolution took place. From 1789 he attached himself to the Orleans party. In 1795

he was placed by the Committee of Public Safety at the head of the topographical department. Being patronized by Carnot, he was chosen by the Directory, in 1796, to make overtures of peace to the Emperor, for which purpose he went to Milan. The real object of his mission was, not to open a negotiation, but to act as the secret agent of the Directory at head-quarters, and to watch the General, whose victories began to give umbrage. Clarke sent reports to Paris respecting the first persons in the army, which excited murmurs, and drew unpleasant reflections on him. Napoleon, convinced that it is necessary that governments should obtain information, was glad they had confided this mission to a man who was known, rather than to one of those subaltern agents who pick up the most absurd information in antechambers and taverns. He therefore encouraged Clarke, and even employed him in several negotiations with Sardinia and the princes of Italy. After the 18th of Fructidor he defended him warmly, not only because he had gained his esteem in the very delicate mission he had been employed in, but also because it became him to grant protection to a man who had been in daily communication with him, and of whom he had had no ostensible cause to complain. Clarke's genius was not military; he was an official man, exact and upright in business, and

a great enemy to knaves. He is descended from one of the Irish families which accompanied the Stuarts in their misfortunes. His foible was that of priding himself on his birth; and he rendered himself ridiculous in the imperial reign by genealogical researches which were strangely at variance with the opinions he had professed, the course of his life, and the circumstances of the times: this was a blunder. The Emperor, nevertheless, entrusted him with the portfolio of the war department, as an able minister who was likely to be attached to him who had loaded him with favours. In the time of the empire Clarke rendered important services by the integrity of his administration; and it is to be regretted, for the sake of his memory, that towards the end of his career he was a member of the ministry which France will eternally reproach with having forced her whole people to pass under the Caudine Forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, and by giving up to our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses. If the royal confidence, in 1814 and 1815, had not been placed in men whose minds were unequal to the circumstances of that crisis, or who, like reuegades to their country, could see no safety or glory for their master's throne but in the yoke of the Holy Alliance; if the Duke de Richelieu, whose ambition it was to

deliver his country from the presence of foreign bayonets; if Chateaubriand, who had just rendered distinguished services at Ghent, had had the direction of affairs, France would have remained powerful and formidable after those two grand and critical trials. Chateaubriand has received from nature the sacred fire; his works prove it. His style is not that of Racine—it is that of prophecy. He is the only man in the world who could, with impunity, have said in the Chamber of Peers, “*Napoleon’s grey great coat and hat hoisted on a stick, on the coast of Brest, would set all Europe in arms.*” Should he ever take the helm of affairs, it is possible that Chateaubriand may lose himself: so many have found it their destruction! But it is certain that greatness and national spirit must always acknowledge his genius, and that he would have rejected with indignation the idea of those infamous actions by which the administration of that period disgraced itself.

II.

Count Merfeld, a new Austrian plenipotentiary, arrived at Montebello on the 19th of June. The Cabinet of Vienna disavowed the Marquis de Gallo, and persisted in its resolution to treat for peace only in the congress of Berne and in the presence of its allies: it had evidently changed

its plan. Was it engaged in a new coalition? Did it place its confidence in the Russian armies? Was this change one of the effects of Pichegru's conspiracy? Did the enemy flatter themselves that the civil war, which ravaged the departments of the West, would spread itself over all France; and that the supreme power would fall into the hands of the conspirators?

The Austrian plenipotentiaries confessed that they had nothing to say in reply, when Napoleon observed to them that England and Russia would never consent to allow the Emperor to take his indemnities at the expense of ancient Venice, that to decline to negotiate, except in concert with these powers, was to declare a determination to try the chances of war once more. The minister Thugut sent new instructions, he gave up the congress of Berne, and agreed to the principle of a separate negotiation. The conferences began at Udine on the 1st of July. General Clarke alone attended on the part of France. Napoleon intimated that he should not attend until he should see reason to conclude, from the protocol, that the Austrian plenipotentiaries were sincerely desirous of peace, and had power to make it. A few days afterwards he left Montebello and went to Milan, where he remained all July and August. Austria was waiting to see the result of the troubles in France. These two months were accord

ingly spent in idle parleys. The affair of the 18th of Fructidor baffled all her hopes. Count Cobentzel hastened to Udine, invested with the full powers of the Emperor, whose entire confidence he possessed. The Marquis de Gallo, Count Merfeld, and Baron Engelmann took part in the conferences; but they were in reality only introduced for form's sake.

III.

Napoleon went to Passeriano: Clarke having been recalled, he was now the only plenipotentiary on the part of France. On the 26th of September the negotiation with Count Cobentzel began. The conferences were alternately held at Udine and at Passeriano. The four Austrian plenipotentiaries sat on one side of a rectangular table; at the ends were the secretaries of legation; and on the other side was the French plenipotentiary. When the conferences were held at Passeriano the dinner was given by Napoleon; when they were held at Udine, it was given by Count Cobentzel. Passeriano is a handsome country house situate on the left bank of the Tagliamento, four leagues from Udine and three leagues from the ruins of Aquilea.

In the first conference Count Cobentzel disclaimed all that his colleagues had been saying for four months; he urged extravagant pretensions, and it became necessary to recommence the

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circle of nonsense which had been going on ever since May. With a negotiator of this kind, there was but one method of proceeding; namely, to go as far beyond the true medium as he himself did, in the opposite direction.

Count Cobentzel was a native of Brussels; a very agreeable man in company, and distinguished by studied politeness; but positive and untractable in business. There was a want of propriety and precision in his mode of expressing himself, of which he was sensible; and he endeavoured to compensate for this by talking loud and using imperious gestures.

The Marquis de Gallo, Neapolitan minister to Vienna, enjoyed the favour both of the Queen of Naples and the Empress. He was of an insinuating, supple character, but a man of honour.

Count Merfeld, colonel of a regiment of Hussars, had distinguished himself and gained the confidence of the minister Thugut. Baron Engelmann belonged to the Chancery, and was a well-meaning, sensible man.

IV.

The progress of the negotiations after the arrival of Count Cobentzel, left no farther doubt respecting the real intentions of the Court of Vienna, which wished for peace, and had contracted no new engagement with Russia or England. Accordingly, the moment the Austrian negotiators

were convinced that they could only obtain peace by adhering to the terms proposed at Montebello; it might have been signed, had not the Directory changed their policy. The affair of the 18th of Fructidor had led them to trust too much to their own strength, and they now thought they might with impunity require the nation to make new sacrifices. They conveyed insinuations to Napoleon calculated to induce him to break off the negotiations and recommence hostilities, whilst the official correspondence was still dictated in the spirit of the instructions of the 6th of May. It was evident that the Directory wished for war, but was anxious that the responsibility of the rupture should rest entirely with the negotiator. When they perceived that this plan did not succeed,—and, what they thought more important, when they believed their own power firmly established,—they sent their ultimatum, by a despatch dated the 29th of September, which Napoleon received at Passeriano on the 6th of October. France now refused to yield to the Emperor either Venice or the line of the Adige; and this refusal was equivalent to a declaration of war.

Napoleon had fixed ideas respecting the degree of obedience which he owed to his government. With respect to military operations, he thought it his duty to execute his orders only so long as they

seemed to him reasonable and likely to succeed ; he would have considered it a crime to undertake the execution of a defective plan, and in that case would have thought himself obliged to offer his resignation. He had acted thus in 1796, when the Directory had wished to detach part of his army into the kingdom of Naples.

His ideas respecting the degree of obedience due from him as a plenipotentiary, were not so well settled. Could he renounce his mission in the midst of a negotiation, or thus hazard its result, by executing instructions of which he did not approve, and which were equivalent to a declaration of war ? But his principal character at Passeriano was that of general-in-chief. It appeared to him absurd to suppose that he was to declare war as a plenipotentiary, and at the same time give up his command as a general, so as not to have to recommence hostilities, by executing a plan of campaign contrary to his opinion.

The minister of foreign relations extricated him from this anxiety. In one of his despatches he informed Napoleon that the Directory, in drawing up its ultimatum, had been persuaded that it was in the power of the general-in-chief to compel its acceptance by force of arms. He meditated profoundly on this communication ; it was now evident that he held in his hands the destiny of France : war or peace depended on his

decision. He resolved to abide by his instructions of the 6th of May, and to sign the peace on the terms settled at Montebello; which, before the 18th of Fructidor, had been approved by the government.

V.

The motives which influenced his decision were: 1st, that the general plan of his campaign was defective; 2dly, that having only received the ultimatum on the 16th of October, hostilities could not recommence before the 15th of November, when it would be difficult for the French armies to enter Germany, whilst the season would be favourable to the Austrians for collecting considerable forces in the plains of Italy; 3dly, that the command of the army of Germany was entrusted to Augereau, whose political opinions had become very violent since the events of Fructidor; his staff was principally composed of satellites of the propagandists, intoxicated with the principles of 1793, which was an insurmountable impediment to the harmony so necessary in the operations of the two armies; Napoleon had desired that the command of the army might be given to Desaix, Moreau being removed; 4thly, that he had required a reinforcement of 12,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, which had been refused; yet that with only 50,000 men under

arms he was twenty days' march nearer to Vienna than the armies of the Rhine, having to fight three-fourths of the forces of the House of Austria, which covered Vienna on the Italian side, whilst the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine were opposed only by a mere corps of observation; 5thly, that the Directory, in its delirium, had, by its despatches of the 29th of September, declared its refusal to ratify the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance of the preceding 5th of April with the King of Sardinia. By that treaty the King of Sardinia had engaged to join the army of Italy with a contingent of 8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon. The refusal of the Directory drove the Court of Turin to despair; it could no longer avoid perceiving the ultimate intentions of the French government; it had therefore no terms to keep; and the army of Italy would therefore have been under the necessity of detaching 10,000 men to reinforce the garrisons of Piedmont and Lombardy.

On the 21st of October, the Directory notified, that in consequence of the observations of the General of Italy, they had determined to reinforce his army with a body of 6000 men, to be sent from the army of Germany; to modify the general plan of the campaign agreeably to his wishes; and to ratify the treaty of offensive and

defensive alliance with the King of Sardinia; and that this resolution had been communicated to the legislative body the same day, 21st of October.

But the treaty of Campo-Formio had been signed three days before the writing of these despatches, which did not reach Passeriano until twelve days after the signature of the peace. Perhaps, if the Directory had taken this resolution on the 29th of September, when it sent its last ultimatum, Napoleon would have determined on war, in the hope of liberating all Italy as far as the Isonzo, of which he was more desirous than any one.

VI.

It was Napoleon's interest to conclude peace. The republicans openly manifested their jealousy of him. "So much glory," said they, "is incompatible with liberty." If he had recommenced hostilities, and the French army had occupied Vienna, the Directory, constant to the principles by which they had been actuated ever since the 18th of Fructidor, would have wanted to revolutionize the empire, which would undoubtedly have involved France in a new war with Prussia, Russia, and the Germanic body; but the Republic was ill governed; and the administration corrupt; the government inspired neither confi-

dence nor respect. Had Napoleon broken off the negotiations, the responsibility of the consequences would have lain with him; but in giving peace to his country, he added to the glory of conquest and pacification that of being the founder of two great republics; for Belgium, the departments of the Rhine, Savoy, and the county of Nice, could not be legitimately annexed to France until the treaty of peace with the Emperor, nor could the existence of the Cisalpine Republic be regularly secured without that event. Thus crowned with laurels and with the olive branch in his hand, he thought he should safely return into private life, with equal glory to the great men of antiquity; the first act of his public life would be concluded; circumstances and the interest of his country would regulate the remainder of his career; glory, and the love and esteem of the French nation, were sufficient means for the attainment of any object.

France was anxious for peace. The struggle of the allied Kings with the Republic, was a conflict of principles: it was a repetition of the contest between the Ghibellines and the Guelphs; a war between the oligarchs who reigned at London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, and the republicans of Paris. The French plenipotentiary conceived the idea of altering this state of affairs, which left

France opposed singly to them all, and of throwing an apple of discord amongst the allies, and thus changing the state of the question by creating other passions and other interests. The Republic of Venice was wholly aristocratical; the cabinets of St. James's and St. Petersburg were most particularly interested in its fate. In seizing on the territories of this republic, the house of Austria would excite the highest degree of resentment and jealousy in those powers. The senate of Venice had conducted itself very ill towards France, but extremely well towards Austria. What opinion would nations form of the morality of the cabinet of Vienna, when they saw it appropriate to itself the dominions of its ally, the most ancient state in modern Europe, and that which entertained the most opposite principles to democracy and the French system; and all this without any pretext, and merely for its own convenience? What a lesson would this be for Bavaria and the powers of the second order! The Emperor would be obliged to give up to France the fortress of Mentz, which he only held, as a pledge; and would appropriate to himself the spoils of the princes of Germany, whose protector he was, and whose armies were fighting under his standard. This was presenting to all Europe a complete satire on absolute govern-

ments and the European oligarchy. What could afford a more convincing proof of their being worn out, decayed, and illegitimate?

Austria would be content; for although she gave up Belgium and Lombardy, she received an equivalent, if not in revenue and population, at least in geographical convenience and commercial facilities. Venice was contiguous to Stiria, Carinthia, and Hungary. The league of the European oligarchy would be divided, and France would avail herself of this circumstance to grapple with England singly, in Ireland, Canada, and the Indies.

The different factions which divided Venice would be extinguished; aristocrats and democrats would unite in opposition to the sway of a foreign nation. There was no reason to fear that a nation of such soft manners would ever conceive an affection for a German government; or that a great commercial city, which had for ages been a maritime power, would become sincerely attached to an inland monarchy without colonies; and if ever the opportunity of creating the Italian nation should arise, this cession would be no impediment. The years which the Venetians would have passed under the yoke of the house of Austria, would make them hail any national government with enthusiasm, whether a little more or less aristocratical, whether Venice should be its

capital or not. The people of Venice, Lombardy, Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, Bologna, Romagna, Ferrara, Tuscany, Rome, and Naples, could not be converted into Italians without being decomposed and reduced to elements; they wanted recasting, as it were. In fact, fifteen years afterwards, that is to say, in 1812, the Austrian power in Italy, the throne of Sardinia, those of the dukes of Parma, Modena and Tuscany, and even that of Naples, with the oligarchies of Genoa and Venice, had disappeared. The temporal power of the pope, which had always been the cause of the parcelling out of Italy into so many portions, was on the point of ceasing to be an obstacle; the grand-duchy of Berg had recently become vacant, and awaited the court of King Joseph. "*It will take me twenty years,*" said Napoleon in 1805, at the council of Lyons, "*to create an Italian nation.*" Fifteen had sufficed. He was ready; he waited only for the birth of a son, in order to take him to Rome, to be crowned king of the Italians, give the regency to his son Eugene, and proclaim the independence of the peninsula, from the Alps to the Ionian Sea, from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic.

VII.

The court of Vienna, the struggle which it had to sustain

tained, was not solicitous to retain Belgium, which it could never have defended; and thought itself fortunate, after so many disasters, in obtaining indemnities for losses already sustained, and in contracting engagements with the French Republic, which secured it certain advantages in the arrangement of the affairs of Germany; but although the principles of the treaty were agreed upon, the mode of execution was by no means settled. Count Cobentzel required, he said, "the Adda as a boundary, or nothing." He supported his demand by statistical calculations.

"You wish," said he, "to restore the system of 1756; you must therefore give us an advantageous treaty, framed without reference to the events of the war. Both powers have had their glorious days; our two armies ought to esteem each other; a peace disadvantageous to either power would never be any thing but a truce. When you agree to this principle, why do you refuse to give us a complete and absolute indemnity? What are the foundations of power?—Population and revenue. What does the Emperor, my master, lose?—Belgium and Lombardy, the two most populous and richest provinces in the world. Belgium is doubly valuable to you, because it renders Holland subject to your power, and enables you to blockade England from the Baltic to the Straits of Gibraltar. We further consent to

your adding Mentz, the four departments of the Rhine, Savoy, and the county of Nice, to the Republic. For all these extensive concessions, what do we ask of you in return?—Four millions of Italians—bad soldiers; but inhabiting, it is true, a tolerably fertile country. We have, therefore, a right to require the *Thalweg* of the Adda as our boundary.”

The French plenipotentiary replied: “It is an advantage to the Austrian monarchy to be relieved of the possession of Belgium, which has always been burthensome to it. England alone had any interest in its remaining in your possession. If you calculate what this province cost you, you will be satisfied that it has always been a source of expense to your treasury: but at all events it can no longer be of any value to you, now that the new principles which have changed the state of France are established in it. To think of obtaining, on your Styrian, Carinthian, and Hungarian frontiers, an indemnity equivalent to the revenue and population of a detached possession is an extravagant expectation. Besides, were you to pass the Adige, you would weaken yourselves, and neither you nor the Cisalpine Republic would have any frontiers.”

These arguments, however, were far from convincing the Austrian plenipotentiaries; but they reduced their claims to the line of the Mincio.

“ But this,” said Count Cobentzel, “ is our *ultimatum*; for if the Emperor, my master, were to consent to give you the keys of Mentz, the strongest fortress in the world, without exchanging them for the keys of Mantua, it would be a degrading act.” All the official measures of protocols, notes, and counternotes, having been adopted without producing any satisfactory result, confidential conferences were now tried; but neither side would give way any further. The armies put themselves in motion. The French troops, which were cantoned in the Veronese, Paduano, and Trevisano, passed the Piave, and stationed themselves on the right of the Isonzo. The Austrian army encamped on the Dravo and in Carniola. When the Austrian plenipotentiaries came from Udine to Passeriano, they were obliged to pass through the French camp, in which all military honours were lavished upon them. The conferences were held within hearing of the drums; but Count Cobentzel remained immovable: his carriages were got ready, and he announced his departure.

VIII.

On the 16th of October, the conferences were held at Udine, at Count Cobentzel's. Napoleon recapitulated, in the form of a manifesto to be inserted in the protocol, the conduct of his go-

vernment since the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben, and at the same time repeated his ultimatum. The Austrian plenipotentiary replied at great length, endeavouring to prove that the indemnities which France offered the Emperor were not equivalent to a fourth part of what he was losing; that the Austrian power would be considerably weakened, whilst the French power would be so materially increased, that it would be dangerous to the independence of Europe; that by means of the possession of Mantua, and the line of the Adige, France would, in fact, add all Italy to the territories of the Gauls; that the Emperor was irrevocably determined to risk all the chances of war, and even to fly from his capital if necessary, rather than consent to so disadvantageous a peace; that Russia offered him armies, that they were ready to come to his assistance, and that it would soon be seen what the Russian troops were; that it was very evident that Napoléon preferred his interest as a general to his character as a plenipotentiary, and that he did not wish for peace. He added, that he should depart that night, and that the French negotiator would be responsible for all the blood that would be shed in this new contest. Upon this the latter, with great coolness, although he was much irritated at this attack, arose, and took from a mantel piece a little porcelain vase, which

Count Cobentzel prized, as a present from the Empress Catherine, "Well," said Napoleon, "the truce, then, is at an end, and war is declared; but remember that before the end of autumn I will shatter your monarchy as I shatter this porcelain." Saying this, he dashed it furiously down, and the carpet was instantly covered with its fragments. He then saluted the Congress, and retired. The Austrian plenipotentiaries were struck dumb. A few moments afterwards they found that as Napoleon got into his carriage he had despatched an officer to the Archduke Charles, to inform him that the negotiations were broken off, and that hostilities would recommence in twenty-four hours. Count Cobentzel, seriously alarmed, sent the Marquis de Gallo to Passeriano, with a signed declaration that he consented to the ultimatum of France. The treaty of peace was signed the following day, the 17th of October, at five o'clock in the evening. It was on this occasion that the person who drew the treaty having inserted, as the first article, "The Emperor of Austria acknowledges the French Republic," Napoleon said, "Strike out that article; the French Republic is like the sun; they who cannot see it must be blind. The French people are masters in their own country; they formed a republic;

perhaps they may form an aristocracy to-morrow; and a monarchy the day after. It is their imprescriptible right; the form of their government is merely an affair of domestic law." The treaty was dated at Campo-Formio, a small village between Passeriano and Udine, which had been neutralized for this purpose by the secretaries of legation; but it was thought unnecessary to remove thither, and there was no suitable house in the place for the accommodation of the plenipotentiaries.

By this treaty the Emperor acknowledged the natural limits of the Republic, the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees, and the Atlantic Ocean: he consented to the formation of the Cisalpine Republic, composed of Lombardy, the Duchies of Reggio, Modena, and Mirandola; the three legations, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna; the Valteline and that part of the Venetian states which lay on the right bank of the Adige, (the Bergomasco, Cremoesse, Bresciano, and Polesino); and he ceded Brisgaw, which placed a greater distance between the Hereditary States and the French frontiers. It was agreed that the important bulwark of Mentz should be surrendered to the troops of the Republic, pursuant to a military convention which was to be agreed upon at Rastadt, where the

Count Cobentzel prized, as a present from the Empress Catherine, "Well," said Napoleon, "the truce, then, is at an end, and war is declared, but remember that before the end of autumn I will shatter your monarchy as I shatter this porcelain." Saying this, he dashed it furiously down, and the carpet was instantly covered with its fragments. He then saluted the Congress, and retired. The Austrian plenipotentiaries were struck dumb. A few moments afterwards they found that as Napoleon got into his carriage he had despatched an officer to the Archduke Charles, to inform him that the negotiations were broken off, and that hostilities would recommence in twenty four hours. Count Cobentzel, seriously alarmed, sent the Marquis de Gallo to Passeriano, with a signed declaration that he consented to the ultimatum of France. The treaty of peace was signed the following day, the 17th of October, at five o'clock in the evening. It was on this occasion that the person who drew the treaty having inserted, as the first article, "*The Emperor of Austria acknowledges the French Republic*," Napoleon said, "Strike out that article; the French Republic is like the son; they who cannot see it must be blind. The French people are masters in their own country, they formed a republic;

perhaps they may form an aristocracy to-morrow; and a monarchy the day after. It is their imprescriptible right; the form of their government is merely an affair of domestic law." The treaty was dated at Campo-Formio, a small village between Passeriano and Udine, which had been neutralized for this purpose by the secretaries of legation; but it was thought unnecessary to remove thither, and there was no suitable house in the place for the accommodation of the plenipotentiaries.

By this treaty the Emperor acknowledged the natural limits of the Republic, the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees, and the Atlantic Ocean: he consented to the formation of the Cisalpine Republic, composed of Lombardy, the Duchies of Reggio, Modena, and Mirandola; the three legations, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna; the Valteline and that part of the Venetian states which lay on the right bank of the Adige, (the Bergomasco, Cremoese, Bresciano, and Polesino); and he ceded Brisgaw, which placed a greater distance between the Hereditary States and the French frontiers. It was agreed that the important bulwark of Mentz should be surrendered to the troops of the Republic, pursuant to a military convention which was to be agreed upon at Rastadt, where the

French plenipotentiary and Count Cobentzel made an appointment to meet. All the princes dispossessed on the left bank of the Rhine were to be indemnified on the right bank, by the secularization of the ecclesiastical princes. The peace of Europe was to be negotiated at Rastadt; the cabinets of the Luxembourg and Vienna were to act in concert. The Prussian territory on the left bank was reserved; and it was agreed that it should be ceded to the Republic by the treaty of Rastadt, but with an equivalent for Austria in Germany. Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Santa Maura, and Cerigo, were ceded to France, who on her side consented to the Emperor's taking possession of the Venetian states on the left bank of the Adige, which added upwards of two millions of souls to his empire. By one of the articles of the treaty the property which the Archduke Charles possessed in Belgium, as the heir of the Archduchess Christina, was secured to him: it was in consequence of this article that Napoleon, when Emperor, purchased for a million of francs the mansion of Lacken, situate near Brussels, which, previously to the Revolution, was part of the property of the Archduchess; the rest of the Archduke's domains in the Low Countries were purchased by the Duke of Saxe-Teschen. This stipulation was a mark of esteem which the French plenipotentiary afforded to the general he

had been fighting with, and with whom he had had communications honourable to both.

IX.

During the conferences of Passeriano, General Desaix came from the army of the Rhine to visit the fields of battle which the army of Italy had rendered famous; Napoleon received him at head-quarters, and thought to astonish him by imparting to him the light which d'Entraigues's portfolio threw on Pichegru's conduct. "We have long known," said Desaix, smiling, "that Pichegru was a traitor; Moreau found proofs of the fact in Klinglin's papers, with all the particulars of the bribes he had received, and the concerted motives of his military manœuvres. Moreau, Regnier, and I are the only persons in the secret. I wished Moreau to inform government of it immediately, but he would not. Pichegru," added he, "is perhaps the only general who ever got himself beaten purposely." He alluded to the manœuvre by which Pichegru had intentionally moved his principal forces up the Rhine, in order to prevent the success of the operations before Mentz. Desaix visited the camps, and was received with the greatest respect in all of them. This was the commencement of the friendship between him and Napoleon. He loved glory for glory's sake, and France above every thing. He

was afterwards a senator, and was always faithful to him. The sciences are indebted to him for the excellent work of descriptive geometry.

The treaty of Campo-Formio surprised the Directory, who were far from expecting it: they could not wholly conceal their vexation; it is even said that they thought, at first, of refusing to ratify it; but the opinion of the public was too positive, and the advantages which the peace secured to France were too evident, to allow of this rejection.

Immediately after the signature of the treaty, Napoleon returned to Milan, to complete the organization of the Cisalpine Republic, and the arrangements for the supply of his army. He was now to proceed to Rastadt, to terminate the grand work of the continental peace. He took leave of the Italians in these terms:

“Citizens!

“From the first of Frimaire next, your constitution will be in full operation. Your Directory, your Legislative Body, your Tribunal of Cassation, and the other subaltern branches of administration, will be completed.

“You afford the first instance which appears in history of a people liberated without factions, revolutions, or convulsions.

“We have given you liberty; do you take care to preserve it. Next to France, you are the most

populous and richest of republics ; and your situation must one day require you to act a great part in the affairs of Europe.

“ Prove yourselves worthy of your destiny by making none but wise and moderate laws.

“ Have them executed with vigour and energy.

“ Promote the diffusion of knowledge, and respect religion.

“ Compose your battalions, not of the refuse of society, but of citizens imbued with the principles of the Republic, or deeply concerned in its prosperity.

“ Generally speaking, you require to be impressed with a sense of your own strength, and of the dignity which belongs to the free.

“ Divided as you had been, and compelled to crouch under a tyrannical sway, you would not have acquired your liberty without assistance ; but in a few years, should you be left to yourselves, no power on earth will be strong enough to deprive you of it.

“ Until that period the *Great Nation* will protect you against the attacks of your neighbours. Its political system will be united with yours.

“ Had the Roman people made the same use of its strength as the French people, the Roman eagles would still have been seen on the Capitol ; and eighteen centuries of slavery and tyranny would not have disgraced mankind.

"I have performed a task, for the purpose of establishing liberty, and solely with a view to your happiness, which has hitherto never been undertaken but through ambition and the love of power.

"I have filled up a great number of places, and have incurred the risk of having passed over the honest man and given the preference to the intriguer: but there were still greater objections to leaving these first nominations to you; you were not sufficiently organized.

"I shall leave you in a few days. Nothing but the orders of my government, or any imminent danger that may threaten the Cisalpine Republic, will be likely to recall me into these parts.

"But wherever my country's service may place me, I shall always feel a lively interest in the welfare and glory of your Republic.

"BONAPARTE.

"Head-quarters, Milan, 22 Brumaire, year VI." (12 Nov. 1797.)

Napoleon set out for Turin. He alighted at Guinguené's, the French minister's, on the 17th of November. The King of Sardinia desired to see him, and express his gratitude to him in a public manner; but circumstances were already such that he did not think it expedient to indulge himself in court entertainments. He continued his journey towards Rastadt. He crossed Mount Co-

nis: at Geneva he was received as he might have expected to be in a French town, and with the enthusiasm which characterizes the Genoese. On his entrance into the Pays de Vaud, three parties of handsome young girls came to compliment him at the head of the inhabitants: one party was clothed in white, another in red, and the third in blue. These maidens presented him with a crown, on which was inscribed the famous sentence which had proclaimed the liberty of the Valteline, and that maxim so dear to the Vaudois, *that one nation cannot be subject to another*. He passed through several Swiss towns, Berne amongst others, and crossed the Rhine at Bâle, proceeding towards Rastadt.

The order of the day, on his leaving Milan, contained these expressions: “Soldiers, I set out to-morrow for Rastadt. Separated from the army, I shall sigh for the moment of my rejoining it, and braving fresh dangers. Whatever post Government may assign to the soldiers of the Army of Italy, they will always be the worthy supporters of liberty and of the glory of the French name. Soldiers, when you talk of the princes you have conquered, of the nations you have set free, and the battles you have fought in two campaigns, say: “*in the next two campaigns we shall do still more!*”

XI.

On reaching Rastadt he found the grand apartments of the palace prepared for his reception. Treilhard and Bonnier, whom the Directory had appointed to negotiate jointly with him with the Germanic body, had arrived a few days before him. Old Count Metternich represented the Emperor at this congress as head of the German confederation; whilst Count Cobentzel represented him as head of the house of Austria; thus forming two legations with opposite interests and instructions. Count Lherbach represented the circle of Austria to the Diet. Count Metternich's part was merely one of parade; Cobentzel transacted the business. After exchanging the ratifications of the treaty of Campo-Formio, the plenipotentiaries signed the convention respecting the surrender of Mentz, in execution of the treaty. In the first place the Austrian troops were to quit Mentz, and to leave only the Elector's troops; at the same hour the French troops were to invest the place and take possession of it; Secondly, the French were to quit Venice and Palma Nuova, leaving only the Venetian troops in those places of which the Austrians were to take possession, as well as of the whole of the country. Albini, the minister of Mentz, made the strongest protestations; all the German

princes loudly complained. They said that Mentz did not belong to Austria; and they accused the Emperor of having betrayed Germany for the sake of his interests in Italy.. Count Lherbach, as deputy for the circle of Austria, was employed to answer all these protestations, which task he discharged with all the energy, arrogance, and irony, which distinguished his character.

Sweden appeared at Rastadt as a mediatrix, and as one of the powers which had guaranteed the treaty of Westphalia. Russia had arrogated similar pretensions to herself ever since the treaty of Teschen; but she was at this moment at war with France. The state of Europe had undergone great changes since the treaty of Westphalia: Sweden then possessed great influence in Germany, being at the head of the protestant party, and dignified by the victories of the great Gustavus; Russia was not then an European power, and Prussia scarcely existed. The progress of these two powers had forced Sweden to fall back, and fixed her in the rank of a power of the third order. Her claims were therefore unreasonable. This court had, moreover, been foolish enough to send Baron Fersen as its representative to Rastadt. The favour which this nobleman had enjoyed at the court of Versailles, his intrigues in the time of the Constituent Assembly, and the hatred he had on all occasions ex-

pressed against France, rendered him so unfit for this mission, that his appointment might be regarded as an insult to the Republic. When he was introduced, on the visit of etiquette, to the French ambassador's residence, he was announced as ambassador from Sweden and mediator to the Congress. Napoleon told him, that he could not acknowledge any mediator; and, moreover, that his former opinions did not allow of his acting in that capacity between the Republic and the Emperor of Germany; that he could therefore receive him no more. Baron Fersen was so completely disconcerted, and this reception made so much noise, that he left Rastadt the following day.

Immediately after the surrender of Mentz to the French troops, Napoleon held a conference with Treilhard and Bonnier, and after having demonstrated to them that the instructions of the Directory were insufficient, he declared that he would stay no longer at the Congress, but return home. Affairs were more complicated at Rastadt than at Campo-Formio; it was necessary to cut matters short, in order to come to a conclusion.

The Directory knew not what course to determine on; they named, however, new plenipotentiaries in addition to Treilhard and Bonnier. Napoleon, already dissatisfied with the course of

the foreign policy of the French government, determined to meddle no further in a negotiation which was sure to take an unfavourable turn. At the same time, the internal situation of France foreboded, in his opinion, the approaching triumph of the demagogues; and that being the case, the same motives as had induced him to shun the civilities of the court of Sardinia, led him to withdraw himself from the testimonials of approbation which the German princes lavished upon him. He thought the treaty of Campo-Formio an appropriate termination to the first act of his political life; and resolved to live at Paris as a private individual, as long as circumstances might permit. During his short stay at Rastadt, he procured the French plenipotentiaries, who had previously been very much neglected, all the respect and consideration to which they were entitled, as the representatives of a great nation, from the foreign plenipotentiaries, as well as from the multitude of petty German princes who swarmed at this congress. He also induced the government to place large sums at the disposal of the negotiators, to enable them to support their rank with proper dignity. The allowance which they had previously received was insufficient, which circumstance was detrimental to the respectability of the Republic.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PARIS.

I. Napoleon's arrival at Paris — II. Affairs of Switzerland — III. Affairs of Rome — IV. Bernadotte, the ambassador of the Republic at Vienna, is insulted by the populace — V. Plan of an expedition into the East. — VI. Twenty first of January.

I.

NAPOLEON left Rastadt, travelled through France *incognito*, reached Paris without stopping on the road, and alighted at his small house in the *Chaussée d'Antin, rue Chanteraine*. The municipal body, the administration of the department, and the councils, vied with each other in expressing the gratitude of the nation towards him. A committee of the Council of the Ancients drew up an act for settling the estate of Chambord and a mansion in the capital upon him; but the Directory, from some unknown motive, was alarmed at this proposal, which its emissaries contrived to put off. At the same time, by a resolution of the municipality of Paris, which was then more

independent than the councils, the name of *rue de la Victoire* was given to the *rue Chantereine*.

During the two years of Napoleon's command in Italy, he had filled the whole world with the renown of his victories; and the coalition had been broken up by them. The Emperor and the princes of the empire had now acknowledged the Republic. Italy was entirely subjected to its laws. Two new Republics had been created there on the French system. England alone remained in arms, but she had testified a wish to make peace; and it was only owing to the folly of the Directory after the 18th of Fructidor that the treaty had not been signed. Besides the grand results thus obtained by the Republic in her foreign relations, she had gained many advantages in her internal administration and her military power. At no period of history had the French soldier been more thoroughly impressed with the sense of his superiority over all other soldiers in Europe. It was owing to the influence of the victories in Italy, that the armies of the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse had been able to carry the French colours to the banks of the Lech, where Turenne had first unfurled them. In the beginning of 1796, the Emperor had 180,000 men on the Rhine, and meant to carry the war into France. The armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine were not in suffi-

He was received in public audience by the Directory, who had had scaffoldings erected in the Place du Luxembourg for this ceremony, the pretext for which was the delivery of the treaty of Campo-Formio. He avoided all mention of Fructidor, of the affairs of the time, and the expedition to England. his address was simple, but nevertheless afforded room for much meditation. The following expressions were noticed in it. "In order to attain freedom, the French people had to fight the allied kings, and to obtain a constitution founded on reason, they had to combat the prejudices of eighteen centuries. Religion, the feudal system, and despotism, have successively governed Europe for twenty ages, but the era of representative governments may be dated from the peace which you have just concluded. You have accomplished the organization of the grand nation, whose vast territories are bounded only by the limits which nature herself has set to them. I present you the treaty of Campo-Formio, ratified by the Emperor. This peace secures the liberty, prosperity, and glory, of the Republic. When the happiness of the French people shall be established upon the best organic laws, the whole of Europe will become free."

General Joubert, and Brigadier general Adressy, carried, on occasion of this ceremony,

the standard which the legislative body had presented to the Army of Italy, containing the following inscriptions in letters of gold. “The Army of Italy took 150,000 prisoners, 170 standards, 550 pieces of garrison artillery, 600 field pieces, five pontoon trains, nine sixty-four gun ships, twelve frigates of thirty-two guns, twelve corvettes, and eighteen galleys.—Armistices with the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Pope, and the Dukes of Parma and Modena.—Preliminaries of Leoben.—Convention of Montebello with the republic of Genoa.—Treaties of peace of Tolentino and Campo-Formio.—Liberty given to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa Carrara, Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, part of the Veronese, Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valteline; to the people of Genoa, the imperial Fiefs, and the people of the departments of Corcyra, the Egean sea, and Ithaca.—The *chefs-d’œuvre* of Michael Angelo, Guercino, Titian, Paul Veronese, Correggio, Albano, the Carracci, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, &c. sent to Paris.—This army has triumphed in eighteen important affairs or pitched battles, and in sixty-seven actions: I. Montenotte; II. Millesimo; III. Mondovi; IV. Lodi; V. Borghetto; VI. Lonato; VII. Castiglione; VIII. Roveredo; IX. Bassano; X. Saint Georges; XI. Fontana Viva;

XII. Caldiero ; XIII. Arcole ; XIV. Rivoli ; XV. La Favorite ; XVI. The Tagliamento ; XVII. Tarvis ; XVIII. Neumarekt." Here followed the names of the sixty-seven actions in which the army had fought during the two campaigns of 1796 and 1797.

The Directory, the Legislative Body, and the minister of exterior relations, gave entertainments to Napoleon. He appeared at them all; but remained only a short time. That of the minister Talleyrand bore the stamp of good taste. A celebrated woman, determined to engage with the conqueror of Italy, addressed him in the midst of a numerous circle, demanding who was, in his opinion, the first woman in the world, dead or alive: "*She who has borne the greatest number of children,*" replied he, smiling. People thronged to the sittings of the Institute for the sake of seeing Napoleon, who always took his place there between Laplace and Lagrange; the latter of whom was sincerely attached to him. He never attended the theatre except in a private box, and positively refused the proposal of the managers of the opera, who wished to give a grand representation in honour of him, although Marshal Saxe, Lowendhal, and Dumouriez had attended such representations on returning, respectively, from Fontenoy, Bergen-op-Zoom, and Champagne. When Napoleon

afterwards appeared at the Tuileries, at the time of the revolution of Brumaire, after his return from Egypt, he was still unknown to the inhabitants of Paris, who were excessively eager to satisfy their curiosity.

The Directory shewed him the greatest respect; when they thought proper to consult him, they used to send one of the ministers to request him to assist at the council, where he took his seat between two of the directors, and gave his opinion on the matters in question.

The troops, as they returned to France, extolled him to the skies in their songs; they proclaimed that it was time to turn the lawyers out, and make him king. The Directors carried the affectation of candour so far, as to shew him the secret reports which were made by the police on the subject; but they could ill conceal the jealousy which all this popularity excited in their minds. Napoleon was sensible of all the delicacy and difficulty of this situation. The proceedings of the administration were unpopular, and many people fixed their hopes on the conqueror of Italy: The Directory wished him to return to Rastadt, but he refused to do so, under the pretext that his mission into Italy had terminated at Campo-Formio, and that it no longer became him to wield both the pen and the sword. He soon afterwards consented to

accept the command of the army of England, in order to deceive Europe and cover the design and preparations of the expedition to Egypt.

The troops composing the army of England were quartered in Normandy, Picardy, and Belgium. Their new General inspected every point, but chose to travel through the departments *incognito*. These mysterious journeys increased the anxiety that was felt in London, and contributed to mask the preparations making in the South. It was at this period that he visited Antwerp, and conceived the grand plans of naval establishments, which he carried into execution when Emperor. It was also in one of these journeys that he perceived all the advantages which Saint-Quentin would derive from the canal which was opened under the Consulate, and settled his ideas respecting the superiority of Boulogne to Calais, on account of the tide, for the purpose of attempting an enterprise against England with mere pinnaees.

II.

The principles which ought thenceforth to have governed the policy of the Republic had been laid down by Napoleon at Campo-Formio, without regard to the instructions of the directors. In fact, the directors were strangers to this policy, and were, besides, incapable of overruling their passions. Switzerland became the first proof of

this fact. France had always had to complain of the canton of Berne and the Swiss aristocracy ; all the foreign agents who had raised disturbances in France had constantly made Berne their centre of action. The time had now arrived for destroying the preponderance of this aristocracy, by means of the great influence which the Republic had lately acquired in Europe. Napoleon highly approved of the resentment of the Directory ; he also thought that the opportunity of establishing the political influence of France over Switzerland now presented itself ; but he did not think it necessary for that purpose to overturn every thing in that country. The proper course was to conform to the policy which dictated the treaty of Campo-Formio, and to attain the proposed object with as few alterations as possible. He wished the French ambassador to have presented a note to the Helvetic Diet, supported by two camps, one in Savoy, the other in Franche-Comté ; and to have declared, by this note, that France and Italy considered it necessary to their policy, their safety, and the dignity of the three nations respectively, that the Pays-de-Vaud, Argau, and the Italian bailiwicks should become free and independent cantons, equal to the other cantons ; that they had reason to complain of the aristocracy of certain families of Berne, Soleure, and Friburg, but that they would consign all their

dissatisfaction to oblivion, provided the peasants of those cantons and of the Italian bailiwicks were restored to their political rights.

All these changes might have been effected without difficulty and without resorting to arms: but Rewbell, listening to some Swiss demagogues, got a different system adopted in preference, and the Directory, without regard to the manners, religion, or local circumstances of the cantons, resolved to subject all Switzerland to an uniform constitution similar to that of France. The small cantons were enraged at the loss of their liberty; Switzerland took up arms on the approach of a convulsion fatal to so many interests, and exciting so many passions. The French troops were obliged to interfere and conquer. Blood was shed, and Europe was alarmed

III.

At the same time the court of Rome, still actuated by the vertigo that it seemed subject to, and rather incensed than corrected by the treaty of Tolentino, persisted in its system of aversion towards France. This cabinet of weak and imprudent old men set public opinion in a ferment around them; quarrelled with the Cisalpine republic, had the folly to place the Austrian general Provera at the head of their troops, and excited the fury of the people of all classes who adhere

to their party. The tumult broke out. Young Duphot, a general of the most promising talents, who happened to be at Rome whilst travelling, was murdered at the gate of the French palace, whilst endeavouring to prevent disorder. The ambassador withdrew to Florence. Napoleon, being consulted, replied by his usual adage, "*That incidents ought not to govern policy, but policy incidents* ; that however wrong the court of Rome might be, the measures to be adopted towards it were a most important question ; that it ought to be corrected, but not destroyed ; that by overthrowing the Holy See and revolutionizing Rome, a war with Naples would infallibly be produced, which ought to be avoided ; that it would be best to order the French ambassador to return to Rome, and require that an example should be made of the guilty ; to receive an extraordinary nuncio with excuses from the Pope ; to expel Provera, place the most moderate prelates at the head of affairs, and force the Holy See to conclude a concordat with the Cisalpine republic ; that by all these measures combined, Rome would be tranquillized and prevented from giving any further trouble ; and that the concordat with the Cisalpine state would have the further advantage of preparing men's minds in France for a similar measure long beforehand."

But La Reveillère, surrounded by his theophilanthropists, prevailed on the Directory to decide

on marching against the Pope. "It is now time," said he, "to abolish that idol. The word Roman republic would be enough to throw all the ardent minds of the revolutionists into transports. The General of Italy had been too circumspect when he had the opportunity, and it was entirely his fault that there were now any quarrels with the Pope. But possibly he had his private views. In fact the civility of his behaviour, his considerate conduct towards the Pope, and his generous compassion for the exiled priests, had gained him many partisans in France who were no friends to the revolution." As to the apprehension that the entrance of the army into Rome might bring on a war with Naples, he treated it as chimerical. According to him, France had a numerous party at Naples, and had nothing to fear from a power of the third class. Berthier received orders to march on Rome with an army, and to re-establish the Roman republic, which was done. The Capitol once more beheld consuls, a senate, and a tribunate. Fourteen cardinals went to St. Peter's church to sing the *Te Deum* in commemoration of the restoration of the Roman republic, and the destruction of the throne of Saint Peter. The people, intoxicated with the idea of independence, drew the greater part of the clergy into their sentiments.

The hand which had hitherto restrained the officers and agents of the army of Italy, was no longer with them; the greatest robberies were committed in Rome; the Vatican was plundered of its furniture; pictures and curiosities were everywhere seized. The inhabitants were enraged; and even the soldiers cried out against some of their generals, whom they accused of misconduct. This commotion was extremely dangerous, and it was not without great difficulty that order was restored. There is reason to think that the clamour was excited by the intrigues of Neapolitan, English, and Austrian agents.

IV.

Bernadotte had been appointed ambassador to Vienna; this choice was a bad one; the character of this general was too enthusiastic; his head was not sufficiently cool, not to mention that a general can never be an agreeable envoy to a nation which has constantly been beaten: a magistrate would have been the proper person; but the Directory had few men of this class at its disposal, having disgusted most of those who were not too obscure for the purpose. However this may be, Bernadotte suffered his temper to master his judgment, and committed serious errors. One day, from what motive has never

been divided, he hoisted the tri-coloured flag on the top of his hotel, at the instigation of certain agents who wished to embroil Austria with France. An instantaneous rising of the populace was the consequence; they tore down the tri-coloured flag, and insulted Bernadotte.

The Directors, in the first moments of rage, sent for Napoleon, in order to obtain the support of his influence over public opinion. They communicated to him a message to the councils, declaring war against Austria, and a decree investing him with the command of the army of Germany; but this general was not of the opinion of government. "If you intended war," said he, "you should have prepared for it independently of what has happened to Bernadotte; you should not have sent your troops to Switzerland, Southern Italy, and the coasts of the Atlantic: you should not have proclaimed the intention of reducing your army to one hundred thousand men; for although that scheme has not yet been executed, it is known, and discourages the army. These measures shew that you calculated on peace. Bernadotte is materially in the wrong. In declaring war you are only playing the game of England. It would indicate very little knowledge of the policy of the cabinet of Vienna to imagine, that, if it had wished for war, it would have insulted you: on the contrary, it would have flattered you and lulled your vanity."

cions, whilst it was putting its troops in motion, and you would have learnt its real intentions only by the first cannon-shot. Depend upon it, Austria will give you every satisfaction. To be thus hurried away by every event is to have no political system at all." The force of truth calmed the government; the Emperor gave satisfaction; the conferences of Seltz took place; but this incident delayed the sailing of the expedition to Egypt for a fortnight.

V.

In the mean time Napoleon began to be apprehensive that, amidst the daily storms which the irresolute conduct of the government and the nature of events produced, an Oriental enterprize might not be conducive to the true interest of the nation. "Europe," said he to the Directory, "is any thing but tranquil: the congress of Rastadt does not close its negotiations: you are obliged to keep your troops in the interior to secure the elections: you require a force to keep the western departments in awe. Would it not be best to countermand the expedition, and wait for a more favourable opportunity?"

The Directory, alarmed, and fearing that it was his real intention to place himself at the head of affairs, urged the expedition more warmly than ever. They were not sensible of all the consequences of the changes they had introduced into

the political system within the last six months. According to them, the events in Switzerland, far from weakening France, had given her excellent military positions, and the Helvetic troops as auxiliaries: the affair at Rome was at an end, for the Pontiff was already at Florence, and the Roman Republic had been proclaimed: Bernadotte's affair could lead to no unpleasant consequences, since the Emperor had offered amends. The present moment was therefore the most favourable that had ever occurred for attacking England, as had been determined, in Ireland and in Egypt. Napoleon then offered to leave Desaix and Kleber, whose talents might, he thought, prove serviceable to France. The Directory knew not their value, and refused them. "The Republic," said they, "is not reduced to these two generals; multitudes would be found to effect the triumph of their country, if it were in danger; we are more likely to want soldiers than generals."

The government was on the brink of an abyss which it did not perceive. Its affairs were going on ill; it had abused its victory in Pruetidor, and committed an error in not rallying round the Republic all those who did not belong to the foreigners' party, but had only been drawn in to follow it. The Directory had thus deprived themselves of the assistance and talents of a great number of individuals, who, out of recent

ment, rushed into the party opposed to the Republic, although their interests and opinions naturally inclined them to that form of government. The Directory found themselves under the necessity of employing men devoid of morality; thence arose the public dissatisfaction, and the necessity of keeping up a great number of troops in the interior, to secure the elections and overawe La Vendée. It was easy to foresee that the new elections would produce violent differences. The Directory had no more system in administration than in foreign policy: they went on from day to day, actuated by the individual characters of the directors, or by the vicious nature of a government of five persons, foreseeing nothing, and only sensible of obstacles when actually stopped by them. When it was asked, "how will you manage at the approaching elections?" "We shall provide for that by a law," answered La Reveillere. The event shewed what kind of law he had in view. When it was asked, Why do you not bring forward all those friends of the Republic who were only misled in Fructidor? why not recall Carnot, Portalis, Dumolard, Muraire, &c., in order to form a combination of knowledge and liberal ideas against the foreigners and emigrants? they made no answer; they could not comprehend these anxieties; they thought them unpopular, and established on so

A party composed of the influential deputies in the two councils, the Fructidorians who sought a protector, and the most distinguished and enlightened generals, long urged Napoleon to step forward and place himself at the head of the Republic. He refused; the time was not yet come; he did not think himself popular enough to go alone; he had ideas on the art of governing and on what was requisite for a great nation, different from those of the men of the revolution and assemblies: he was fearful of compromising his character. He determined to sail for Egypt, resolved, nevertheless, to appear again as soon as circumstances should render his presence necessary, as he already partly foresaw they would. To render him master of France, it was necessary that the Directory should experience disasters in his absence, and that his return should recall victory to the colours of the nation.

VI.

The government celebrated the anniversary of the death of Louis XVI., and it was a grand subject of discussion amongst the Directors and ministers, whether Napoleon should assist at this ceremony. On one side it was feared that, if he did not go, it would tend to render the festival unpopular; and, on the other, that, if he went, the Directory would be neglected.

and he alone would occupy the attention of the public. It was nevertheless considered that his presence was necessary for political reasons; and one of the ministers was instructed to negotiate, as it were, this matter with him. Napoleon, who would have preferred being unconnected with acts of this description, observed "that he had no public functions; that he had personally nothing to do with this pretended fête, which, from its very nature, was agreeable but to few people; that it was a very impolitic one, the event it commemorated being a tragedy, and a national calamity; that he very well understood why the fourteenth of July was

tory, which had shut up the meetings of the jacobins and the anarchical clubs, could fail to perceive that this ceremony created the Republic many more enemies than friends; that it estranged, instead of conciliating; irritated, instead of calming; and shook the foundations of government, instead of adding to their strength." The emissary brought all his rhetoric into play; he endeavoured to prove "that this fête was just, because it was politic; that it was politic, for all countries and republics had celebrated the fall of absolute power and the murder of tyrants as a triumph; thus Athens had always solemnized the anniversary of the death of Pisistratus, and Rome the fall of the Decemvirs; that it was, moreover, a law of the country, and that every one consequently owed submission and obedience to it, and lastly, that the influence of the General of Italy over public opinion was such, that it was incumbent on him to appear at this ceremony, as, otherwise, his absence might be prejudicial to the interest of the commonwealth." After several conferences, a middle course was agreed upon: the Institute attended this ceremony, and it was settled that Napoleon should walk amongst the members, in the class to which he belonged, thus performing, as a duty attached to a public body, an act which he did not consider voluntary. This arrangement of the matter

was very agreeable to the Directory. But when the Institute entered the church of Saint Sulpice, some one who recognized Napoleon having pointed him out, he instantly became the sole object of general interest. The fears of the Directory were realized; they were totally eclipsed. At the conclusion of the ceremony the multitude suffered the Directory to walk out by themselves, and remained to attend him who would have preferred being left unnoticed in the crowd, rending the air with shouts of "*Long live the General of the Army of Italy!*" This event, accordingly, only served to increase the displeasure of the rulers of the state.

Another circumstance placed Napoleon under the necessity of loudly condemning the proceedings of the Directory. At the Garchi coffee-house, two young men, under pretence of political raillery, excited by the manner in which they wore their hair in tresses, were insulted, attacked, and assassinated. This murder had been conducted under the orders of the Minister of Police, Sotin, and executed by his agents. Circumstances were already such that Napoleon, although living in the most profound retirement in his power, was obliged, with a view to his own safety, to keep a vigilant eye upon events of this nature. He gave vent to his indignation. The Directory were alarmed,

their ministers to explain to him the motives of their conduct, stating, "that such events were common in critical times; that revolutionary moments were exceptions from ordinary laws; that in this case it had become necessary to overawe the upper ranks of society, and check the audacity of the saloons; that there were faults which the tribunals could not reach; that the *Lanterne* of the Constituent Assembly could not, certainly, be approved of, but yet the revolution would never have proceeded without it; and that there are evils which must be tolerated, because they save us from greater calamities." Napoleon replied, "that such language could scarcely have been listened to before Fructidor, when the opposite parties were in the field and ready for action, and when the Directory had to defend itself, rather than to govern; that such an act, might, perhaps, at that time have been palliated by necessity, but that the Directory being now invested with undisputed power, the law meeting with no opposition, and all the citizens being, if not attached, at least subjected to the government; this action could only be considered as an atrocious crime, an absolute insult to civilized society; that wherever the words law and liberty were uttered, all the citizens were guards to each other; and that in this cut-throat affair, every one would be struck with terror.

and anxiously ask where such proceedings would stop." These arguments were too plausible to need much illustration to a man of talent, and of this minister's character; but he had a commission, and endeavoured to justify a Government whose favour and confidence he was ambitious to preserve.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1796 AND 1797 IN ITALY.

- I. On Field-Marshal Beaulieu.—II. On Napoleon's manœuvres against Field-Marshal Beaulieu.—III. On Field-Marshal Wurmser.—IV. On Napoleon's manœuvres against Field-Marshal Wurmser.—V. On Field-Marshal Alvinci.—VI. On Napoleon's manœuvres against Field-Marshal Alvinci.—VII. On the march against the army of the Holy See.—VIII. On the Archduke Charles.—IX. On Napoleon's manœuvres against the Archduke Charles.

I.

First Observation.—1st. An army in position on the upper ridge of the Maritime Alps, resting its left on the Col d'Argentieres, and its right on the Col di Tende, would cover the whole country of Nice. It would be from fifteen to eighteen leagues distant from the sea;—three or four days' march. In its rear there would be a great number of good positions, in which it might rally and arrest the march of a conqueror, it would have time to effect its retreat at pleasure up a series

or the Var. This theatre of operations possesses sufficient depth to admit of being defended to advantage.

An army occupying the upper ridges of the Apennines, from Tanarello to the St. Bernard (of the Tanaro), would cover part of the *Riviera di Ponente*; it would occupy positions two days' march from the sea; in its rear it would have Monte Grande, San Bartolomeo, and Rocca Barbena: the little river of the Arosoia, which passes near Pieva and Albenza, is very defensible.

This army might, therefore, defend the ground, cover Oneglia, and advance on Genoa or Nice at pleasure; but an army occupying the upper ridge of the Apennines, from Bardinetto to the Bocchetta, that is to say, the heights of Saint-Jacques, Cadibona, Montelegino, Stella, and Montefaiàle, would undoubtedly cover the other part of the *Riviera di Ponente* as far as Genoa; but as this army would be only from two to five leagues from the sea, it might be cut off in one day, and would be in danger of not having time to rally and effect its retreat. This is a bad field of operations, essentially dangerous, not having sufficient depth.

2d.—Had General Beaulieu reflected on these topographical circumstances, he would not have marched on Voltri to cover Genoa; he would have advanced by Acqui, and on Cairo, whence

he would have debouched in three columns at once, each 15,000 strong; the left by Montenotte, Monteleghino, and Savona; the centre on Cadibona and Vado; and the right on la Madonna della Neva, Saint-Jacques, and Finale. He would have had a reserve in a proper situation to succour these three attacks. The French army would soon have fallen back from Voltri and Genoa, to defend these three important positions. The Austrian general would have drawn the war into a field entirely advantageous to him; for he might have cut off the French army, driven it back to the sea-shore, and ruined it in one day.

3d.—After the battle of Montenotte, the Austrians rallied on the Montferrat road; they could act no otherwise, because the greater part of their forces were about Voltri and Sassello, and dispersed on their left. But the Piedmontese army, under the command of General Colli, should have supported itself on Dego, and formed Beauchamp's left, instead of marching on Millesimo. It was an error to imagine that, in order to cover Turin, it was necessary to be posted on both sides of the road to that city. The armies united at Dego would have covered Milan, because they would have been posted across the high road of Montferrat; they would have covered Turin, because they would have been on the flank of the road to that city. If Beauchamp had led

five or six days to spare for the purpose of rallying his left, he should have marched on Ceva to join the Piedmontese army, because it was most advantageous to the allies to remain near the line of operations of the French army. There was no fear that the latter would enter Montferrat whilst the enemy had an army near Ceva. United, the two armies were still superior to the French army ; but, if separated, they were lost.

4th.—Dego and Millesimo were too near Montenotte to be safe rallying-points for the Austrian and Piedmontese armies. Beaulieu should have collected his army before Acqui and Colli, since they would separate, on the heights of Montezemolo ; they would thus have avoided the battle of Millesimo, and the action of Dego. The divisions of each army would have had time to reach these two points of assemblage, before the French army could have attacked them there.

When you are driven from a first position, you should rally your columns at a sufficient distance in the rear, to prevent the enemy from anticipating them ; for the greatest misfortune you can meet with is to have your columns separately attacked before their junction.

5th.—In order to contest the passage of the Po, General Beaulieu took up a position on the left bank of that river, near Valleggio ; this operation could never fulfil its intention, in the face of an army accustomed to manœuvres. He should

have posted himself across the Po, by throwing two bridges over at Stradella, and covering them by strong *têtes-de-pont*. By this alone he would have prevented the French army from marching down the right bank, and obliged it to pass the Po above Stradella, which would have given the Austrian general the important advantage of protecting his defensive operations, by the two great barriers of the Po and the Tiemo.

6th.—General Beaulieu wished to defend the Minero by a cordon. This is the very worst plan in the whole system of defence. It was only May, he should have occupied the Scraglio with his whole army, he might have remained there seventy days without danger of sickness. He left a garrison of 13,000 men in Mantua, and he had 26,000 on the Minero. He might, therefore, have collected 10,000 men, that is to say, a force superior to the French army, in the formidable position of the Scraglio, he would thus have maintained his communications with Modena and Lower Italy, and got a great quantity of provisions into Mantua. Had the French general succeeded in forcing this intrenched camp, it would have been no easy matter for him to invest an army which occupied Saint-George's, Ceres, Pietoli and Pradella in force. By this line of conduct, Beaulieu would have avoided violating the neutrality of Venice. He had spent

would have been able to insist effectually on the maintenance of neutrality by the Senate of Venice, which would have been highly advantageous to him.

7th.—But not having taken these steps, Marshal Beaulieu might, after passing the Oglio, have proceeded to the heights of Gavardo, and taken the position of Saint-Ozetto, with his right to the Chiesa, and his left to the lake of Garda: the French army would then have been forced to take up an opposite position before Brescia, and could not have extended itself beyond the Mincio, so long as the Austrian army occupied that position, or any other between the lakes of Idro and Garda.

Lastly.—As the Austrian General, in the dispirited state of his army, could not give battle, he ought not to have deceived himself so far as to expect much protection from the Mincio. By dispersing his army along that river, he weakened himself; he would have been stronger had he occupied a good position on the hills between the lake of Garda and the Adige, before the level of Rivoli, covering himself there with retrenchments. He might then have required the Venetians to occupy the fortress of Peschiera in force, and to refuse entrance to the French army, as they would have been thought to have refused it to the Austrian army. Verona, which was a

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fortified place, with a garrison of 3000 Sclavonians, would also have refused admission to the French, since it would likewise have been considered as having refused it to the Imperialists. These great advantages were sacrificed by the Austrian general, for the sake of strengthening his cordon of the Mincio. He himself violated the neutrality of Venice, by occupying Peschiera.

Second Observation—1st. When the French army directed its march on Ceva to attack the Piedmontese army, Laharpe's division was left in observation against the camp of Acqui, where Beaulieu was rallying all the Austrian army. It would appear that the natural position of this corps of observation would have been on the banks of the Bormida, before Dego, in order to cover the line of operations on Savona. It is to be remarked that Napoleon only preferred the position on the Belbo, before San Benedetto, two days' march on the left of Dego, leaving the Savona road uncovered, because he wished to keep his army in junction, that Beaulieu might not throw himself between his divisions and insulate them. The camp of San Benedetto covered the army which was manœuvring on Ceva. If Beaulieu had marched on Dego, the corps placed at San Benedetto would have attacked him in flank and rear; besides, the communit-

cations of Garessio and Ormea were open; the choice of the camp of San Benedetto for the corps of observation against Beaulieu deserves consideration.

2d.—The divisions of Serrurier and Massena marched on Mondovi: they were sufficient; and, in the mean time, Beaulieu having detached some troops from Acqui on Nizza della Paglia, Augereau's division was ordered to proceed to the support of the camp of San Benedetto, and, after the battle of Mondovi, marched on Alba, pushing forward a vanguard on Nizza della Paglia.

3d.—It has been said that Napoleon should have passed the Po, not at Placenza, but at Cremona; but this is erroneous. His operation was sufficiently daring as it was; for, in marching along the Po from Alexandria, he exposed his flank for twenty leagues to the Austrian army; had he prolonged this march seven leagues more, it is evident that he would have been still more exposed. Beaulieu, after reaching Fombio, would have passed the Po at Placenza, would have fallen on the columns in march, and cut off the line of operations of the right bank, as he intercepted that of the left by observing the Adda. Besides, Placenza is situate on the right bank, and afforded resources for the passage of the river; Cremona is situate on the left bank, and the few Austrians who

were there would have been sufficient the passage.

4th.—It has been said, that if the army, after the battle of Lodi, had marched to Mantua, it would have found that place without provisions or means of defence, and might have taken it; but this conjecture is rashly put out. The army had, in a few days, covered all Lombardy; it was necessary to stay long enough to establish the blockades of the fortresses, occupy the most important points, and organize the administration. What the army performed, under these circumstances, was a very maximum of what may be required, by rapidity and activity. To demand any more would be asking impossibilities. In the six days that the French army remained in Lombardy, it doubled its means, by increasing its artillery and ammunition, remounting its cavalry, and rallying the stragglers, who remained in the rear in consequence of long marches.

5th.—The revolt of Pavia might have had important consequences: the activity and vigour of the repressive measures adopted, the burning of Binaseo, the sacking of a few houses in Pavia, the taking of four hundred hostages, sent to prison throughout Lombardy and sent into France,

respectable character of conciliators, with which Napoleon invested the bishops and clergy;—all these proceedings were worthy of applause and imitation. The tranquillity of this fine country was never after disturbed. By confiding the police of the country to the city and country guards and to national magistrates, he organized the country, spared his own army, and obtained auxiliaries.

6th. — The battle of Borghetto was fought on the 30th of May; Wurmser's attack took place on the 1st of August: it was in this interval of sixty days that part of the army passed the Po, took the legations of Ferrara and Bologna, fort Urbino, the citadel of Ferrara and Leghorn, and disarmed these provinces. The troops had returned to the Adige before Wurmser was in a situation to commence his operations: surely their time had been well employed. The strength of an army, like the quantity of movements in mechanics, is estimated by the mass multiplied by quickness. This march, instead of weakening the army, increased its resources and its courage, and added to its means of conquest.

7th. — Had Napoleon carried into execution the orders of his government, he would have marched on Rome and Naples with 20,000 men, leaving the rest of the army before Mantua, under the command of Kellermann. Italy and

the army would have been lost. Napoleon would certainly have been only obeying the orders of his superiors, but this would not have been a sufficient excuse for him. A general-in-chief is not completely justified by the order of a minister or prince far from the field of operations, and ill informed or uninformed of the latest posture of affairs. 1st. Every general-in-chief who undertakes to execute a plan which he considers bad and likely to prove disastrous, is criminal; he ought to make representations on the subject, to insist upon a change, and, in short, to give in his resignation rather than become the instrument of his men's destruction. 2dly. Every general-in-chief, who, in consequence of orders from his superiors, fights a battle that he is certain to lose, is equally guilty. 3dly. A general-in-chief is the first officer of the military hierarchy. The minister or the prince gives instructions to which, in spirit and conscience, he is to adhere; but these instructions are never military orders, and do not require passive obedience. 4thly. Even military orders do not require passive obedience, unless they are given by a superior who, being present at the moment of giving them, is acquainted with the state of affairs, and has an opportunity of listening to objections, and of giving explanations to the person who is to execute the order.

Tourville attacked eighty English ships with only forty French, and the French fleet was destroyed. The orders of Louis XIV. do not justify this commander: they were not military orders requiring passive obedience, but instructions. The clause understood was, provided there be an equal chance of success. In that case the Admiral's responsibility was covered by the prince's letter; but when, from the state of affairs, the loss of the battle was certain, the literal execution of the order shewed little understanding of its spirit. Had the Admiral, when he waited on Louis XIV. said to him: "Sire, if I had attacked the English, your whole squadron would have been lost; I have brought it back into such a port;" the King would have thanked him, and the royal order would in fact have been executed.

The conduct of the Duke of Orleans before Turin in 1706 has been justified; historians acquit him of all blame. The Duke of Orleans was a prince; he was afterwards regent; he was a liberal man, and writers have been favourable to him; whilst Marsin, who was left dead on the field of battle, could not defend himself. It is well known, however, that he protested, with his dying breath, against the resolution that was adopted of remaining in the lines. But who was the general-in-chief of the French army of Italy?

The Duke of Orleans. Marsin, Lafenillade, and Albergotti, were under his command; it depended on him whether to take the opinion of a council of war; he presided at it: it was at his option whether to abide by the opinion of this council or not. The Prince was not disturbed in his command; no one refused obedience to him. 1st. Had he ordered the French army to march out of his lines; 2dly, had he given orders for the left to pass the Doire in order to reinforce the right; 3dly, had he positively ordered Albergotti to repass the Po, and the generals had refused to comply, under the pretext that they were not bound to obey him, all would have been well; the Prince would have been exculpated. But, it is said, Albergotti did not obey the order he received to detach a body of troops to the right bank of the Po; he indulged in remarks: a thing that happens daily. This was not an act of disobedience; had the Prince sent him a positive order; had he galloped up to his camp, ordered the troops to fall in, and given the word,—*Head of column to the left*, he would have been obeyed; 4thly, The battle being lost, the army retreated on Asti, to cover Lombardy, and join Melavi's army, who had the same day gained a victory at Castiglione. The Commander-in-chief (the Duke) changed his mind, and retreated on Pignatol.

because he thought himself cut off from the road to Lombardy. If the obscure anecdote which has been circulated, that the Duke of Orleans was only nominally general, and that Marsin was furnished with a secret order from the King, authorizing him to command, were really true, the performance of such a part by the Duke of Orleans at the age of thirty-two would have been a dishonourable, contemptible action, which would have disgraced the most inconsiderable private gentleman. Had the French been victorious, who would have reaped the glory? Count Marsin was provided with a recommendation from the King requiring the Prince to attend to his advice; this was all. The Duke of Orleans was the Commander-in-chief acknowledged by the generals, officers, and soldiers; no one refused, or would have refused to obey him, and he was responsible for all that took place.

General Jourdan, in his Memoirs, says, that government had it intimated to him that they wished him to give battle at Stockach; thus endeavouring to exculpate himself from the unfortunate result of that affair; but this justification could not be admitted, even had he received positive and formal orders, as we have already proved. When he determined on giving battle, he thought he had a fair chance of gaining the victory, and he was deceived.

But might not a minister or a prince express his intentions so clearly that no condition could possibly be understood? Might he not say to a general-in-chief, "*Give battle.*" The enemy, from his number, the excellence of his troops, and the positions he occupies, will beat you; that is of no importance; it is my will." Ought such orders to be passively executed? No. If the General comprehended the utility, and therefore the morality, of so strange an injunction, he ought to execute it; but if he did not understand it, he ought not to obey it.

Something of the kind, however, frequently occurs in war: a battalion is left in a difficult position in order to save the army; but the commanding officer of that battalion receives a positive order to that effect from his general, who is present when he gives it; and answers all objections, if any reasonable objections can be made: these are military orders given by a present chief, and are entitled to passive obedience. But if the minister or prince were with the army? In that case, if they take the command, they are the generals-in-chief; and the general is only a subordinate general of division.

It does not follow that a general-in-chief is not bound to obey a minister who orders him to give battle; on the contrary, he ought to do it whenever the chances are, in his opinion, equal, and

there is as much probability of his success as of his defeat; for the foregoing observation applies only to cases where the chances appear to him wholly unfavourable.

Third Observation.—1st. Marshal Wurmser's plan, in the beginning of August, was defective; his three corps, one of which was immediately under his own command, another under that of Quasdanowich, and the third under that of Davidowich, were separated from each other by two great rivers, the Adige and the Mincio, several chains of mountains, and the lake of Garda.

Wurmser should either have debouched with all his forces between the lake of Garda and the Adige; possessed himself of the level of Rivoli, and made his artillery join him at Incanale (70 or 80,000 men, thus posted, with the right supported on the lake of Garda and the left on the Adige, with a front of three leagues, would have overawed the French army, which, containing scarce 30,000 fighting men, could not have made head against them);

Or he should have debouched, with his whole army in junction, by the Chiesa on Brescia, where artillery can pass.

2dly.—In the execution of his plan he committed an error which cost him dear; this was his losing two days in advancing on Mantua. He should, on the contrary, have thrown two bridges over

the Mincio, a cannon-shot from Peschiera, and promptly crossed that river, joined his right at Lonato, Dezenzano, and Salo, and thus made up for the defects of his plan by the rapidity of its execution.

3dly.—To operate in directions remote from each other and without communications between them, is a fault which commonly produces a second error. The column detached has orders only for the first day, its operations for the second depend on what may have happened to the principal column; thus it either loses time in waiting for orders, or acts at random. On this occasion Wurmser ought to have avoided this disadvantage, and given orders to Quasdanowich, not only for debouching on Brescia, but even on Mantua, and advanced himself, with the principal corps, on that fortress with all possible expedition. Quasdanowich would have reached Mantua, if he had not been stopped at Brescia, he would have compelled the French to raise the siege; would have found protection behind the ramparts of the place, and subsisted on its magazines; the junction with the army would have been effected at a fixed point, which was not exposed to the vicissitudes of the campaign, and if Wurmser had been defeated before he reached Mantua, Quasdanowich would, nevertheless, have supplied the garrison with provisions, he might

into confusion, and are sure to fall into the enemy's power.

5thly.—When Wurmser conceived the idea of directing General Mezaros's division on Verona, it was too late for that movement, which had been foreseen. Kilmaine was there with a small corps of observation. Wurmser would have done better in keeping this division at Bassano, to support the two others; but, at all events, as he was determined to operate on Mantua with part of his troops, he should have given this division 2000 cavalry, thirty pieces of cannon, and an equipage of pontoons; directing it, not on Verona, but on Albaredo, where it would have constructed its bridge, and whence it might have marched with the utmost expedition upon Mantua. The blockade of that place would have been raised, and the rear of the French much harassed; even Verona might have been taken in the rear; and the garrison of Mantua, thus reinforced, might long have maintained the command of the country. The Marshal might then have retreated from Bassano, with his two other divisions, his parks, and his staff, upon the Piave. The left of the French army would have been obliged to remain on the Avisio, before Trevis; its centre, on the Piave, to oppose the principal corps of the enemy's army; and it must have extended its rear to Mantua, in order to renew

the blockade : this would have been no inconsiderable share of employment for a small army, and might have given rise to vicissitudes of fortune.

6thly.—Wurmser's march on the Adige, with the remaining 16,000 men of his army, was compulsory ; he ought to have been surrounded, driven to the river, and forced to lay down his arms, because he had no pontoons, his two trains and his parks of reserve having been taken at Bassano. He was entirely indebted, for his success in making his way to Mantua, to the error of a lieutenant-colonel, who evacuated Legnago.

7thly.—The Marshal left 1800 men and several batteries in Legnago to no purpose ; there was no possibility of his retreating in the direction of the Adige, where there was the whole of the French army. It was necessary for him to regain Mantua ; and if that proved impossible, it was easier for him to enter Milan than to return to Legnago. He thus weakened his army unnecessarily, and made an useless sacrifice.

8thly.—Wurmser was also wrong in risking the battle of St. George's ; it would have been more advantageous to him to have remained in the Seraglio, which is the proper field of battle for the garrisons of Mantua, when they are numerous.

9thly.—The Marshal, whilst master of the Seraglio, might also have passed the Po with the

whole of his cavalry, some battalions of grenadiers, and a few well-horsed batteries, marched down the right bank of that river, repassing the Po lower down, crossed the Adige, and regained Padua: the French general would not have been apprised of this operation until it would have been too late to oppose it. Wurmser might thus have saved all his cavalry, a great part of his artillery, the staff of his army, all that belonged to his head-quarters, and the honour of the Austrian arms.

Fourth Observation.—1st. There were at Brescia a French magazine and hospital, with a garrison of only three companies; they were made prisoners of war. If the citadel had been secured from a *coup-de-main*, this would not have happened. It was done at a subsequent period, and ought to have been done before.

2dly.—Soret's division, which was at Salò, should have kept a vanguard on the lake of Idro, at la Rocca d'Anso, to watch the Chiesa road as far as Lodrone, which would have prevented Breseia and Salò from being surprised; twelve hours' notice would have been secured, which would have allowed time to make preparations for defence.

3dly.—Since there is but one road practicable for artillery between the lakes of Garda and Idro, that is to say the road which runs through

la Rocca d'Anfo, and it was necessary to pass through that defile in order to reach Salo, would it not have been more judicious to have placed Soret's division in position on the lake of Idro, behind the defile of Anfo, occupying the avenues and the lake of Idro with redoubts, entrenchments, and two gun-boats? It would have taken Quasdanowich twenty-four hours to carry this position, which would have allowed of sending intelligence to Brescia, Salo, Verona, and to head-quarters. The position occupied by Soret's division at Salo, neither defended nor covered any thing; it must therefore be acknowledged that this division was ill posted, and did not occupy the positions it should have been placed in, in order to fulfil its object, that is to say, to cover the country from the Chiesa to the lake of Garda.

4thly.—It has been said that the march of Massena's division on the left bank of the Adige, and that of Vaubois' division on the Chiesa, in September, were liable to the same objections as those of Wurmser and Quasdanowich, in August; for in both cases the columns were separated by the Adige, the Mincio, the lake of Garda, and the mountains. This assertion is not correct. These marches, far from similar, are inverse to each other. Wurmser and Quasdanowich separate at Roveredo, where they were in

junction, and march in two directions, which form an obtuse angle ; so that the distance between them daily increases: on their third day's march, the one was at Brescia and the other at Rivoli, and it was then that they were separated by two rivers, a lake, and mountains ; that is to say, at the moment when they were to meet the enemy, and were commencing operations and debouching in the plain. But of the two French columns, on the contrary, previously to their beginning to move, one was on the Adige and the other at Brescia, and they marched also on lines meeting in an angle, but towards its vertex, so that on the third day one of them reached Mori, and the other San-Marco ; they were then close to each other, or at least separated only by the Adige, over which river they had thrown two bridges, at Seravalle and Roveredo. These columns were constantly in communication, and their communications became shorter and easier, in proportion as they approached the enemy, so that at the last moment they could speak together. Wurmser's two columns were leaving the mountains to debouch in the plain, whilst the French columns were quitting the plain to enter defiles, where number was less important ; and it being the object of both to reach Trent, they evidently aided each other on their march, as they were approaching a narrow area.

5thly.—If it has been proved that these two operations cannot be compared, does it follow that the march of the French general was conformable to rule and free from danger? It cannot be said, in the abstract, that this march was absolutely without danger, but it was attended with very little. If Vaubois had not left Brescia and Lodrone, it was to be concluded that he had returned to Polo to pass the Adige, which would have occasioned a delay of five days. The divisions of Massena and Augereau were already in columns on a single road, in narrow passes; Vaubois' division would only have brought an increase of difficulties. Napoleon contented himself with giving particular instructions with respect to all that could happen, not only to General Vaubois, but to General Saint-Hilaire, a confidential officer, commanding the van-guard. He recommended them to keep a good look-out, and not to engage, if the enemy should by a sudden and unexpected movement advance to attack them; with this view they were to keep the parks and baggage far behind, that they might be able to fall back one march without inconvenience. But in fact Vaubois' division was constantly in communication with the army, at first by Riva, and afterwards by the bridge of Sarca; it sent and received intelligence three times a-day.

othly.--It has been thought that if Napoleon had had Legnago occupied as a fortified place, if he had stationed a commandant, a staff, officers of artillery and engineers, and a commissary, with magazines, and a garrison of 4 or 500 men besides depôts, the commandant would never have conceived the idea of evacuating the place; and as Wurmser could not have forced it, being cut off from Mantua, he must have been certain. Napoleon was sensible of this, for he afterwards had Legnago fortified.

7thly.—Had he, in the first instance, constructed lines of encirculation at Dumbell's Gap, they would have materially assisted West. If he had some constructed elsewhere, which contributed to the success of the latter of a favorite.

[illegible]

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ment to the right by the defiles of the Brenta, and on Bassano, placed it in jeopardy; that if Wurmser had marched on Verona, he would have cut off its retreat and surrounded it in the defiles of the Tyrol; and that this operation was not merely daring, but rash, and contrary to the rules of war.

The battle of Roveredo took place on the 3d of September, and the battle of Bassano on the 8th. In the evening of the 3d of September the French had made 9000 prisoners, and put half the Austrian army *hors de combat*. On the 5th Wurmser's head-quarters were still at Borgo di Valsugana, with two divisions on their march to Bassano, and one division lay that night at Bassano. It was not possible, then, for the marshal to attempt any thing on the Adige; in fact the French army reached Bassano at day-break on the 8th; and Wurmser's head-quarters had only arrived there very late on the preceding evening. An operation of this nature may be meditated before-hand, and conceived at once; but its execution is progressive, and is sanctioned by the events which take place each day. But after all, suppose Wurmser had reached Verona and passed the Adige, the French army would always have been certain of a retreat on the Chiesà and Brescia, three days' march in the rear. This operation was

and by the side of the level of Riviera the east side.

Alvinzi, with his remaining twenty-four battalions, without cavalry or artillery, that is to say, with less than 25,000 men, passed the heights of Montebaldo, and occupied the whole, now surprized between Moate Maggiore and the lake of Garda. These dispositions were contrary to the grand principle, which requires an army to be every

shal Alvinzi thought he had to deal only with Joubert's brigade of 9000 men, which, being ordered to guard the whole country from la Corona to Rivoli, and from the lake of Garda to the Adige, would be obliged, he thought, to place at least 3000 men at Rivoli, to defend the level, and prevent Quasdanowich from debouching by the valley of the Adige. Alvinzi had at his disposal 25,000 men against, as he imagined, 5 or 6000; he consequently detached Lusignan's division, which he caused to pass between Montebaldo and the lake of Garda, in order to march on Montepoli and turn the level of Rivoli. He had then only 18,000 to oppose Joubert, who could not, he thought, have more than 6000 on Montebaldo and Monte Magnone. This calculation would have been very clever, if men, like mountains, were immoveable; but he had forgotten the popular proverb, *that, although mountains are motionless, men walk and meet together*. The Austrian tacticians have always been apt to fall into this error. The Aulic Council, which drew up Wurmser's plan, supposed the French army motionless, and fixed to the fortress of Mantua; and this gratuitous assumption produced the destruction of the finest army of the house of Austria. Lauer, who directed Alvinzi's operations took it for granted that Massena's division would be kept in check by the division which de-

houched from Caldiero, and would remain balled, as it were, to the ramparts of Verona; in short, that the General-in-chief would not understand the importance of anticipating the Austrian army on the level of Rivoli.

5thly.—What should Alvinzi have done? He should have marched in such a manner as to be ready for battle every day and hour. For this purpose he should, first, have kept his forty-two or battalions so placed on the mountain between Monte Magnone and the lake of Garda, as to be united, in communication, and forming only a single mass; secondly, he should also have united with them his thirty squadrons of cavalry; for it is a prejudice to suppose that the cavalry cannot pass wherever the infantry can pass, and that it

premature dispositions you may have made to your own destruction.

Generals are often deceived respecting the strength of the enemy they have to engage. Prisoners are only acquainted with their own corps; officers make very uncertain reports; hence an axiom adapted to all cases has been generally adopted: *that an army ought always to be ready by day, by night, and at all hours, to make all the resistance it is capable of making.* This requires the soldiers to be constantly provided with their arms and ammunition; the infantry to have its artillery, cavalry, and generals always with it; the different divisions of the army to be always ready to support and cover each other; and points out, that in all camps, halts, and marches, the troops should always be in advantageous positions possessing the qualities requisite for every field of battle, that is to say:—first, that the flanks be supported, and secondly, that all the artillery may be brought into action in the most advantageous positions possible. To fulfil these conditions, when troops are in marching columns, it is necessary to have vanguards and flankers, to watch the motions of the enemy in front and on the right and left, at a sufficient distance to allow the principal corps to deploy and take position. The Austrian tacticians have always deviated from these principles, by drawing up plans

founded on uncertain reports, and which, even if they had been true at the moment of preparing the plans, had ceased to be so the following day, or the next day but one, that is to say, when they were to be executed.

A great captain ought every day to ask himself several times this question: If the enemy's army should now appear in my front or on my right or left, what should I do? and if he should find himself embarrassed, he must be ill-posted, or irregular in his arrangements, and should endeavour to remedy the evil. If Marmar had said to himself, *Should the French army meet me before I reach Ruedi, and whilst I have only half my infantry and no cavalry or artillery to oppose it, he must have added, I shall be taken before I am senior to my own.* How happened it that what had taken place at Lodi, Castiglione, the Brenta, and Arcole, did not make him take care to

Verona, which had no object, and only weakened the two principal attacks without connecting them, which local circumstances rendered it impossible to do. It is true that the orders from Vienna were, that if Alvinzi should be beaten, and Provera should succeed in raising the blockade of Mantua, Wurmser should pass the Po with the garrison of Mantua, and retreat on Rome; but without being certain of the co-operation of the King of Naples, which was not secured, these measures would have been fruitless.

7thly.—Provera, after having surprised the passage of the Adige at Anghiari, should have crossed to the right bank with his whole corps, including Bayalitsch's division, raised his bridge, and made for Mantua, which was his only asylum. He might have reached that place with 20,000 men. Instead of this he conducted but 8000 men to Mantua, for he left Bayalitsch's division on the right, 2000 men to guard his bridge (who were taken prisoners), and having wasted time, his vanguard suffered loss. Arriving in the morning before Saint-Georges, he ought to have entered into the place before noon, either by the citadel, where there were no lines of circumvallation, or by Pietoli, crossing the lake, which is very narrow at that spot; there were upwards of a hundred boats in the port

of Mantua. He lost the day and night. By five in the afternoon, Napoleon having reached la Favorite with part of the army of Rivoli, the whole posture of affairs was altered. Provera was obliged to capitulate the next morning. *The Austrians, in general, do not know the value of time.*

8thly — General Provera had been taken at Cossaria, the day after the battle of Millesimo. he had evinced little talent, and this was Napoleon's true reason for extolling him, as he wished to keep up his credit. This plan succeeded, Provera was again employed, and suffered himself to be taken a second time at la Favorite. We ought therefore to look with suspicion on the praises of an enemy, unless they are given after the cessation of hostilities.

Sixth Observation — 1st. It has been said that the bridge over the Adige should have been placed at Albaredo and not at Ronco, but this is erroneous. Kislamine had but 1500 men in Verona. After having passed the bridge at Ronco, and previously to marching on Arcole, a reconnoitring party was sent forward on the dyke of Porcil, that village was taken, and Massena proceeded thither, who thus found himself two leagues in the rear of Marshal Alvinzi. If this marshal had marched on Verona the same day, as it was probable he would, the French army would have followed at his heels, there was no

obstacle to separate them, and Alvinzi would have been hemmed in between the French army and Verona. If the bridge had been placed opposite Albaredo, on the left of the Alpon, that river, or the morass of Arcole, would have covered Alvinzi's march, and allowed him time to force Verona. The circumstances were so delicate ! The operation of passing into the rear of Alvinzi's army at Ronco was bold, but secure from all disadvantage ; that of passing the Adige at Albaredo would have been rash and hazardous ; it would have compromised both Verona and the army.

2dly.—Why was Arcole abandoned on the first and second day ? In order to have an opportunity of raising the bridge of Ronco at midnight, if the news from Rivoli should require it, and then marching on Roverbella and reaching that place before Davidowich. If the latter arrived before Mantua before the French army, all was lost ; if the French army got there first, all was won. After effecting a junction with Vaubois, the general-in-chief would have beaten Davidowich, driven him into the Tyrol, and returned to the Adige before Alvinzi could have passed that river.

3dly.—It has also been said that on the first day, a bridge should have been thrown over the Alpon, and the army should have debouched in the

plain; or at least that this should have been done on the second day! No. It was not until the third day of this battle that the enemy's army was sufficiently weakened and discouraged to allow of a hope of beating it in deployed line. It was even contrary to the opinion of the generals, who thought this manœuvre too daring, and after an hour's hesitation, that Napoleon gave the order on the third day. It is necessary to bear in mind that the French army had been weakened by the battles of the Brenta and of Caldiero; it now amounted only to 13,000 men, and the first and second days of the battle of Arcole had still further reduced it. The manœuvres of this battle are not to be understood without a thorough knowledge of the topographical situation of Rivoli, Verona, Castel-Nuovo, Mantua, Ronco, Caldiero, Villa-Nuova, and Vicenza.

4thly.—The capitulation granted to Wurmser is unexampled. Napoleon was induced to grant it by a generous feeling towards the Marshal, who was old enough to have been his grandfather; by a wish to acquire a reputation for clemency towards the vanquished; and in order to testify his extreme indignation at the order the Directory had sent him to treat this respectable marshal as an emigrant taken in arms, being a native of Alsace.

5thly.—Napoleon should have had the level of Rivoli, la Corona, the chapel of San Marco, and la Rocca d'Anfo occupied with good works of timber, and even of masonry. The Adige is covered with loads of timber, which are brought down by traders from the Tyrol to be carried to Ferrara and Venice; lime and stone are in great abundance there; Verona and Brescia afford resources of all kinds. In the course of six weeks four forts might have been completed, on the level of Rivoli, at the chapel of San Marco, and at la Rocca d'Anfo, which, when each lined with fifteen pieces of cannon, and manned with garrisons four or five hundred strong, would have secured all these debouchés from any surprise or *coup-de-main*; and this would have been more serviceable to the army than a reinforcement of 15,000 men. It is said that after Wurmser's operation in August, when the full extent of the danger that the army was in from the debouché of the Chiesa was perceived, Napoleon gave orders to occupy la Rocca d'Anfo, but the engineers made out plans which were far too extensive, and would have required a twelvemonth's labour to carry into execution. But this opinion of the engineers was evidently erroneous: in war the general-in-chief alone understands the importance of certain things; and he alone, by his superior information and authority, can overcome all difficulties.

6thly.—Mantua at length fell, after having been eight months invested. Some Italian engineers had proposed to divert the waters of the Mincio, and thus to dry up the lakes of Mantua, which would have deprived that place of its principal means of defence. This operation was attempted by the Visconti in their wars against the Dukes of Mantua, but they were not masters of Peschiera, and, besides, the Milanese engineers conducted their works upon false principles: they endeavoured to bar the Mincio with dykes, which the river always carried away. It is well known that the course of water must never be directly opposed: it was by humouring it and submitting to all its caprices, that the Dutch subdued the ocean. This plan might, however, have been accomplished by drawing off the waters into the Tartaro and Molinella.

7thly.—In order to shorten the line of the Adige, it has several times been proposed, as an effectual expedient, to cut the dyke of the right bank of that river, near Laguago. The waters drawn off would mingle with those of the Tartaro and Molinella, and would make a morass of all the country comprised within the Adige from Legnago to the Po. But the consequences of such an operation would be ruinous to that province. At the time of the second attack of Altonzi and Provana, in January, this plan was sub-

mitted to Napoleon, who did not think that the critical state of affairs could justify such a devastation. The English did not act with so much moderation in Egypt: in order to obtain a very slight advantage they cut the dyke of Lake Maa-dieh, and let the Mediterranean into Lake Mareotis, which had very nearly ruined Alexandria.

Seventh Observation.—There were but 4000 French in the army that marched against Rome, although it consisted of 9000 men, including the newly-levied Milanese and Bolognese battalions, which were not yet fit to face regular troops in line. The court of Rome made great efforts, but with little success. A nation that has no skeleton regiments, no principle of military organization, will always find it very difficult to organize an army. France raised good armies with great celerity in 1790; but this was because she had a good foundation, which the emigration rather improved than injured. Romagna and the mountains of the Apennines were worked up to a high pitch of fanaticism; the all-powerful influence of the priests and monks, missions, sermons and miracles, were effectually employed. The people of the Apennines are naturally brave; some sparks of the character of the ancient Romans are still to be found amongst them: yet they could make no resistance against a handful of well-disciplined and well-conducted troops.

Cardinal Busca alluded to la Vendée. The situation of la Vendée was very peculiar; the population was warlike, and included a great number of officers and non-commissioned officers who had served in the army, whilst the troops sent against them had been levied in the streets of Paris, were commanded by men who knew nothing of military affairs, and committed the greatest blunders, which insensibly inured the Vendéans to war. At last the desperate measures adopted by the Committee of Public Safety and the Jacobins, left these people no middle course, death being inevitable, it was still best to make a defence. It may easily be conceived that in this war against the Holy See, if, instead of endeavouring to calm the people, and gaining victories, the French had suffered defeats at first, and had then resorted to measures of violence and extermination, a Vendean war might have been established in the Apennines: severity, bloodshed, and death create enthusiasts and martyrs, and excite courageous and desperate determinations.

Eighth Observation.—1st. In the campaign of 1797, Prince Charles, wishing to cover Vienna and Trieste, ought to have collected all his forces in the Tyrol, where he would have been supported by local circumstances and the disposition of the inhabitants. He could readily have received his reinforcements from the army of the Rhine:

and as long as he maintained himself in the Tyrol, he had no reason to fear the march of the French army to the Isonzo. On the first move of that army on the Piave, he would have recalled it by passing the Avisio and possessing himself of the Trentine, which would have obliged the French general to have carried the war into the Tyrol with his whole army, a very difficult and hazardous operation. If Prince Charles's head-quarters had been at Bòlzano instead of Conegliano; if the 40,000 men he had on the Piave and the Tagliamento had been on the Avisio, Vienna and Trieste would have been perfectly covered. There would, however, have been nothing to prevent his arming and occupying the fortress of Palma-Nuova, and making it the point of appui for a division of five or six thousand men of all weapons, employed in observing the Piave and Tagliamento.

2dly.—Napoleon's plans at the battle of the Tagliamento admit of no doubt; he wished to possess himself of the Col de Tarwis. It was not, therefore, at Codroïpo that the Archduke should have fixed his head-quarters, but on the heights of San Daniele, so as to be able, in case of need, to operate his retreat on la Ponteba and the heights of Tarwis.

3dly.—After the battle of the Tagliamento, he should not have retreated in the direction of the passes of Cividale and the Isonzo, upon Tarwis,

because Masseua was already master of them, which circumstance produced the destruction of all the troops he sent in this false direction, and ruined his army.

4thly.—The fortress of Gradisea was not tenable after the passing of the Isonzo; the battalions he had placed there were sacrificed to no purpose; they did not delay the march of the French army a single moment.

5thly.—As it was of the utmost importance to the Archduke, in April, to gain three or four days in order to give Kerpen and Spork time to join him; and as he had reached Murau, one day's march from Scheifling, he should have availed himself of the opportunity of gaining that time which the French General afforded him by the proposal of peace. He should have answered this offer by sincerely embracing it, by promising to use his influence, and requesting an armistice to enable him to go to Vienna to speak to the Emperor on the subject. The armistice would have been signed. But the Archduke gave a cold vague answer, and twenty-four hours after, upon second thoughts, applied for a suspension of hostilities; but it was then too late; his object was too evident.

Ninth Observation.—1st. Was not the march into Germany by two lines of operation, those of the Tyrol and la Pontcha, contrary to the prin-

ciple *that an army should never have more than one line of operations?* Was not the junction of these two corps d'armée in Carinthia, so far from the point from which they departed, contrary to the principle of *never joining your columns before the enemy and near him?* Would it not have been preferable to leave seven or eight thousand men before Trent, on the defensive, and to make ten or twelve thousand more men join on the Piave? By this plan the French would have avoided carrying the war into the Tyrol, a difficult theatre of operations; nor would they have exposed themselves to the chances unfavourable to a junction; yet the whole of the forces would have been concentrated in the very outset of operations.

Neither of the above-mentioned principles were violated. If only 8000 men had been left with Joubert on the Avisio, he would have been attacked, and Davidowich's corps d'armée would have reached Verona before the French army had arrived at Villach. Joubert would have wanted at least 14,000 men to enable him to maintain himself on the Avisio. It appeared preferable to avoid depriving him of any part of his forces, and to allow him by means of the superiority he thus retained over Davidowich's army, to beat that general, weaken his army, and drive it beyond the Brenner. The Tyrol is a

difficult theatre of war, but a fatal one to the vanquished. The French troops had acquired a great superiority over those of Germany.

The army did not enter Germany by two lines of operations; for the Pusterthal is on the Italian side of the upper ridge of the Alps, and, as soon as Joubert had passed Lienz, the line of operations was that of Villach and the Ponteba. The junction of the two corps d'armée was not effected in presence of the enemy; for when Joubert left Brixen, to march to Spital, wheeling to the right, through the Pusterthal or the valley of the Drave, the principal corps of the army had reached Klagenfurth, and had patrols advanced as far as Lienz. It was therefore impossible for the Archduke to invent any manœuvre to oppose this junction. Joubert remained on the defensive until the battle of the Tagliamento. After that battle he attacked, beat, and destroyed the greater part of Davidowich's corps, and repulsed it beyond the Brenner; which was attended with no disadvantage, because, had he been beaten, he would merely have retreated from position to position, into Italy. When he was informed that the army had passed the Julian Alps and the Drave, he effected his movement of junction by the Pusterthal, which was also unattended with any disadvantage. This operation, thus executed in three movements, was strictly conform-

able to rule : it was calculated to succeed, and did in fact succeed, in every respect.

2dly.—It has been asked why Serrurier's division and the head-quarters did not support Guieux's division, by directing their march from the field of battle of the Tagliamento, on Cividale and Caporetto, under the pretence that Bernadotte's division was alone sufficient to follow the enemy's left on Palma-Nuova and Goritz.

From Cividale to Tarwis, by way of Caporetto, the road presents but one defile. Guieux's division, which contained 8000 fighting men, all excellent troops, was more than sufficient to drive Bayalitsch's corps as far as Caporetto ; but as the Archduke had ordered this corps to take an erroneous direction, which was certain to produce its destruction, if Bayalitsch, on reaching Caporetto, should persist in marching in the direction of Tarwis, it was supposed that the Archduke would reconsider the matter, and send him orders at Caporetto, to go down to Gradisca and return on Carniola, which induced Napoleon to march on Palma-Nuova and Gradisca, with Serrurier's and Bernadotte's divisions ; from Goritz he sent Bernadotte's division into Carniola, to follow Prince Charles's left, and proceeded with Serrurier's division on Caporetto. If Bayalitsch's corps, instead of going up the Isonzo, marched down it to seek safety by way of Goritz, it would be

attacked in front, whilst Guieux would push its rear guard: this corps would be taken. If, on the contrary, he advanced to Tarwis, disregarding Massena's position who occupied that place, as in fact he did, Serrurier's division formed a second line in the rear of Guieux. Thus Napoleon had provided for all contingencies.

3dly.—Bernadotte's division marched on Laybach, because it was necessary to subdue Carniola, to take possession of Trieste and the mines of Idria, and to drive Prince Charles's left out of Carniola and beyond the Drave; but immediately after attaining these objects, this division proceeded, by a wheel to the left, to join the army; and the French general took care not to direct it, as many generals would have done, by way of Cilli and Goritz, on the Simering, because in that case this division would not have been in a situation to support the army in all the actions which took place, or might have taken place, at Judenburg, Bruck, &c. The march of Bernadotte's division on Groetz, which, if it had been performed without any bad consequences, might have been attended with some advantage, would have been contrary to rule; whilst the march it actually performed was agreeable to the principles of concentration, which are the true principles of war.

4thly.—Napoleon determined to conclude the

treaty of Leoben, and to stop on the Simering, because, as we have already seen, he had been informed by a letter from the Directory, that he was not to calculate upon the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine. Had the government informed him, on the contrary, that such co-operation would be afforded, had it been even as late as the month of June, he would have waited, and not have concluded the peace; for his position was good: he had above 60,000 men with him in Carinthia, and reserves on the Adige, which were more than sufficient to suppress the insurrections of the Venetians, and check the Tyrolese levies; and he was desirous of entering Vienna.

5thly.—The order given to Joubert after the battle of the Tagliamento, to enter the Tyrol and advance to Villach in Carinthia, by the Pusterthal, was communicated to Lallemand, the French minister to the Republic of Venice, that he might take measures to prevent the commotion that was expected to break out: it was apprehended that, as soon as the oligarchs should learn that the Tyrol was evacuated, they would imagine that the French were beaten, and would take rash and premature measures. Lallemand had several conferences on this subject with the persons who were deputed to him; he shewed them a copy of the instructions given to Joubert. This produced some effect, but the communication came too

late: the Senate had secretly taken its measures thirty-six hours before, in the persuasion of the destruction of Joubert's corps. This delay of thirty-six hours was the principal cause of the ruin of the Republic of Venice. On what trifles does the fate of nations depend!

6thly.—Certain foreign officers, imperfectly acquainted with the circumstances of the case, have blamed Napoleon for having left the divisions of Victor and Kilmaine in the Marches and in Romagna, to observe the Pope's army and Naples, which, said they, was useless, because peace was restored with those powers.

General Kilmaine commanded on the Adige;—his head-quarters were at Verona; when the insurrection of that city, and the arrival of General Fioravanti, placed him under the necessity of ordering the commandants of the forts to shut themselves in. He quitted the Adige, and retired to the Mincio, with 6 or 700 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, wishing to avoid being surrounded, and to keep up his communications with Mantua and Peschiera. General Victor's division consisted of 8000 men, including 3000 Milanese under the command of General Lahoz. This division had orders to march to the Adige, to form a corps of observation, and keep down the Venetians. Victor made General Lahoz precede him, and delayed his own march with the

French brigade for a fortnight; whether he was not fully sensible of the importance of expediting his movement, or whether that time was requisite for his executing the articles of Tolentino, or from any other cause unworthy of the attention of history. The fact is, however, that this fortnight's delay was the sole cause of the massacres of Verona. Perhaps Pesaro and his party would have been more circumspect, had they seen this general's division quartered on the Adige, as it ought to have been; and this would have been very fortunate for the senate, and prevented its ruin. The Pope had disbanded his army;—it was on the peace establishment, and excited no apprehension. The Bologna troops were more than sufficient to occupy Romagna, and overawe all the malevolent on the right bank of the Po. There was never, therefore, any intention of leaving a single man in observation on the Rubicon. But dates are not to be disputed: the peace of Tolentino was signed on the 19th of February; the battle of the Tagliamento was fought on the 16th of March, and the preliminaries of Leoben were signed on the 14th of April.

VARIATIONS.*

1st.—See *Memoirs of the History of France during the Reign of Napoleon*, Vol. III.—War of Italy, dictated to the Count de Montholon.

Thus account of the battle of Rivoli may be placed at Section VI. p 408.—*Memoirs*, &c. Vol. III.

BATTLE OF RIVOLI.

ON the 13th of January, 1797 (24 Nivose), the French army was formed in five divisions.

That of General Massena, having, for its brigadier-generals, Generals Rampon, Leclerc, Lemonnier, and Brune, was composed of the 18th, 25th, 32d, and 75th of the line, of the 18th light infantry, the 1st regiment of cavalry, and the 15th dragoons; besides two companies of gendarmes, and one battalion of the *Côtes-du-Nord*.—Head-quarters were at Verona.

* For the better explanation of the plans of Rivoli and La Favorite, we have thought it right to introduce here, under the title of VARIATIONS, two accounts of these battles, drawn up under Napoleon's direction, and given by him in an abridged recital in the *Memoirs*.—(Note by the French Editor)

General Joubert's division was composed of the 14th, 33d, 39th, and 85th of the line; of the 4th, 17th, 22d, and 29th light infantry; and the 22d regiment of light horse. Brigadier-generals Vial and Leblay were attached to this division, the head-quarters of which were at Rivoli.

General Augereau had under his command Brigadier-generals Walter, Verdier, Guieux, Point, and Bon. His division was composed of the 4th, 40th, 50th, and 57th of the line; the 5th light infantry, the 5th regiment of cavalry, the 9th dragoons, and the 1st and 7th hussars. The head-quarters were at Ronco.

General Serrurier was employed in the siege of Mantua; he had under his command Brigadier-generals Dumas, Dallemagne, Miollis, Beaumont, and Victor. His division consisted of the 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th, 64th, and 69th of the line; of the 5th and 20th regiments of dragoons, and of the 10th, 24th, and 25th light horse.

Lastly, General Rey had under his command Brigadier-generals Murat, Guillaume, and Baraguay d'Hilliers; and commanded a division composed of the 58th of the line, the 11th and 12th light infantry, and the 8th regiment of dragoons. The head-quarters of this division were at Dezenzano.

Napoleon having ascertained that the enemy had only a corps of 2000 men before Verona, and

that the greater part of the column from Bassano had filed off towards the upper part of the Adige, received a courier from General Joubert, on the 13th of January (24 Nivose), confirming his ideas of the enemy's real design. This general informed him that a corps of 25,000 men was advancing upon him; that part were attacking him in front, whilst a column of 5 or 6000 men was turning his position by the back of Montebaldo; that the cavalry and the rest of the infantry were marching down the valley of the Adige; and that, in consequence of all these movements, he had thought it best to retire and concentrate all his forces on the level of Rivoli, where he intended to fight, and wait for farther orders.

Napoleon, who had foreseen these circumstances, and already provided for them by an original movement, which brought his troops nearer to Verona, sent forward the 18th, 32d, and 75th demi-brigades, and two squadrons of General Massena's division, by night, towards Rivoli; leaving at Verona the 25th demi-brigade and a regiment of cavalry, with orders to maintain themselves in that place until his return. The 18th was directed by way of Garda, to keep a look-out on the left flank of the march, and secure that point, where General Murat's troops, which formed the garrison of Salò, might land, if circumstances and his means would allow of this

movement. The other troops of General Rey had orders to station themselves in reserve before Castelnovo on the 14th of January (25th Nivose), at day-break. Lastly, General Dugua's reserve was placed at the disposal of General Augereau; and that of the blockade of Mantua, under the command of General Victor, was stationed at Villa Franca in its stead.

General Augereau was informed of all these dispositions, and had orders to attack the enemy, in case they diminished their force before him.

Ever since the 8th of January (29th Nivose), General Provera had remained in the position of Bevilacqua, without shewing any intention of moving.

Napoleon, having thus prepared every thing, set out in person for Rivoli, where he arrived on the 14th of January (25th Nivose), at two o'clock in the morning.

POSITION BEFORE THE BATTLE.

General Joubert's division is mustered on the level of Rivoli. That of General Massena, coming from Verona, debouches on the field of battle even with Rivoli. General Rey's division arrives by La Sega; Caveggione, and Orza. The Austrians were posted between Lumini and Dolce: they occupied the banks of the Tasso, between Caprino and Lubiara,

and the flanks of Mount San Marco; their advanced posts extended as far as the first steps of the Amphitheatre of Rivoli, at Trombalora, Zoro, Serpelle, and the chapel of San Marco.

He found Joubert's division mustered on the level of Rivoli, occupying Zoanne-Montagna, and guarding the intrenchments of the important defile of Torte, on the Incanale road; intrenchments known by the name of the works of the plateau. This division had advanced posts at Montalto, at Bellebarbe, Bettinelli, and La Fontana, on Mount San Marco; the redoubt of Monte Castello, the mountain of La Rocca, and the fort of La Chiusa, on the Postale road, were also guarded by the infantry.

The level of Rivoli is in the centre of a semicircle of a radius of about a league, formed by the course of the Tasso, a torrent which falls from the heights of La Corona, passing through Pazzone, San Martino di Lubiara, and Caprino. Another mountain-stream, running from Lumini towards Pezzena, joins the former above Boi, from the south-western extremity of Montebaldo.

The semicircular form of the course of the Tasso begins at Lubiara, and is continued from Pezzena towards Costerman, Affi, and Orza; whence it runs through Caveggione, and falls into the Adige near La Sega.

The Tyrolese road, which is called the Imperial road, or *Strada Cavallare*, runs in nearly a straight line from La Sega to Rivoli, and thence to San Martino di Lubiara, Pazzone, and Ferrara. At Lubiara this road forms a narrow and difficult defile, hemmed in between the declivities of Mount San Marco and Montebaldo; it runs through a deep ravine between the heights, which, rising, like the steps of a circular amphitheatre, form the elevated level of Rivoli. The road to Brentino, through Incanale, meets the before-mentioned road at Rivoli, and runs up the valley of the Adige on the right bank.

The enemy, with twenty-four companies of light infantry and thirteen battalions, occupied the banks of the Tasso between Caprino and Lubiara, and from thence was posted up the side of Mount San Marco. The advanced posts extended as far as the first steps of the Amphitheatre of Rivoli, at Trombalora, Zoro, Serpello, and the chapel of San Marco.

General Lusignan's column bivouacuated at Lumini. Thirteen battalions and thirteen squadrons were advancing through the valley of the Adige. Part of the column of Bassano, which had shewn itself before Verona, on the 12th of January (23d Nivose), was entering Dolce, where General Alvinzi was fixing his head-quarters, and where his park of artillery had also arrived.

Napoleon having, as soon as he reached the spot, visited the line which he considered suitable only to the situation of General Joubert, before an enemy so superior in number, ordered the troops to resume the positions already occupied by the Austrian advanced posts, in order to make himself master of all the heights on that side of the Tasso, and to begin the action with advantage on the arrival of the reinforcements which he had ordered to march.

FIRST MOVEMENT OF ATTACK.

Napoleon, arriving from Verona, and finding General Joubert's division concentrated on the level of Rivoli, in presence of an enemy far superior in number, orders all the positions occupied by the Austrian advanced posts to be attacked and taken, whilst the reinforcements he has put in motion are coming up.

General Vial, at the head of the light infantry, advances on Mount San Marco; General Joubert supports him with the 33d of the line.

The 29th light infantry and the 85th of the line are detached on the left, to drive the enemy from the heights of Trombalora and Zoro; the 14th of the line is ordered to attack him in the centre, on those of Rorina.

The attack of the right is attended with some success; but the enemy, advancing impetuously and in force against the left, makes the 29th and 85th fall back, and retakes Trombalora. The 14th, being taken in flank, wheels to the left, and maintains its ground with admirable courage. The right is obliged to fall back, to avoid being surrounded.

This attack took place before day, and caused no little surprise to the enemy, who did not expect an obstinate defence. General Vial, at the head of the light infantry, advanced on Mount San Marco, passing beyond Lubiara, and extending the right on the flank of that mountain. General Joubert, with the 32d, sustained this attack on a line with Lubiara.

The 29th light infantry and the 85th were stationed on the left, on the heights of Trombalora and Zora, which the Austrians had occupied; and the 14th of the line in the centre, on those of Rovina, which flank the Lubiara road.

The action had commenced somewhat earlier than might have been wished, on account of the close proximity of the enemy's line; the success of the right led it, perhaps, a little too far, and a battalion of the 14th was attacking the village of San Martino di Lubiara, when the enemy, ad-

vancing with superior forces and great determination against our left, obliged the 29th and 85th to give way, (although, with more firmness, they might have maintained their ground,) and retook the position of Trombalora.

The 14th, taken in flank, wheeled backwards to the left, and withstood the efforts of the enemy.

SECOND MOVEMENT.

General Massena comes up, with the 32d of the line. Napoleon, who had gone to the left, where the danger was pressing, orders him to attack Trombalora again. The 29th and 85th rally to the 32d; the position is carried a second time. In the mean time the rest of General Massena's division arrives on the level of Rivoli. General Rey, at the head of the 58th, appears on the field of battle at Orza.

Napoleon, who was then in the centre, left General Berthier there, and hastened to the left, where the danger appeared imminent. General Massena arrived with the 32d. He ordered him to attack the enemy again at Trombalora. The 29th and 85th rallied, and the positions were retaken.

In the mean time the right, which had wit-

nessed the check sustained by the left, fell back, to avoid the danger of being separated from it, and was briskly pressed during this movement.

The enemy particularly directed his efforts against the 14th, which defended the only defile by which the troops of the right could return.

General Berthier directed the valour of these brave fellows with great energy, and they were immoveable. The battalion which had attacked San Martino di Lubiara, retreated from house to house under cover of the hedges. The 32d took a more compact position in the rear of their former one, still resting on the 14th and the heights of San Marco.

Four pièces of cannon had been placed in battery in front of the 14th, which had formed a square, and was attacked on every side by ten or twelve thousand men: these guns were in great danger; the cannoneers and horses belonging to them were killed, and the pieces could no longer be served. The Austrians were resolved at all hazards to capture them, and parties of their bravest grenadiers repeatedly rushed forward for that purpose. They had already fastened dragropes to them in order to carry them off, when a voice called out from the midst of a battalion, "*Fourteenth! will you let your guns be taken?*" Fifty grenadiers instantly advanced with the bayonet: supported by the musquetry of the battalion,

they surrounded the guns, and forced the enemy to abandon them.

In the mean time, the remainder of General Massena's troops reached Rivoli. General Leclerc's brigade of cavalry, which formed part of them, took up a position on the level; and the 18th received orders to proceed thither, leaving a post on the Garda road, between the lake and La Rocca.

The 58th, commanded by General Rey, Baraguay d'Hilliers being second in command, marched over the heights which border the Tasso, from La Sega towards Caveggione and Orza, and there waited for orders to attack.

General Lusignan's corps had gone down from Lumini by the *Speroni*, filed off through Pezzenna, and was marching along the Tasso, having a considerable detachment on the look-out towards Costerman.

THIRD MOVEMENT.

The Austrian infantry, stationed at Dolce in the valley of the Adige, advances under the command of the general-in-chief Alvinzi, protected by a numerous artillery posted at Sommano.

This infantry attacks the works of the plateau, and carries them after extraordinary exertions.

Upon this the Austrian cavalry, which was in column on the Incanale road, rapidly advances, threatening to turn the right and centre of the French army.

During this movement General Joubert advances from Lubiara at the head of the light infantry, and falls furiously on the Austrians; whilst General Leclerc, leading General Massena's cavalry, charges the enemy's cavalry in front and on both flanks. These combined attacks are crowned with perfect success. The Austrian infantry is driven in disorder into the valley of the Adige. The cavalry takes to flight in confusion; and the enemy loses 2000 men in killed and prisoners.

The infantry which General Alvinzi had left in the valley of the Adige, was advancing on the banks of that river, under cover of a numerous artillery stationed at Sommano. This general had selected four battalions to push the attack of the centre with increased vigour; and with the nine remaining battalions he had the works of the level attacked, consisting of one line on the extreme right, and two detached works on the left, which played upon the front, whilst the cavalry was marching in column along the Incanale road, waiting only for the success of the infantry in order to debouch.

After incredible exertions, this body of infantry at length obtained possession of the works of the level. They were already beginning to form: the cavalry, rapidly advancing, already threatened to turn the right and the centre; when General Joubert, bringing up the light infantry which had defiled to Lubiara, stationed part of them on the extremity of Mount San Marco, whence they fired down upon the Austrian cavalry; and attacked their infantry at the head of the remainder: whilst General Berthier and General Leclerc led the cavalry of Massena's division against the enemy's cavalry, in front and on both flanks.

Their charges, skilfully combined and boldly executed, were attended with all the success that could be expected. The Austrian infantry was thrown into confusion and driven into the vale of the Adige; the column of cavalry fell into disorder; and all who had ascended to the *plateau*, amounting to about 2000 men, were killed or taken.

During these transactions, General Lusignan's column, proceeding from *Pezzena*, had reached the Brunissi mountains by the Fenilone; the detachment placed at Costerman had marched to the Calcine, to occupy the Garda road; and the head of the first column which had appeared on Mount Braiare had been repulsed by the 75th, which had remained in reserve at Rivoli.

But the 18th, on their way from La Rocca di Garda, had forced the passage of the Calcina, driving back the Austrian detachment that guarded it upon the main body. The 18th had then continued their route to Rivoli, where they were posted on the left of the 75th, facing to the rear towards General Lusignan's troops, which were still proceeding to the height of the Amphitheatre of Rivoli, to Mount Pipolo, and thus cut off the road from Rivoli to La Sega, thinking to hem in Joubert's division.

Orders had been sent to General Rey to advance and occupy Mount Braiare; but these orders had never been received. This general remained near Orza, taking the Austrian corps which separated him from Joubert's division for French troops retreating, and making dispositions to support it.

FOURTH MOVEMENT.

The Austrian general Lusignan, posted at Lumini, had put his troops in motion to take the French army in the rear, at the instant of General Alvinzi's attack. General Lusignan, after having crossed to the Brunissi Mountains, and marched along the heights of the Amphitheatre of Rivoli, reaches Mount Pipolo.

lo, and there announces his arrival by a general discharge of musquetry, thinking he has hemmed in Joubert's division.

11 But Napoleon, unmolested in front and victorious on his right, does not hesitate to attack these new comers. He forms three columns of the 18th and 75th of the line, which were in reserve at Rivoli, gives the command of them to Generals Monnier and Brune, and directs them on Mount Pipolo.

General Rey and General Baraguay d'Hilliers had arrived lower down, at Orza, at the head of the 58th. Their position being in the rear of Lusignan's corps, they promptly second Napoleon's attack in front by another in the rear. The enemy, surprised and disconcerted, seek safety in flight, or in the clemency of the victor. The greater part of them lay down their arms.

General Lusignan annoueed his arrival on Mount Pipolo by a general discharge of musquetry; but our troops, proud of their success, far from imagining their retreat cut off, said themselves that these new comers were so many prisoners for them. Napoleon, undisturbed in front of his line and victorious on his right, immediately resolved to attack the enemy, who was offering to hem him in on his left. He had seve-

ral twelve-pounders brought up to the height of Campagna, to cannonade the enemy; whilst, in order to drive him from Mount Pipolo, he formed three battalions of the 18th and 75th into three columns of attack, under the command of General Brune and General Monnier. The enemy being vigorously attacked, was obliged to give way, leaving a great number of killed; but he rallied again at Mount Brunissi, where some troops which had not yet fought were posted.

General Rey and General Baraguay d'Hilliers, having in the mean time discovered the real state of affairs by the return of the convoys which, proceeding from La Sega to Rivoli, had been stopped on their march by General Lusignan's column, resolved to second the attack which they saw Napoleon making, by another made in the rear by their three battalions. The enemy, thus attacked again at Mount Brunissi by the columns of the 18th and 75th, and seeing that of the 58th debouch in their rear, endeavoured only to save themselves by flight, or to obtain the clemency of the victor. The greater part laid down their arms. Fifteen hundred men fled by way of Garda; but the post of fifty men stationed there stopped them; and the whole of Lusignan's corps, which consisted of about 4500 men, were made prisoners.

At the conclusion of this brilliant day, in which Joubert's division and the troops under Massena and Rey, being the forces which took part in the battle, amounting at the utmost to 16,000 men, had taken above 6000 prisoners from a corps of 25,000 men, Napoleon was informed by General Guieux that General Provera had passed the Adige at Anghiari, in the night of the 13th of January (24th Nivose). Knowing that this general might have marched on Mantua or Verona, he immediately adopted the plan of bringing back General Massena's victorious troops, in order to anticipate the enemy's march in either case. It was natural to suppose, above all things, that the numerous garrison of Mantua, being apprised of the march of succours or of a battle fighting on the Adige (for they could hear the cannon), would attempt a sortie, which might facilitate the arrival of the succours, or compel the French to raise the blockade. Napoleon, therefore, took measures to proceed to Mantua, with General Massena's troops and the reserves which were at Valleggio and Villa-Franca, in order to beat the garrison and General Provera's corps separately.

Before he set out in person for Castelnovo, he wished, however, to obtain still further advantages from the victory gained at the point he was leaving; and he ordered General Joubert to fol-

low up his successes, by taking advantage of the terror with which the Austrian army was struck by its recent losses. To second him in this attack he left him the 58th, which had merely shewn itself on the evening of the battle.

MOVEMENTS AFTER THE BATTLE.

Napoleon finding that a corps of the enemy menaces the troops blockading Mantua, marches on that point immediately after the battle of Rivoli, taking with him General Massena's division. On his departure he orders General Joubert and General Rey to pursue the Austrians. The latter had a single defile to pass at La Ferrara. General Joubert detaches General Devereaux at the head of 1200 men to cut them off there; he then presses the enemy at Pazzone, at Mount Magnone, and at the heights of La Corona and San Martino. The enemy are every where overthrown. Finding themselves rapidly overtaken at the defile of La Ferrara, they precipitate themselves in disorder from the almost vertical heights of La Corona. A horrible carnage is made of them.

The enemy had but one defile to pass, at Ferrara, where his columns could be stopped. General Joubert detached a column consisting of

1000 or 1200 men, under the command of Adjutant-general Devereaux, which was to pass through Lumini, and to descend from the ridge of Montebaldo by Pezzo di Laguna and the valley of Naole, and to reach La Ferrara with all possible despatch. He then had the enemy closely pressed by General Vial on Mount Magnone and the mountain of La Corona, attacked them himself in front at Pazzone, and made General Baraguay d'Hilliers advance at the head of two battalions on the heights of San Martino. Notwithstanding an overwhelming fire of artillery, the enemy's line of 8 or 10,000 men could not withstand these columns, which attacked with equal rapidity and boldness; and finding themselves overtaken in the defile by the superior celerity of the French, they precipitated themselves in confusion from the almost vertical heights of La Corona. A horrible carnage then took place. The ladder-path of La Madonna, by which a great number of infantry and horsemen attempted to escape, only served to whelm them in an abyss. The French took 7000 men and 9 pieces of cannon.

POSITION AFTER THE BATTLE.

All the troops, commanded by Generals Joubert, Vial, Rey, and Baraguay d'Hilliers, take position at La Corona and La Ferrara.

All the enemy's troops in the valley of the Adige retreated in disorder; and Joubert's division resumed its positions at La Corona and La Ferrara, until Napoleon's successes down the Adige should enable him to make new dispositions.

We were unwilling to separate what took place on the 15th of January (26th Nivose) near Rivoli, from the battle of the 14th of January (25th Nivose), because the action of the 15th was a necessary consequence of the other. Had it been summer, all would have taken place on the same day; and it is to be remarked that these events happened when the days were at the shortest.

VARIATION II.

(Same Volume.)

(This account of the Battle of La Favorite may be placed at Section VIII, page 407, vol. III, of *Memoirs, &c. War of Italy.*)

BATTLE OF LA FAVORITE.

WE shall now resume the narrative at the period of the passage of the Adige by General Provera.

It was on the 13th of January (24th Nivose), at eleven o'clock at night, that General Provera, at the head of 12 or 13,000 men, suddenly constructed a bridge at Anghiari, a league above Porto Legnago, under the protection of twenty-nine pieces of artillery. He had sent about 1500 men towards Castelbaldo and La Badia, to engage General Augereau's attention. Some troops which had ventured to pass the Adige on that side were beaten, taken, or drowned, by Lieute-

nant-general Estève and a battalion of the 5th light demi-brigade.

General Guieux, adding a battalion which he had at Ronco to that which was posted at Angiari, made an attempt to dispute the passage with the enemy, and even took 300 prisoners, before they could place a numerous corps on the right bank.

General Provera did not waste his time in pursuing General Guieux's troops, but ordered a column of nearly 9000 men to march towards Mantua: they entered the high road to Cerea.

General Augereau's line was now intersected. General Dugua had not been able to join him, being only even with Roverbella, at the farthest. He had had orders to proceed to Castelnovo in the course of the 14th of January (25th Nivose); but General Lannes's flying column had reached Porto Legnago. General Augereau resolved to attack the rear of the enemy's column, and the rear-guard, which he judged they must have left with their bridge, in order to break down or burn this bridge, and so cut off their retreat.

For this purpose he detached two columns, under the command of General Lannes and Adjutant-general Duphot, to attack the enemy in flank, between the Adige and a canal called Fossa Nuova, which runs parallel with that

river at the distance of 5 or 600 metres. To reach Cerea from that spot, the enemy had to cross some rice fields and woods, amidst which the road forms a defile half a league in length, which terminates in a dyke that is perpendicular to it. General Augereau sent General Point with a small column, to conceal themselves behind the dyke. The enemy had got half their artillery on this road; and in the disorder into which they were thrown by the attack on their flank, they thought they could not do better than rejoin General Provera's column: but these troops, which were marching in too great security, being surprised and stopped by General Point's column, were obliged to surrender. Upwards of 2000 men and 15 pieces of cannon remained in our power.

General Augereau burned the bridge, and prepared to pursue General Provera's column, putting in motion all the troops of his division, with which he had renewed his communications.

He only left a garrison at Porto Legnago, to defend itself there against General Hohenzollern's troops remaining on the left bank of the Adige.

In the mean time General Vietor, at the head of two battalions of the 57th, and of the 18th, 32d, and 75th of General Massena, was going to Villa Frauca.

Napoleon had received intelligence from General Serrurier, in the night of the 14th of January (25th Nivose), that General Provera's column was marching towards Castellaro, on the road to Mantua. He had received no news from General Augereau; whence he had concluded that that general had remained on the Porto Legnago side, but was still harassing the enemy on his left flank, and would perhaps reach Castellaro before him.

He ordered the troops which were collecting at Villa Franca, with General Leclerc's cavalry, and General Dugua's reserve, which were at Bussolengo and Castelnuovo, to proceed to Roverbella. He sent orders to General Serrurier to throw provisions for forty-eight hours into Saint-Georges, and to maintain that position firmly. He directed General Augereau and General Guieux to follow the enemy on his two flanks, that no part of the enemy's column might escape; and then set off for Roverbella, without taking a moment's rest.

Before we proceed further it is here proper to describe the situation of the French troops about Mantua; which place was the object of the enemy's efforts, and was about to become the theatre of events of the utmost importance. The garrison of Mantua was shut up in that city, on the right bank of the Mincio. It occupied, on

that side, the works of the gates of Pradella, Té, and Migliaretto; and only the citadel on the left bank, north of the place, with which the citadel communicates only by a bridge of 700 metres in length, thrown over the lakes formed by the waters of the Mincio.

The suburb of Saint-Georges, which is separated from Mantua in a similar manner on the east side, was occupied by 1200 French, under the command of General Miollis. It had been carefully entrenched by General Samson of the engineers.

In this suburb, the road from Porto Legnago through Goito, by which General Provera was marching, and the road from Verona through Roverbella and Villafranca, terminate.

Saint-Anthony's is on the latter road, half a league from the citadel. Another road comes up to the gate of the citadel, running behind the castle of La Favorite, east of Saint-Anthony's.

General Provera arrived on the 15th of January (26th Nivose), at noon, before Saint-Georges, and summoned General Miollis to surrender. That general replied that it was his custom to fight, not to surrender. A second summons was sent, which he answered by firing his cannon; upon which General Provera was obliged to make for the citadel. With this view he crossed in the

evening the Fossa Magna, which runs between the Verona and Legnago roads, and approached the road to La Favorite.

General Augereau having assembled the troops under General Lannes and General Point, directed them to follow in the rear of General Provera's column; having ordered those under General Guieux and General Bon to march on his right flank by Due Castelli.

The 23d, commanded by General Rampon, was directed on the same point by Napoleon. General Dugua's reserve, composed of the 3d dragoons and 10th chasseurs, was stationed at La Favorite, as well as the 18th, 57th, and 25th chasseurs, commanded by General Victor. General Leclerc had orders to proceed, with his cavalry and the 8th dragoons, to Castellaro, and to march along the Mollinella, to turn the left flank of the enemy. Lastly, General Serrurier had orders to keep a corps of 1500 men in readiness to engage the garrison of Mantua, in case it should attempt a sortie from the citadel to join General Provera. In fact, on the 16th of January (27th Nivose), at six o'clock in the morning, General Wurmser, who commanded in the place, sent out a pretty strong column, which in vain attempted to possess itself of La Favorite and Saint-Anthony's. General Serrurier, having caused it

to be attacked on its march, checked it on his side; whilst the troops under General Victor and General Dugua, united to those of General Guieux and General Bon, kept General Provera's column in check at La Favorite, and prevented it from joining Wurmser. Under these circumstances, about ten o'clock in the morning, General Miollis made a sortie from Saint-Georges on General Provera's left flank; whilst at the same time General Victor attacked him in front, and General Laanes in the rear. A great part of his column immediately laid down their arms; and the general himself, seeing it was useless to prolong the action without the least chance of success, was obliged to surrender, stipulating only that the officers should retain their arms and their horses.

General Wurmser fought with the greatest obstinacy at Saint-Anthony's; but not having been able to possess himself of La Favorite, and seeing General Provera's column surrounded and taken, he was compelled to return into Mantua after having had 400 men made prisoners, and a considerable number killed.

General Provera's column consisted of 6000 infantry, 700 cavalry, 22 pieces of cannon, a great number of ammunition and baggage-waggons, and an immense quantity of military

stores and provisions. The splendid troop of Vienna volunteers, composed of young men belonging to the most respectable families, whose colours had been embroidered by the Empress, composed part of this column.

The enemy's loss in the battles of Rivoli and La Favorite, and in the different actions which took place on these ever-memorable days, was 22,000 prisoners, 3000 killed, and 46 pieces of cannon with their ammunition; that is to say, it amounted to the almost total destruction of the fourth Austrian army.

After this battle, General Massena's division remained several days at Verona and in its neighbourhood. General Augereau's division took up a position, with its right resting on Anghiari, its centre at Legnago, and its left at Verona, to guard the right bank of the Adige.

General Joubert's division supported its right on the Adige, before Rivoli: its centre was placed in the valley of Caprino, and its left rested on the lake of Garda.

The right of General Rey's division proceeded to Sermione and Peschiera; its centre to Dezenzano, Lonato, and Salo; and its left to Brescia.

General Serrurier's division still blockaded Mantua; and the division of the flying column,

under the command of General Víctor, was stationed at Bologna and in the villages surrounding that city.

The head-quarters of the army remained at Verona.

APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS.

SECTION IV.

NAPOLÉON'S INSTRUCTIONS respecting the publication of his Memoirs of the War of Italy.

TO MONTHOLON.

I SEND you my correspondence. I request you to insert in ink what I have written in pencil, both as to the notes and to the number of the chapter to which each letter belongs.

2dly. To make a little book of eighteen sheets, each of four pages, making seventy-two pages; these sheets to be appropriated as follows:

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| 1st sheet to chapter | 5.—Montenotte. |
| 2d | 6.—Lodi. |
| 3d | 7.—Pavia. |
| 4th | 8.—Leghorn. |
| 5th | 9.—Castiglione. |
| 6th | 10.—Operations of the
Brenta. |
| 7th | 11.—Operations of the
armies of the Rhine. |

| | | |
|------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 8th | sheet to chapter 12.— | Areole. |
| 9th | | 13.—Rivoli. |
| 10th | | 14.—Tolentino. |
| 11th | | 15.—Corsica. |
| 12th | | 16.—Tagliamento. |
| 13th | | 17.—Leoben. |
| 14th | | 18.—Venice. |
| 15th | | 19.—Montebello. |
| 16th | | 20.—18th Fructidor. |
| 17th | | 21.—Campo-Formio. |
| 18th | | 22.—Paris. |

Each sheet should contain the number of the page of the chapter in which the letter concerning it is to be found. There are some of these chapters which will have letters in all the volumes. Nearly all of them will have them in several volumes. You know that the correspondence of Italy is in four volumes, so that this little book will be sufficient for printing the correspondence from, divided into eighteen chapters.

The letters which it would be useless to give I have struck out. Mark each letter by chapter and date, making four classes of each chapter.

- 1st, Letters from me.
- 2dly, Those from the Directory.
- 3dly, Military letters.
- 4thly, Diplomatic letters.

Taking care that they tally and correspond; that is to say, you may deviate from this order when necessary. For this purpose it will be proper to leave a half margin for corrections to be made in these letters, or for explanations to be given, which are intended to be printed.

Besides the letters in the correspondence, the letters which are printed by chapters, and which are in the *Moniteur*, relative to the affairs of the army of Italy, must be added. Before my letters must be placed the official papers, such as proclamations, capitulations, orders of the day, and treaties of peace; next, my printed reports; next, my letters, taken from the correspondence. By these means the work will form six good volumes, two of our text, and the rest in support of it; this will contain the whole of these two campaigns.

Note.—In the final arrangement of the chapters of this work, Napoleon deviated from the order prescribed by these instructions; he likewise approved of some slight alterations in the classification of the documents to be published.

A great number of his letters having been laid before the public since the period of the completion of this work, General Montholon thought himself justified in not reprinting any of those of secondary interest.

| | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 8th sheet to chapter 12.— | Areole. |
| 9th | 13.—Rivoli. |
| 10th | 14.—Tolentino. |
| 11th | 15.—Corsica. |
| 12th | 16.—Tagliamento. |
| 13th | 17.—Leoben. |
| 14th | 18.—Venice. |
| 15th | 19.—Montebello. |
| 16th | 20.—18th Fructidor. |
| 17th | 21.—Campo-Formio. |
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| | |
|------|-------------------------------|
| 8th | sheet to chapter 12.—Arcole. |
| 9th | 13.—Rivoli. |
| 10th | 14.—Tolentino. |
| 11th | 15.—Corsica. |
| 12th | 16.—Tagliamento. |
| 13th | 17.—Leoben. |
| 14th | 18.—Venice. |
| 15th | 19.—Montebello. |
| 16th | 20.—18th Fructidor. |
| 17th | 21.—Campo-Formio. |
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BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE.

(CHAP. V.)

LETTER from the DIRECTORY to General BONAPARTE.

Paris, 16th Ventose, year IV. (5th March, 1796.)

THE Executive Directory, Citizen General, send you hereto annexed, the instructions they have drawn up for the conduct of the approaching campaign in Italy; and have thought proper to add to them the authority with which you are hereby furnished, to possess yourself of the fortress of Savona, in case circumstances should render this measure expedient for the security of the French army; recommending you, in that case, to treat the Republic of Genoa with all the delicacy which our political situation, with respect to that republic, requires.

LETOURNEUR, President.

INSTRUCTIONS for the GENERAL-IN-CHIEF of the Army of Italy.

THE principal enemies with whom the French Republic has to contend on the Italian side, are two—the Piedmont-

tese and the Austrians. The latter, although the less numerous, are formidable, from their hatred of France, their infinitely more powerful resources of all kinds, and their closer connexion with our natural enemies, the English; but, above all, from the sway which their possessions in Italy enable them to exercise over the Court of Turin, which is obliged to yield to all their demands, and even to their caprices. It results from this state of things, that it is the most immediate interest of the French Republic to direct its principal efforts against the Austrian army and possessions in Lombardy.

It is, in fact, easy to perceive that every military movement against the Piedmontese and on their territories, becomes, in some degree, indifferent to the Austrians, who appear, as was seen in the last campaign, to give themselves very little concern about the disasters of their allies; and who, in the hour of danger, instead of endeavouring to afford them effectual protection, separate from them immediately, and seem only solicitous to cover the country which belongs to themselves, and abundantly supplies them with the resources for which they have occasion.

Great as our successes in Italy have hitherto been, we have not yet advanced far enough into that country to deliver Piedmont from the yoke imposed on her by the Austrian army, which has always remained master of her destiny by the positions it has taken.

When the true interest of the Court of Turin is considered, it appears, in some respects, essentially connected with ours; and there now exists no doubt of the wishes of that Court to see the ambitious Austrian wholly expelled from Italy, and to obtain the Milanese in compensation

for the countries irrevocably annexed to France by the first article of her republican constitution *

This state of affairs, the probability of which it is unnecessary to maintain by arguments which the subject itself suggests, seems to give rise to the following question

Why, when it is the interest of the Piedmontese to unite with the French in driving the Germans out of Italy, does not the Court of Turin eagerly combine her forces with those of the Republic, in order to attain this equally glorious and advantageous end as speedily as possible?†

The solution of this question would contribute to elucidate our political position with respect to Italy, as well as to point out the best course for us to adopt, in order to vanquish our enemies there, particularly the satellites of Austria. Piedmont, situated between the countries subject to that power and the French Republic, is obliged to take part in the present war, and had she wished to remain in a state of neutrality, she must have suffered all the calamities of war, without enjoying an advantage of great value to a State which is weaker than its neighbours, that is to say, the respect which the troops it is able to add to those of one of the belligerent powers, and the danger of a defection on their part, and of their going over to the enemy, necessarily create these considerations being a guarantee that such State will experience as little oppression as possible, at least, from the power with which it forms an alliance.

* The first interest of the Court of Turin was to stifle revolutionary ideas, and to oppose the success of the French republicans (*This note and those which follow are by Napoleon*.)

† For fear of being guillotined

Without absolutely rejecting the idea that the King of Sardinia may have been drawn into the coalition against France by family considerations, it is certain that our position at the commencement of the present war, and the necessity under which we were of possessing ourselves of Savoy and the county of Nice, as well to attack the Austrians with more advantage as to annex those countries to France and guarantee her frontiers in that quarter, have, in some measure, forced the Court of Turin to side with our enemies, in order to oppose our efforts; but since our successes in Frimaire, the hope of obtaining an indemnity out of the Austrian possessions in Italy, by joining us, would undoubtedly have altered the policy of the Court of Turin, if France, scarcely recovered from the storms of the Revolution, had been able to offer it the subsidies it obtains from England and Austria.

The King of Sardinia—certain that France would not grant him a peace that would place Piedmont in a state of neutrality which, on the supposition of success on the part of the Austrians, would evidently become null, and even dangerous as respects the Republic *—forced to continue the war, had to secure the means of carrying it on at the least possible expense, which he could only find in the subsidies and aids of every kind that were only to be obtained from his present allies. Piedmont, overwhelmed with taxes, is unable to supply him with the means of acting in a more independent manner, and more conformably to the views which it is natural to suppose him to have on the Milanese.

* In that case the King of Sardinia would be still more dangerous if he had an army with us.

It is accordingly to be concluded, under these circumstances, that the Court of Turin will not sincerely consent to a defensive and offensive alliance with us, until we can afford it the same assistance as it receives from its present allies *

The Republic, therefore, not being in a condition to furnish this assistance, cannot reckon upon an alliance of this nature, until Piedmont shall be forced, by the overthrow of the Austrians, or the presence of our troops in the Piedmontese territories, to turn her arms against our common enemies.

Should events produce this favourable result, it must be expected that the Piedmontese, even if they obtain the object of their wishes and a considerable indemnity (the Milanese, &c), will purchase it by all the sacrifices which a State already exhausted can support, for they will not only have to provide their own army with necessaries of all kinds, but the armies of the Republic ought to be principally fed and maintained by them. And if the state of affairs should force us to act in that country as in a conquered territory, although we should, indeed, do as little mischief as possible, we should still do a great deal, since it would be indispensably necessary to secure our march by the provisional possession, until peace, of the principal fortresses of Piedmont which are situated on our side, and the demolition of which would secure us, for the future, a solid peace and alliance with the Court of Sardina. It follows, from what has been said, that the mere attack of Piedmont would not fulfil the object which the Executive Directory ought to have in view, that of expelling the Austrians from Italy, and

* Until it is compelled to do so by the most urgent necessity.

of procuring a glorious and durable peace as soon as possible. This, instead of putting an end to the war, would be prolonging it, since the Austrians, remaining unhurt, would have no reason to bring it to a conclusion, and England being still able to send subsidies to the Piedmontese army, matters would remain nearly on the same footing as they were on at the end of the last campaign.*

The regular and exclusive attack of Piedmont presenting, moreover, difficulties of the greatest importance, on account of the number of sieges which it would be necessary to undertake at the opening of the campaign, it became the object of the Executive Directory to fix their views particularly on a system of offensive warfare chiefly directed against the Austrian forces in Italy, and so framed as to present at once, to the French army, the possibility of placing itself, by the defeat of the Piedmontese on the commencement of military operations, out of danger of any enterprise of theirs for the rest of the campaign; the chance of forcing the Court of Turin into an alliance with France; and lastly, the means of hastening the conclusion of an advantageous peace by the total defeat of the Austrians in Italy.

The first military operations required by this system are confined within a narrow compass, and require little explanation. The Directory have only to point them out, and to leave the details of the execution to the General in whom their confidence is placed. They will be submitted to the Directory as far as time and circumstances will allow, and

* To attack Piedmont, is to attack the Austrian army which covers it.

in extraordinary cases where the directions of Government may be absolutely necessary for the determination of military movements of primary importance, and which had not been foreseen. Every thing urges us to endeavour, by all means in our power, to force the enemy to re-pass the Po, and to make our greatest exertions in the direction of the Milanese. It appears that this essential operation cannot take place, unless the French army be previously in possession of Ceva.

The Directory leave the General-in-chief at liberty to commence operations by the attack of the enemy at this point, and whether he obtain a complete victory over them, or whether they retreat towards Turin, the Directory authorize him to pursue them, to encounter them again, and even to bombard that capital, if circumstances should render it necessary.

After having made himself master of Ceva, and placed the left of the army of Italy near Com, in order to menace and keep in awe the garrison of that place, the General-in-chief will supply the wants of the army, as speedily as possible, by means of the resources which Piedmont will afford. He will then direct his forces against the Milanese, and principally against the Austrians, he will drive the enemy beyond the Po, ascertain the means of passing that river, and endeavour to secure the fortresses of Asti and Valenza *

* Of what importance is Ceva, a little fortress garrisoned by five or six hundred men? It is impossible to enter the Milanese without occupying Com, Suza, Turin, and the whole plain of Piedmont. Here was a rational plan indeed, to mask Com and march on Milan, leaving the King of Sardinia at the head of his army, two days' march from Com, and to abandon all our communications!

The General-in-chief must never for a moment forget that the most important object is to annoy the Austrians, and that one of the measures adapted to induce Italy to make peace, is to intimidate her by advancing as much as possible on the right and towards Tortona, from the bad situation of which place the Directory think it will be easy to gain possession of it.*

This essential movement of the troops towards our right, which the General-in-chief will probably not be able to effect until after the taking of Ceva and the gaining of a brilliant victory over the Piedmontese, will place us in a situation to overawe the Genoese Republic, and will assist the agent of the French Government at Genoa in carrying on negotiations which may prove advantageous to us, and even in obtaining, perhaps, a loan from Genoese individuals.

Being richer than their Government, it may be expected that they will consent to supply us, when their Government shall be guarantee to them of our fidelity in fulfilling the conditions of this loan, which the favourable turn of the war may even put us in a condition to demand. The entrance of the republican army into Piedmont ought only to be considered as a preliminary disposition which puts us in a situation to attack the Austrian forces with greater advantage. The army ought to make as short a stay as possible in Piedmont, and to advance briskly to engage the Austrians, whom the defeat of the Piedmontese must have intimidated and rendered more easy to vanquish. †

* Tortona is a fine fortress, which cannot be taken without a siege.

† To advance briskly in order to be surrounded and made prisoners by the combined Piedmontese and Austrian armies.

At the period of the movements which the right of the French will have to make towards Alessandria and Tortona, it will become indispensably necessary, to secure ulterior operations, that it should possess itself of Gavi, whether the Genoese submit with a good grace to yield it to us during the war, or whether it be necessary to compel them to it by a menacing display of forces destined to oblige them to consent to it.*

The Directory, persuaded that the General-in-chief will carry this particular measure into execution with all the prudence required by circumstances and our political situation with respect to the Republic of Genoa, leave wholly to him the management of this delicate affair, of the necessity, difficulties, and advantages of which he must, from his presence on the spot, be fully aware.

By throwing the principal part of the republican army on the right and in the direction of the Milanese, we shall gain several important advantages. We shall force Piedmont, already staggered, to come over to our side; and the first victory we gain over the Austrians will be the certain pledge of the total overthrow of their forces in these parts. We intimidate all Italy, and dissolve the coalition of all these petty States in favour of the Austrian cause.†

The course of proceeding which the Directory have thus pointed out to the General-in-chief is to be considered the principal, and, in short, the only one to be adopted; and by which all the secondary movements which circumstances

* Another siege, which would place us at war with the Republic of Genoa. What stupidity!

† An operation so injudicious would force Piedmont to attack our rear, and change her views, if they were pacific.

and events will render it necessary for him to order, will be regulated. It is, in a word, the aim towards which every thing must tend; and every operation positively deviating from it should be absolutely rejected.

The Directory are not ignorant that these grand operations cannot be attempted by the right or centre of the army of Italy, unless the remainder of this brave army support and pave the way for them; nor until the General-in-chief shall first have satisfied himself that one part of his army will not be cut off from the other, and thus exposed to a total overthrow. He will therefore keep a vigilant eye upon the left, and by his able dispositions prevent the Piedmontese troops at Coni from having it in their power to injure him, or to attempt any operations.*

The Directory have now to declare their intentions with respect to the sieges which the events of the campaign about to open may render it necessary to lay. Their resolution is, that no siege is to be undertaken until the enemy who might interrupt it be totally routed and disabled to offer any annoyance. The General-in-chief will in all cases take care not to place his heavy artillery on any point where, in case of a partial success of the enemy, it would be endangered. The Directory particularly insist on this essential precaution.†

Although it be the interest of France to direct her principal efforts against the Austrians, and to lead the Pied-

* It was not the garrison of Coni that could do any harm; but the whole Piedmontese army, the nation itself in arms.

† Very well! How then take Ceva, Tortona, and Gavi? Here are three sieges ordered by the Government at the outset! What imbecility!

montese, by our victories over the former, into an alliance advantageous to ourselves, the Piedmontese must not be spared so long as they are our enemies.

The General-in-chief will therefore endeavour, by all means in his power, to excite the disaffected Piedmontese to revolt, and to induce them to rise against the Court of Turin either generally or partially.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the utility of a diversion of this kind, of which the enemy first set us the example; it may enable the army of the Alps, acting in concert with the left of the army of Italy, to make a rapid conquest of Piedmont, the possession of which, during the war, would secure us advantageous conditions on the conclusion of peace.

Such are the principal features of the plan of campaign which the Directory have adopted. They cannot close the present instructions without urging the necessity of maintaining the army of Italy in and upon the enemy's territories, and of supplying it, by means of the resources which the country may afford, with every thing it may stand in need of.

The General-in-chief will make a point of maintaining strict discipline, and of sparing the inhabitants all the vexations and calamities which the scourge of war too often brings with it, and which nothing but order and good government can check.

He will cause heavy contributions to be levied, one half of which will be paid into the treasuries appointed for the service of the different administrations, and the other half will be destined to defray in cash the subsistence and pay of the army.

The Executive Directory, reserving to themselves the

power of making peace, the General-in-chief will grant no suspension of hostilities,* and will in no respect slacken his military operations. He will receive all proposals tending to a pacification, and immediately transmit them to the Directory.

The Directory rely upon the patriotism, zeal, activity, and talents of the General-in-chief of the army of Italy; confidently recommending to him the precise execution of the dispositions contained in the present instructions, to which the Directory will make additions as the events of the war shall render it necessary. †

LETOURNEUR, CARNOT, L. M. REVEILLERE,
LEPAUX, REWBELL.

INSTRUCTIONS of the DIRECTORY as to their ulterior views respecting the King of Sardinia, and the operations to be commenced. ‡

Paris, 6th Floreal, year IV. (25 April, 1796.)

THE Executive Directory have received, Citizen General, by a second courier, the news of the victory of Millesimo. The glorious tokens of the national gratitude which the Legislative Body has just bestowed on the brave army of

* In this case the armistices of Cherasco, Placenza, Milan, and Brescia, would not have taken place. What ignorance of war!

† By these despatches it appears that Napoleon conquered in spite of the instructions of his Government, which he disregarded.

‡ This letter reached head-quarters on the 30th of April; the armistice had been signed on the 21st.

Italy for this victory, and that of Montenotte which paved the way for it, make it unnecessary for the Directory to dwell upon the praises to which the army has entitled itself, they will, therefore, content themselves with congratulating the general on the talents and activity to which these victories are chiefly owing, on the dispositions made by him, and the success which has crowned his plans. They request him to transmit to the French generals who so ably seconded him, and to the brave soldiers who conquered under their command, the testimony of their satisfaction, and of that of all the true friends of liberty.

A republican Government knows how to value those who render important services to their country. It ought to encourage the men whom their patriotic sentiments and the intrepidity which accompanies French soldiers lead to actions honourable to their nation.

The Directory inform you that they readily acceded to your request of the rank of brigadier-general for Citizen Rampon, chief of the 21st demi-brigade. They have written him a letter testifying their satisfaction, which with his brevet you will find hereunto annexed, and are requested to deliver to him.

The Directory have likewise thought proper to confirm your appointment of Citizen Lannes to the rank of lieutenant colonel of the 39th demi brigade, in the place of the officer who commanded it and who has fallen in the field of honour.

One effort more, Citizen General, and nothing will be able to stop the triumphant march of the army you command. Ceva has doubtless been attacked by this time, and the valour of the French troops has probably carried the entrenched camp of the Piedmontese near that fortress. A

vast career is opening before you; the Directory have measured its full extent: the instructions they have already given you, the further explanations added by the present letter which circumstances required them to address to you, your own military talents, and the valour of the troops you command, will enable you to fulfil it with glory and in a manner worthy of the republic for which you are fighting.

The instructions sent you by the Directory with the intelligence of your appointment to the chief command of the army of Italy, have already established principles to which the Directory refer. They will now briefly point out the line of conduct you are to adopt in the various circumstances in which military events may be expected to place you.

The hypothesis which is first to be laid down is, that which is most connected with the hopes which the army of Italy and the talents and zeal of the general commanding it, excite in the Directory. Every thing tends to make it probable that after you have obtained a victory at Ceva, and possessed yourself of that fortress,* terror will spread through all Piedmont; that the Court of Turin will be obliged to abandon Coni, Mondovi, and its other fortified places to their own strength, to assemble its troops to cover Turin, and to endeavour still, by efforts which your activity and the military dispositions you will make will no doubt frustrate, to oppose the march of part of the army of Italy against that capital. Perhaps also the King of Sardinia, dazzled by your victories, and alarmed at the symptoms of commotion which will probably appear in Turin itself, will at length abandon the coalition into which, unfortunately

* For which purpose a siege and heavy cannon would be requisite.

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part, and of the Piedmontese being again compelled to join the Austrians through victories obtained by the latter. But if the Court of Turin should be induced by the hopes of introducing its troops into the Milanese (the possession of which would be guaranteed to it by France) to turn its arms on a sudden against the Austrian forces, it would then become necessary to have some important places as pledges of its fidelity to us. Tortona or Alessandria, Coni, Suza and Fort Exilles, ought to be made security for the good faith of the King of Sardinia in observing the alliance which might be concluded with him by the Executive Directory. The reasons above specified, Citizen General, leading to the conclusion that when the Court of Turin finds itself forced to solicit peace from us, it will be in a total inability to continue the war, have particularly engaged the attention of the Directory. The following are some of the terms they will adhere to in making this peace, if they are under the necessity of giving up all hopes of an offensive and defensive alliance for the benefit of both states.

1st. The general disarming of Piedmont.

2d. The reduction of the Piedmontese troops to an establishment which would leave us nothing to fear during the course of the present war.

3d. The removal of the greater and better part of the troops retained into the island of Sardinia.

4th. The occupation of the citadels and fortresses of Alessandria or Tortona, of Ceva and Coni, and of Exilles and Suza, with stipulations for the demolition of the fortifications of the last three, either on a general peace, or a separate peace with the Court of Turin.

5th. and lastly. The supply of all kinds of necessaries

for him, he allowed himself to be hurried. And it is not improbable that, under existing circumstances, he will ardently solicit a peace which he obstinately rejected before, and to which nothing but the generosity of the French could now enable him to revert.

The Executive Directory have exclusively reserved to themselves the power of negotiating for peace, with which they are invested by the Constitution; but they consider that it may be useful to acquaint you, Citizen General, with some of the terms upon which they will insist in treating for that purpose.

An offensive and defensive alliance with the king of Sardinia would undoubtedly be the most advantageous plan for the Court of Turin, to which it would secure not only Sardinia, the disturbances in which country seem to be kept up solely by the hopes of being seconded by us; it would procure the Sardinian troops, by an attack combined with the movement of the French troops towards Tortona, Alessandria, and Valenza, the important opportunity of invading the Milanese. Lastly, this alliance would ensure us the great advantage of the complete expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. But the want of money in Piedmont, the little confidence enjoyed by the Court of Turin, and the exhausted state of the country after several campaigns, almost preclude the idea of so desirable an alliance, which would suddenly turn the forces of Piedmont against our determined enemies the Austrians. The utmost we might hope for, would perhaps be, that part of the troops of the Court of Turin should join the Republican armies, whilst the rest of the King of Sardinia's forces should be prudently reduced to a state which would leave us nothing to apprehend during the remainder of this war, even in case of reverses on our

part, and of the Piedmontese being again compelled to join the Austrians through victories obtained by the latter. But if the Court of Turin should be induced by the hopes of introducing its troops into the Milanese (the possession of which would be guaranteed to it by France) to turn its arms on a sudden against the Austrian forces, it would then become necessary to have some important places as pledges of its fidelity to us. Tortona or Alessandria, Coni, Suza and Fort Exilles, ought to be made security for the good faith of the King of Sardinia in observing the alliance which might be concluded with him by the Executive Directory. The reasons above specified, Citizen General, leading to the conclusion that when the Court of Turin finds itself forced to solicit peace from us, it will be in a total inability to continue the war, have particularly engaged the attention of the Directory. The following are some of the terms they will adhere to in making this peace, if they are under the necessity of giving up all hopes of an offensive and defensive alliance for the benefit of both states.

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for the troops of the Republic, during the present war, together with the means of carriage, and the establishment of military hospitals and arsenals in Piedmont, for the use of the army of Italy.

The second hypothesis considered by the Directory is, the possibility that the King of Sardinia, either through obstinacy, or in hopes of still receiving subsidies from abroad, should resolve to continue the war. Your first instructions afford you a plan of conduct in such a state of affairs; and it would then become essential to attend more particularly to the exciting of insurrections in Piedmont, to second the wish that exists in that country for the establishment of a Republican Government, and to draw thence all the resources of which the army of Italy may stand in need; but it would be imprudent to advance too far in Piedmont and to attend exclusively to the affairs of that country, which would give the Austrians an opportunity of repairing their losses, and some hopes of success.

You should then (and you may in some measure prepare this movement beforehand) act on your right, drive the Austrians beyond the Po, and direct your principal exertions to the Milanese. Genoa, after the rout of the Austrian forces, will no longer refuse the succours which are indispensable to us. The firmness and energy of the French agents to that republic; their prudent, considerate conduct, worthy in all respects of that of the Directory who employ them, will renew in the Genoese those sentiments which they ought never to have abandoned. They will no longer refuse to allow you to occupy Gavi, in the same manner and on the same conditions as at the time of the taking of Vado; and should they be so blind to their

own interest as to oppose our successes, which tend to secure their existence, force would soon render us masters of that fortress. The Directory, however, rely on your prudence, and are convinced that your conduct in these delicate transactions, which their distance renders it impossible for them to regulate absolutely, will be in all respects prudent and suitable.

Such are the further particulars which your successes have induced the Directory to add to the instructions already given you. They do not doubt for an instant but that you will profit by the victories which the army has gained, being convinced that they will never have to reproach you, Citizen General, with the disgraceful repose of Capua.

Paris, 9 Floreal, year IV. (28th April, 1796.)

By a courier despatched on the morning of the 7th of Floreal, the Directory acknowledged the receipt of your letters announcing the success of the army of Italy at Dego. They have received with equal satisfaction the news of the important advantages gained near the Corsaglia and Mondovi, and of the taking of that place.

These victories are owing, Citizen General, to your prudent arrangements and activity; they confirm the Directory in the opinion they entertain of your judgment and military talents. But whilst they praise the valour and intrepidity of the army which you command, they are filled with bitter regret to see the laurels it has gathered soiled by the disorders and pillage in which it has indulged.

This unfortunate state of things, the excesses which tar-

nish the glory of the defenders of the Republic, will probably have been repressed by the strict orders you have given, and which the urgent circumstances in which you were placed could not fail to justify.

The Directory hope that the future conduct of the army will soon allow of your reporting it, and of your revoking the extraordinary power you have been obliged to confer on the generals of divisions under your command. A Vendean commotion in Lozere, Ardèche, the frontiers of the Gard, &c. has prevented the Directory from ordering General Chateauneuf Randon no longer to detain the two demi-brigades you mention in your letter dated Cairo, the 27th of Germinal last, and which will join you hereafter.

It was with extreme pain that the Directory, convinced of the necessity of the case, submitted to leave this corps under the command of General Chateauneuf Randon. They will immediately give orders to direct a reinforcement of several thousand men to join the army of Italy, who, unfortunately, will not arrive so soon as the Directory could have wished, but who will nevertheless be useful. Be assured, Citizen General, that the Directory will never for an instant lose sight of the brave army you command; and the power conferred by them on Citizens Salicetti and Garreux to require movements of troops upon the opinions of the Generals-in-Chief or one of them, cannot but tend to produce unanimity in the operations of the two armies.

The Directory send you hereto annexed, a copy of the despatches sent to General Kellerman on the 9th instant, in which you will observe they have adopted the principal features of the plan presented by the General of Division Berthier, which had probably been communicated to you, and which prescribes to the fight of the army of the Alps

a close connexion with the left of the army of Italy, and movements which are absolutely dependent upon it. You will see, by the same letter, how strongly the Directory have recommended union between the two armies and the Generals who command them. The Directory consider it superfluous to urge the necessity of such concord to you; knowing it to be unnecessary to recommend to you that consideration for your colleague to which his long services and military talents entitle him, and without which dissensions might arise which would endanger the success of our arms.

The courier despatched on the 7th of Floreal, will have brought you an account of the engineer and artillery officers who have had orders to join the army of Italy. The Directory do not lose sight of this important object.

The confidence of the Directory in your energy and wisdom, dissipates the fears which the statement of the enemy's forces opposed to you might excite. Your successes have produced an event of singular interest, and for which the Directory were peculiarly anxious, the separation of the Piedmontese and Austrian armies; but our advantages can only be firmly established by extreme vivacity in the operations you will have to direct. Act, then, with the rapidity of lightning, and successively against the Austrian and the Piedmontese; above all, beware of extending your troops too hastily on your left. Great as would be the advantage of an immediate junction with the right of the army of the Alps, there is reason to fear that Beaulieu would suddenly take advantage of the movement of a great part of your forces towards Saluces. As you very justly observe, the campaign is not yet decided. Beaulieu is to be feared, particularly as he is obstinate, daring, and enterprising; his attack at Dego, after a defeat, is a proof

of this, and we ought to take it as a warning. Defeat the Austrians then, and you will thenceforth be master of the campaign, and have *nothing* to contend with but heat and sickness, which must be guarded against by the precautions which the climate requires. These scourges have always annihilated our successes in the countries in which you are; they must be averted; and however tedious may be the details which it may be necessary to go through for this purpose, the Directory think it *right* to call your attention to the necessity of watching over them.

Congratulate, on the part of the Directory, the General of division Augereau, and Brigadier-generals Beyrand and Joubert on their conduct at the period of the attack of the redoubts which defend the approach of the intrenched camp of Ceva; the general of division Serrurier, on his behaviour at the attack of San Michele and the passage of the Corsaglia; the general of division Massena, and Brigadier-generals Guieux, Fiorella, and Dommartin, on their conduct on the 3d and 4th of Floreal; and lastly, Lieutenant-colonel Murat, your aide-de-camp, who has likewise distinguished himself.

You yourself may hope every thing from the genius of the Republic, from the bravery of the soldiers, the union of the leaders, and the confidence you find placed in you. The Directory expect the greatest results from the general who commands the intrepid army of Italy, and from the sanctity of the cause for which the French are fighting, and which they will never desert.

CARNOT.

LETTERS OF NAPOLEON

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Nice, 8th Germinal, year IV. (28th March, 1796.)

I HAVE been several days in the midst of the army, of which I yesterday took the command.

I have to give you an account of three matters of essential importance; 1st. of the departments of Vaucluse, the Bouches-du-Rhône, and of the Var and Basses-Alpes; 2dly. of the situation of the army, what I have done, and what I hope to do; 3dly. of our policy with respect to Genoa.

The four departments of the *arrondissement* of the army have paid neither forced loans nor contributions in corn, nor have they furnished the supply of forage required by the law of the 7th of Vendemiaire, or begun to deliver every third horse. There is great delay in the proceedings of the official agents whom I have written to and seen, and who give me some hopes of an increase of activity in these essential concerns of the army.

The state of the army is very bad, but is not hopeless. The soldiers will henceforth eat good bread and will have meat, and have already received something on account of their subsistence-money in arrear.

The halting places for the route of the Rhône and Var are victualled; and five days since my cavalry, waggons, and artillery began to move. I shall shortly march. One battalion has mutinied; the men refused to march from Nice, under the pretext that they had neither shoes nor

money. I had all the grenadiers arrested, made the battalion march, and when it was in the middle of Nice, despatched counter-orders, and sent it into the rear. It is my intention to disband this corps and incorporate the soldiers in the other battalions, the officers not having shewn sufficient zeal. This battalion amounts only to 200 men, and is notorious for its mutinous character.

I have been received by this army with confidence, and have been particularly gratified by the behaviour of General Scherer towards me; he has acquired a claim to my gratitude, by his honourable conduct and his readiness to give me every information that could be useful to me. His health really seems to me somewhat impaired. To great facility in expressing himself he adds such moral and military knowledge as will perhaps render him useful in some important employment.

Our position with respect to Genoa is very critical; there has been great mismanagement; too much or too little has been done; but fortunately no further ill consequences are to be expected.

The Government of Genoa possesses more genius and strength than is imagined; there are but two ways of dealing with it: to take Genoa by a prompt coup-de-main, which is contrary to your intentions and to the law of nations; or to keep up a good understanding with them, and not to endeavour to draw money from them, which is the only thing they prize.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Albenza, 17th Germinal, year IV. (6th April, 1796.)

I HAVE removed head-quarters to Albenza. The movement which I found commenced against Genoa, drew the enemy out of their winter-quarters; they passed the Po, and pushed advanced posts to Dego; following the Bormida and the Bochetta, and leaving Gavi behind them. Bèaulieu published a manifesto, which I send you, and which I shall answer the day after the battle. I was very much vexed and dissatisfied at this ill-timed movement on Genoa, particularly as it has obliged that republic to assume a hostile attitude, and roused the enemy whom I hoped to have surprised off their guard. It will now cost us more men.

The King of Sardinia is, at the same time, as active as possible; he has made a requisition of young men from fifteen years upwards.

The army is in a frightfully destitute condition; its misery justifies its want of discipline; and without discipline there is no conquering. I have yet great obstacles to overcome, but they are not insurmountable. I hope all this will speedily be arranged; every thing already begins to wear a new face; in a few days we shall come to action.

I yesterday sent a reconnoitring party towards Cairo; the advanced posts of the enemy were driven back, and we made a few prisoners.

The strength of the Piedmontese army is 50,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry; I have but 45,000 men disposable in the whole. Many troops have been detained from me in the rear.

Chauvet, the muster-master-general, is dead. He died at Genoa; the army will feel the loss of him; he was an active enterprising officer. His death was lamented by the troops.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Albenza, 16th Germinal, year IV. (26th April, 1796.)

I HAVE received a letter from General Colli, who commands the King of Sardinia's army; I hope you will find the answer I have given him agreeable to your intentions. The Treasury often sends us bills of exchange which are protested. One of 162,800 pounds sterling, drawn on Cadiz, has just been dishonoured, which adds to our difficulties.

I found this army not only destitute of every thing, but without discipline, and in constant insubordination. The general discontent was such, that the disaffected had obtained some influence; a *Dauphin's* company had been formed, and counter-revolutionary songs were sung. But, depend upon it, peace and order will be re-established. I have just had the important position of Garessio fortified.

By the time you read this letter we shall have fought the enemy. The Treasury has not kept its word: instead of 500,000 livres, it has sent only 300,000; and we have heard nothing further of a sum of 600,000 livres, which we were led to expect; but notwithstanding all this we shall go.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Carcaro, 26th Germinal, year IV. (15th April, 1796.)

I HAVE already informed you that the campaign was opened on the 20th of March, and of the signal victory which the army of Italy gained in the fields of Montenotte; I have now to give you an account of the battle of Millesimo.

After the battle of Montenotte, I removed my head-quarters to Carcaro. I ordered the General-of-division La Harpe to march on San Zeno, to menace the capture of the eight battalions which the enemy had in that town, and to proceed the next day, by a concealed and rapid march, into the town of Cairo. General Massena advanced with his division to the heights of Dego; the General-of-division Augereau, who had been two days on his march, attacked, with the 69th and 39th demi-brigades, in the plain of Carcaro; Brigadier-general Menard occupied the heights of Biestro; Brigadier-general Joubert, with the 1st brigade of light infantry, occupied the important position of Santa Margareta.

On the 21st at day-break, General Augereau, with his division, forced the defiles of Millesimo, whilst General Menard and General Joubert, drove the enemy from all the surrounding positions, and by a prompt and daring manœuvre hemmed in a corps of 1500 Austrian grenadiers, commanded by General Provera, knight of the order of Maria Theresa, who, far from laying down his arms and yielding himself a prisoner of war, retreated to the top of the mountain of Cossaria, and intrenched himself in the

ruins of an old castle, in a position of great natural strength.

General Augereau brought forward his artillery; a mutual cannonade was kept up for several hours. At eleven o'clock in the morning, weary of seeing my march obstructed by a handful of men, I had General Provera summoned to surrender. General Provera demanded to speak with me; but a brisk cannonade, which began on my right, induced me to hasten thither. He kept up a parley with General Augereau for several hours; but the conditions he required not being reasonable, General Augereau had four columns formed, and marched on the castle of Cossaria. Already had the intrepid General Joubert, a grenadier in courage, and a good general in military knowledge and talents, passed with seven men into the enemy's entrenchments; but being wounded in the head and knocked down, his soldiers thought he was killed, and the movement of his column was checked. His wound is not dangerous.

The second column, commanded by General Bonnel, was marching on in deep silence with shouldered arms when that brave general was killed at the foot of the enemy's entrenchments.

The third column, commanded by Adjutant-general Guerin, was likewise disconcerted in its march, a ball having killed that general-officer.

The whole army deeply regretted the loss of these two brave officers.

The night coming on under these circumstances, I was apprehensive that the enemy would attempt to cut his way, sword in hand. I had all the battalions joined, and made

epaulements of casks and barriers of howitzers, within half-musquet shot.

On the 25th, at day-break, the Sardinian and Austrian army and the French army met; my left commanded by General Augereau, keeping General Provera blockaded. Several regiments of the enemy, and that of Beljoioso amongst them, endeavoured to break through my centre. General Menard briskly repulsed them. I immediately ordered him to fall back on my right; and before one o'clock in the afternoon, General Massena outflanked the left of the enemy, which occupied the village of Dego, with strong retrenchments and formidable batteries. We pushed forward our light troops as far as the road from Dego to Spino. General La Harpe marched with his division in three close columns in a mass; that of the left, commanded by General Causse, passed the Bormida under the enemy's fire, up to the middle in water, and attacked the left wing of the enemy on its right. General Cervoni, at the head of the 2d column, also crossed the Bormida, under the protection of one of our batteries, and marched directly against the enemy.

All these endeavours, seconded by the intrepidity of the troops and the talents of the different generals, produced the expected effect. Coolness is the result of courage, and courage is the inheritance of the French.

The enemy, surrounded on every side, had not time to capitulate; our columns scattered death, flight, and confusion amongst them.

Whilst we were making dispositions on our right for the attack of the enemy's left, General Provera, with the body of troops he commanded at Cossaria, surrendered prisoner of war.

Our troops hotly pursued the enemy on every side. General La Harpe put himself at the head of four squadrons of cavalry, and followed them briskly.

We made this day from 7 to 9000 prisoners, amongst whom was one lieutenant-general, 20 or 30 colonels or lieutenant-colonels, and the following regiments nearly entire :

Free corps : three companies of Croats ; the battalions of Pelegrine, Stein, , Wilhelm, Orange, Schroeder and Teutdsch ;

Four companies of artillery ; several superior officers of engineers in the service of the Emperor ; the regiments of Montferrat, of the Marine, of Suza, and four companies of grenadiers in the service of the King of Sardinia ;

Twenty-two pieces of cannon, with the ammunition waggons and teams belonging to them, and 15 standards.

The enemy had from 2000 to 2500 men killed, amongst whom was a colonel who was aide-de-camp to the King of Sardinia.

Citizen Riez, aide-de-camp to General Massena, had his horse killed under him ; and General La Harpe's son had his horse wounded.

I will acquaint you, as soon as possible, and when I have received the reports, of the particulars of this glorious affair, and of the names of those individuals who have particularly distinguished themselves in it.

I solicit the rank of brigadier-general for Citizen Rampon, chief of the 21st demi-brigade.

The chief of the 21st having been killed, I have appointed Citizen Lannes, *chef-de-brigade la suite*, to succeed him.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 9th Floreal, year IV. (28th April, 1796.)

CITIZEN DIRECTORS,

CEVA, Coni, and Alessandria are in the power of our army, as well as all the posts of Piedmont beyond the Stura and the Tanaro.

If you do not come to an agreement with the King of Sardinia, I shall keep these places, and march on Turin. My besieging train is about to file off on Coni, in order to proceed to Cherasco.

In the mean time I shall march against Beaulieu to-morrow, oblige him to repass the Po, and pass it myself immediately after. I shall possess myself of all Lombardy, and hope in less than a month to be on the mountains of the Tyrol, to join the army of the Rhine, in concert with which I propose to carry the war into Bavaria. This scheme is worthy of you, of the army, and of the destinies of France.

If you do not grant a peace to the King of Sardinia, you may dictate to him what terms you think proper, as I have the principal fortresses in my possession.

Order 15,000 men of the army of the Alps to join me and remain at my disposal: I shall then have an army of 45,000 men, of which I may possibly send a part on Rome. If you continue to confide in me, and approve of these plans, I am certain of success. Italy is yours.

You must not reckon upon a revolution in Piedmont; that will come in time; but the minds of the people are far from being sufficiently ripe for that purpose yet.

I have justified your confidence and the favourable opinion you had conceived of me; and I shall continue to give you proofs of the zeal and ardour with which I strive to merit your esteem and that of my country.

Send me, 1st, six companies of light artillery, for I have not one; 2dly, some cavalry, and a commissary *muster-master-general*, able and distinguished, and of known talent. I have none but pigmies about me, who keep me starving in the midst of plenty, for I am in the richest country in the world.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 10th Floreal, year IV. (29th April, 1796.)

THE town of Coni has just been occupied by our troops; it contained a garrison of 5000 men.

I cannot entertain a doubt of your approbation of my conduct: one wing of an army grants a suspension of arms in order to allow me time to beat the other; a king places himself wholly at my discretion, giving up to me three of his strongest places and the richer half of his States.

You may dictate peace to the King of Sardinia authoritatively: I beg you not to forget the little Isle of San Pietro, which would be more useful to us than any port of Corsica or Sardinia.

If you grant him the portion of the Milanese which I am about to conquer, it must be on condition of his sending 15,000 men to second us and guard that country, after we have made ourselves masters of it. In the mean time I shall pass the Adige with your army, and enter Germany

by the Tyrol. Upon this hypothesis, we must keep the fortresses and country we occupy *en dépôt* until the general peace: it must be added, that on the day that 15,000 Piedmontese pass the Po, he shall deliver up to us the town of Valenza.

My columns are on their march: Beaulieu is flying, and I hope to overtake him. I shall lay a contribution of a few millions on the Duke of Parma: he will have proposals of peace made to you; do not hurry yourselves, but give me time to make him pay the expenses of the campaign, and to supply our magazines and procure horses for our waggons at his expense:

If you do not consent to a peace with the King of Sardinia, if your intention is to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few *decades*, and inform me of your wishes immediately: I then possess myself of Valenza and march on Turin.

I shall send 12,000 men on Rome when I have beaten Beaulieu, obliged him to repass the Adige, am sure that you will grant a peace to the King of Sardinia, and have received part of the army of the Alps.

As to the Genoese, I think you ought to demand fifteen millions as an indemnity for the frigates and shipping taken in their ports; and to require the trial of those persons who occasioned the burning of the *Modeste*, and called in the Austrians, as traitors to their country.

If you entrust these matters to me, only preserve the greatest secrecy, and I shall accomplish all you desire.

If I have any risk to run in Lombardy, it is on account of the enemy's cavalry: 40 horse artillerymen have arrived, who have never served and are dismounted. Send me therefore six companies, and do not entrust the execution of

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this measure to the official people, for it takes them ten days to despatch an order, and they would have the stupidity to send this reinforcement from Holland, so that it might reach me in the month of October.

Our troops have just entered the citadel of Ceva, and I have received from the King of Sardinia the order to deliver up to us the town and citadel of Tortona.

BONAPARTE.

To the General commanding the Staff.

Head-quarters, Nice, 9th Germinal, year IV. (29th March, 1796.)

THE 3d battalion of the 29th Demi-brigade has been guilty of disobedience; it has dishonoured itself by its mutinous spirit, in refusing to march to the active divisions; the officers have misconducted themselves; the commanding officer, Duverney, has betrayed bad intentions. You will have Citizen Duverney arrested, and brought before a military council at Toulon, whither you will address the complaint, which will be preferred by the *commandant* of the place.

You will have the grenadiers, who are accused of having been the authors of the mutiny, brought before a council of war at Nice. The other grenadiers you will order out, and disperse them five by five, in the battalions of the army.

The officers and non-commissioned officers not having set the example of marching, and having remained silent in the ranks, are all guilty; they are to be immediately discharged and sent home.

The soldiers of the battalion shall be incorporated at Marseilles with the 83d demi-brigade.

The present letter shall be inserted in the orders of the army.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Nice, 9th Germinal, year IV. (29th March, 1796.)

GENERAL MOURET will command from the river d'Ar-gent to Bandole, henceforth the limits of the departments of the Basses-Alpes and the Var. The cantons of Colmar and Entrevaux alone will not be in his division. General Barbantane will command from Bandole to the Rhone; his command will extend into the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and Vaocluse.

General Mouret will have Brigadier-general Gardanne under his command.

General Barbantane will have General Serviez and General Verne under his command.

General Despinois will proceed to head-quarters.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Nice, 9th Germinal, year IV. (29th March, 1796.)

THE cavalry will be formed into two divisions.

The first will be composed of the 1st regiment of hussars, the 10th chasseurs, the 22d chasseurs, the 25th chasseurs, the 5th dragoons, and the 20th dragoons.

The 1st regiment of dragoons will march through Menton, San Remo, Oneglia, and Albenga, and proceed to Toirano. The 10th chasseurs will go to Albenga; the 22d chasseurs will take the same route; two squadrons will repair to Pietra, and the other two to Loano. The 25th chasseurs will also take the same route; two squadrons will go to Borghe, and two others to Cariale; the 5th dragoons will remain at Albenga; the 20th dragoons will go to Alesio.

The 2d division will be composed of the 7th regiment of hussars, which will proceed to La Pietra, and will set out from Nice on the 10th of Germinal; of the 13th hussars, who will proceed to Loano; of the 24th chasseurs, who will go to Oneglia; of the 8th dragoons, who will go to Porto Maurizio; and of the 15th dragoons, who will proceed to Ormea.

You will order Brigadier-general Saint Hilaire to visit the towns appointed for the first division of the cavalry, and to report to you whether there be sufficient stabling for the horses. You will order General Serrurier to send a brigadier-general to visit the villages in which the second division is to be lodged. You will recommend it to these generals to make these observations with prudence, and to do nothing calculated to produce a rumour of this movement.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Nice, 11th Germinal, year IV. (31st March, 1796.)

THE General-in-chief is informed that several commissaries and officers have by them sums of money arising from different sales, and from the contributions and revenues of the conquered countries. This being contrary to the good of the service, to good order, and to the Constitution, he orders these different sums to be remitted without delay to the chest of the paymaster-general or his agents, that they may be disposed of by order of the muster-master-general for the good of the service, and to procure the soldier what is due to him.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Nice, 12th Germinal, year IV. (1st April, 1796.)

THERE will be three divisions of the coast. The first division will extend from the Rhone to Bandole, and include the departments of Vaucluse and the Bouches-du-Rhone: General Barbantane will command in it.

General Mouret will command the second division, which will extend from Bandole to the river d'Argent.

The third division will include all between the river d'Argent and Ventimiglia: General Casabianca will be its commander.

General Stengel will command the cavalry of the army.

General Kilmaine will command one of the divisions of the cavalry of the army.

General Dujard will command the artillery.

Citizen Sugny, lieutenant-colonel of artillery, will be chief of the staff of this army.

BONAPARTE.

To General COLLI, Commander-in-chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Catru, 6th Floréal, year IV. (25th April, 1796.)

THE Executive Directory, Sir, have reserved to themselves the right of treating for peace. The plenipotentiaries of the King your master must therefore go to Paris, or wait at Gênoa for the plenipotentiaries who may be sent by the French Government.

The military and moral situation of the two armies renders it impossible to establish a mere unconditional armistice. Although as an individual I am convinced that the Government will grant your King honourable conditions of peace, I cannot stop my march upon vague presumptions. There is nevertheless a method of attaining your object, consistent with the true interest of your Court, and which would save an effusion of blood which is unnecessary, and therefore contrary to reason and the laws of war. This is, to put into my power two of the three fortresses of Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona, at your option: we might afterwards await the result of the negotiations which might be set on foot without hostilities. This proposal is very mo-

derate. The mutual interests which ought to exist between Piedmont and the French Republic, make me anxiously desirous to avert from your country the calamities of all kinds with which it is threatened.

BONAPARTE.

To General LATOUR.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 7th Floreal, year IV. (26th April, 1796.)

I HAVE received, Sir, the King's order addressed to the commandant of Coni, which you have taken the trouble to forward to me. By this time it has reached its destination. I shall attend here to-morrow to receive the order for one of the fortresses of Tortona and Alessandria. You are aware, Sir, that the distance hence to either of those places renders it necessary that the King's order should be despatched to-morrow, that it may arrive on the 11th of Floreal (30th April).

One division of my army is already on that side. I am assured to-day that Beaulieu is already evacuating your territory.

I am happy, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 8th Floreal, year IV. (27th April, 1796.)

I HAVE this instant received, Sir, with your letter, the King's two orders for Ceva and Tortona.

There is at present only a small *détachment* at Fossano, which will immediately withdraw. The day after to-morrow there will be nobody at Bra, and I shall have the honour to send you notice to that effect.

Beyond the Stura I shall only have a *corps-de-garde* for the bridge of Cherasco.

I have ordered the general commanding at Coni, to send me an account of the state of the magazine at Notre Dame de Loluco. I shall have the honour to write to you on the subject as soon as I receive his answer.

My aide-de-camp is setting out for Paris. You have had the goodness to undertake to furnish him with a passport, and to cause him to be supplied with post-horses.

I shall want a thousand draught horses. I should be glad to buy them in Piedmont; and shall be obliged by your attention to what Citizen Thevenin, principal agent for military transports, will propose to you on this subject.

Your aide-de-camp will hand you a statement of the officers who are prisoners of war: the instant you furnish me with the names of those whom you wish to have, I will order them to be sent either to Coni or Cherasco. You will oblige me by forwarding ours either to Tortona or Cherasco.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-chief of the Piedmontese Army.

Head-quarters, Bosco, 13th Floreal, year IV. (2d May, 1796.)

I AM informed, Sir, that the Neapolitans have possessed themselves of Valenza: the King's interest and that of the

Republic agree in requiring you to expel these troops from Valenza without delay.

The courage which animates your army, and which I have had opportunities of appreciating, leaves me no doubt but that you will promptly re-occupy Valenza: besides, you know it is one of the clauses of the armistice we have concluded.

If, however, you stand in need of it, I offer you the aid of a division of the army under my command.

The general commanding the staff will to-morrow have the honour to send you the statement of the Piedmontese prisoners we have taken since the opening of the campaign.

I shall take care to send you those whom you wish to have in preference with all possible expedition.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chevalier SOLAR, Governor of Alessandria.

Head-quarters, Bosco, 14th Floreal, year IV. (3d May, 1796.)

I HAVE received, Sir, the letter which you have taken the trouble to write to me, and am much obliged to you for the information you have had the complaisance to give me. I congratulate you on the evacuation of your territories by the Austrian army. I am sincerely desirous to have it in my power to acquaint you that they have likewise evacuated the States of his Majesty beyond the Po. A division of the army will immediately appear before Valenza to pass the Po: I beg you will procure me the necessary boats; you are aware that it is the King's interest

that the Austrians should remain but a short time in your territories.

I shall want some contractors to supply us with waggons. I request you to authorise the different subjects of the King to enter into contracts with the army.

I am, Sir, with esteem, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-chief of the Piedmontese Army.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 15th Floréal, year IV. (4th May, 1796.)

IN a few days, Sir, I shall be master of the States of the King beyond the Po, if the chances of war continue favourable to me. I shall oblige General Beaulieu to evacuate these countries, which will be conquered from the Austrian army, and will belong of right to the Republic. I am nevertheless sensible how vexatious it must be to the King to see almost all his territories invaded by our troops. I therefore propose to you to add a division of 6000 infantry and 1500 horse to the army under my command, to aid me in driving out the Austrians: I will place them in garrison in the States of the King beyond the Po.

This affair is so urgent, Sir, that it is necessary I should have the answer as soon as possible. My solicitude to unite the King's interests with those of the Republic and the army induces me, Sir, to make you these overtures, which you will, no doubt, consider very reasonable.

I am with consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 15th Floreal, year IV. (4th May, 1796.)

THE troops of the Republic have this morning occupied the fort of Tortona; consequently, from this day forward there is a suspension of hostilities between the two armies: I have put it in orders, and I trust you will find the French officers disposed to give you satisfactory proofs of their esteem for your army. I have given orders to enable you to occupy the town of Fossano and Bra.

I shall adopt in the line of demarcation all the alterations you may think necessary; adhering, however, to the spirit of the armistice we have concluded.

I have ordered 400 prisoners to be sent in exchange for the 400 you have had the goodness to forward to Cherasco.

The chief of the staff sends you a list of the officers of your army whom the chance of war has made prisoners. I shall immediately send you those you interest yourself for.

I am, with the most distinguished consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 16th Floreal, year IV. (5th May, 1796.)

THE Marquis de Saint Marsan, whom I have had the honour of seeing this morning, has acquainted me, Sir, with your anxiety and complaints respecting different inhabitants of Alba. I shall immediately inquire into the business, and inform you of the result of my proceedings.

I have, on this occasion, to thank you for introducing M. de Saint Marsan to me: he combines with distinguished talents an engaging manner, which secures the esteem of all who have transactions with him.

BONAPARTE.

MILITARY LETTERS,

ADDRESSED to NAPOLEON.

Savona, 9th Germinal, year IV. (29th March, 1796)

I RECEIVED your letter yesterday. I heartily congratulate you on your appointment to the chief command of the army of Italy. You have long known that I do justice to your military talents. I shall act so as to deserve your confidence, as I have obtained that of all the generals who have hitherto commanded.

I am just arrived from Voltri, where I have been visiting our new positions with the commissioner Salicetti. Hopes of cash are held out to us; every effort is making to obtain it.

To-morrow I shall send you an account of the positions of the troops of the vanguard, and of those of the enemy. I shall neglect no opportunity of giving you information that may be useful to the service.

MASSENA.

Oneglia, 10th Germinal, year IV. (30th March, 1796)

I HAVE visited all the points and the coast in the vicinity of Oneglia; and I found them all susceptible of being put in a good state of defence. The batteries of Oneglia are

in good condition and well situated; they are useful, but not sufficient.

It is to be observed, in the first place, that there are two distinct anchorages: that of Porto Maurizio, and that of Oneglia. The former is good in a north-east wind; the latter in a west wind or mistral.

As these winds blow alternately, it is necessary to be able to occupy both these moorings, and, consequently, to make ourselves masters of them.

The moorage of Oneglia is defended, 1st, by the batteries of the place; 2dly, by that of Cape Oneglia; and by that called the Anchorage Battery.

That of Porto Maurizio is defended by the Anchorage Battery and by the Genoese battery of Porto Maurizio. The battery of Cape Oneglia is a considerable one; it affords a good *appui*, but it is mounted only with a 36 pounder. I think it ought to be increased to four pieces of that calibre.

The battery called the Anchorage is not mounted; it is intended to place two 13 pounders upon it; but they will be insufficient, and I think it necessary to put four 36 pounders there, because that battery has two objects to fulfil, and being intermediate, defends both anchorages.

The Genoese battery of Porto Maurizio is lined. It appears to me indispensably necessary to take possession of it, and to send gunners to serve it; it is a good point of *appui*, the loss of which would produce that of the others. I therefore think it would be dangerous to neglect it.

The ammunition of the guns now in the batteries amounts only to five rounds each. I think it would be useful to increase it to a hundred rounds.

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The ammunition of the guns now in the batteries amounts only to five rounds each. I think it would be useful to increase it to a hundred rounds.

By means of this increase of armament, amounting only to seven 36 pounders, I think a convoy of 200 sail would find protection and safety. I am now setting out for Ormea, whence I shall send you a report of my future observations.

MARMONT.

La Pietra, 10th Germinal, year IV. (30th March, 1796.)

I HAVE received your letter of the 8th of this month, by which I learn that you have just taken the command of the army. I am happy to be under your orders, knowing your civism and military talents. I shall do every thing in my power to fulfil your intentions in all the orders you give me. Rely on my zeal, activity, and devotion to the service of the Republic.

General Scherer, your predecessor, placed the 99th demi-brigade, which was to form part of my division, under the command of General Massena, for the intended expedition. As soon as this demi-brigade is no longer wanted in the van, I beg you will send it back to join my division.

AUGEREAU.

Loano, 12th Germinal, year IV. (1st April, 1796.)

I YESTERDAY saw General Serrurier: he gave me all the information you desired, which I now forward to you.

The Col di Terme is an excellent post: it completely covers Ormea; which town cannot be taken without first carrying that post.

It may be turned, 1st, by the gorges of Viosena; 2dly, by the heights of the Arbre; 3dly, by the Col del Inferno.

The Col di Terme, although easy to defend, is of considerable extent. General Serrurier thinks it requires 2400 men and six pieces of cannon. It was, however, defended by only 1600 men when it was attacked last year.

The gorges of Viosena are of greater importance: should they be forced, not only the Col di Terme and Ormea would be turned, but the enemy might, without difficulty, come down into the valley of Oneglia. They cannot be well guarded by less than 2000 men.

General Serrurier also thinks it requires 200 men to defend the heights of the Arbre; 1500 for the Col del Inferno, and 1200 for the gorge of Garessio. His line of defence extending from Viosena to Garessio, would then be occupied by 7500 men.

The Col di Terme is still impracticable, on account of the snow: General Serrurier will have it occupied as soon as the snow has ceased to prevent it. He is more uncovered on our side than on that of the enemy; we may therefore be easy with respect to him.

I have not been able to reconnoitre the various roads you have desired me to get intelligence on, because they are all occupied by the enemy, our advanced posts reaching only to within a league of Garessio; but I have collected the following particulars from people of the country, and officers who have travelled in part of it. It appears certain, by the uniformity of their reports, that they have stated the truth.

1st. From Ponte Nocetto to Ceva, there is a good road for a march of an hour and a half, practicable for carriages: there are two hills. The descent of the second is

overlooked by the fort, within cannon-shot · the chesnut trees, however, afford some cover.

2dly. From Nocetto to Calisano, a mountainous way for two hours and a half, scarcely practicable for mules.

3dly. From Garessio to the Chartreuse, an hour and a half, and from the Chartreuse to Mondovì, five hours and a half. This road is good, but for mules only

4thly. From Bagnasco to Batifolo, an hour's march the road is good, and passable for the field-pieces

I know not of which Frabosa you intended to speak; but there are two · I have referred to both.

5thly From Frabosa to Breuves, four hours, a road for mules, and from Frabosa Fontana to Breuves, five hours, a road for mules

This is the information, General, which you desired me to furnish you with I am going to set out for Finale and Savona.

I forgot to tell you, in my last letter, that it was not off Oneglia, but off Alassio, that the enemy took several vessels. But Alassio was not at that time in a state of defence, and this accident proves nothing against Oneglia. The precautions you pointed out are about to be adopted.

MARMONT.

Ormea, 17th Germinal, year IV (6th April, 1796)

I HAVE received your letters of the 10th, 11th, and 15th of this month. I have informed the soldiers of my division, by means of the order of the day, of the steps you have taken to procure them necessaries.

If provisions for this division are supplied directly from Loano to Garessio, two hundred mules ought to suffice ; but from Oneglia will be a shorter way.

Before I can observe Batifolo, I must necessarily make myself master of the heights of Preconde : I have ordered General Guieux to set the peasants and pioneers to work to open the roads for us. If I were obliged to go as far as Batifolo, I should not be in force ; I should consequently be compromised, because my left must guard Carlino and Visona, and that would be the time to observe the Col di Terme, which I believe the enemy would gladly have ; but if I can make myself master of Preconde and the Col di Casolto, it would be indifferent to me ; indeed I do not think they would then hazard it.

Citizen Barthelemy, chief of the 10th demi-brigade, attempted, without orders, to take from the enemy a post they have at Saint Jacques Viola. It appears that he had not made any military disposition, or taken any precaution. His men were repulsed to their quarters, and he was wounded and made prisoner. I have not yet been informed how many men this foolish affair cost us ;—it took place on the 15th in the afternoon. Unless an example is made, things will go on ill ; many of the soldiers only want to rob, and not to fight.

I shall not enter the Chartreuse di Casolto without occupying the heights.

SERRURIER.

Crevenzano, 10th Floreal, year IV. (29th April, 1796.)

I HAVE this instant received intelligence of the enemy: there are none of them now at Santo Stefano di Belbo, or at Canelli; they have all retreated towards Valenza, except 6 or 7000 men, in great consternation, who are continually asking whether the French are coming; they are all dispersed throughout the positions they occupy to cover themselves. There are but 2000 men collected at Tezzo, with 6 pieces of cannon and 2 howitzers; and 6 or 7000 Austrian and Neapolitan cavalry between Tezzo and Acqui, with 4 or 5 pieces of cannon. At Acqui there are but a few militia, who are busily getting out the stores; we must therefore endeavour to secure something there.

The soldiers of the division are cleaning their arms. If the cartridges arrive to-day, I shall not hesitate to march, although without bread. All the soldier wants is to extricate himself from his present miserable state of want.

I shall form the division into two columns. The 69th and 70th, at the head of which I shall be, will pass through Santo Stefano and Canelli, to take the enemy in the rear. The 89th will pass through Corteniglia, Bure, and Monastero, to attack in front: this attack will at first only be a feint, until I make a real attack myself, when the 89th will do the same. The Canelli column will have 3-pounders, and the Corteniglia 4-pounders, the roads being better.

I consider the taking of Acqui, and the retreat or defeat of the Austrians, as most essential to our campaign: for then the Piedmontese who are our friends will take courage, being themselves delivered from the Austrians; and the Piedmontese who are hostile to us will be confounded at the loss of their support.

Adieu, General. Cartridges : if possible, bread and shoes ; and my next letter shall inform you that the first division does as much as the others. I warn you, however, that if the cartridges do not arrive to-day, I shall be obliged to defer operations for twenty-four hours ; which would be a great misfortune, and cause us considerable loss.

LA HARPE.

INFORMATION required from General MENARD.

QUESTIONS

1. Was not the General under the command of General Massena at the time of the affair of Montenotte ?
 2. What corps did he command ?
 3. What share had his brigade in the action, and what were its movements on that day ?
 4. Did it not proceed to Biestro, after the affair ?
-

INFORMATION required from General CERVONI.

AFFAIRE OF VOLTURI

1. What was, nearly, the strength of the two demi-brigades detached to Volturi ?
2. What was their position ?
3. By what force were they attacked ?
4. Did the column returning from Volturi arrive in time to take any part in the affair of Montelegino ?
5. And in that case, on what point did it move ?

INFORMATION required from General MENARD.

ANSWERS.

1. Yes.
 2. The 18th and 75th of the line.
 3. It attacked Montenotte on the left of the army, and bivouacuated above Cadibona.
 4. Yes, and set out the following day to engage at Cossaria.
-

INFORMATION required from General CERVONI.

AFFAIR OF VOLTRI.

1. About 4500 men.
2. Before Voltri, on the heights of Pegli, on the heights of Voltri, and before Campo Fredo; with a small reserve at Arenzano.
3. All these posts were attacked by 11 or 12,000 men.
4. The arrival of General Cervoni's brigade at Savona, determined the General-in-chief to attack the following day at Montelegino.
5. It was destined to attack the front, and for that purpose took the direction of Doria's house, which is on the side of the mountain.

QUESTIONS continued.

6. What corps composed General La Harpe's division at the affair of Montenotte; and what was, nearly, the strength of the division after the junction of General Cervoni's brigade?
 7. Did not the whole division proceed at night into the rear of the redoubt of Montelegino?
 8. Had the enemy left troops before the redoubt during the night?
 9. Did he occupy at the same time the positions of Montelegino and Montenotte?
 10. Did the affair begin at Montelegino?
 11. What were the movements of La Harpe's division?
 12. Had it repulsed the enemy from that point when General Massena placed himself on the flank of the enemy, at Montenotte?
 13. Where did the division take position after battle?
-

INFORMATION required of General RAMPON, respecting the Affairs of Montelegino and Montenotte.

1. What corps did the General command at the affair of Montelegino?
2. What positions did General La Harpe's troops occupy before the redoubt, when they were attacked?

ANSWERS continued.

6. General Cervoni had been detached to Voltri, and many movements having taken place in the army, he does not know what troops were immediately under the command of General La Harpe. And after the affair of Montelegino, having always acted separately, with the vanguard, he is also ignorant of the strength of that general's division at the affair of Montenotte.

7. The whole of La Harpe's division joined at Savona, whence it marched at two in the morning.

8. Yes.

9. Yes.

10. Yes.

11. Does not know.

12. The real attack began at the same moment through the whole line.

13. It marched all day, and took up a position on the heights of Cairo.

INFORMATION required of General RAMPON, respecting the Affairs of Montelegino and Montenotte.

1 and 2. The troops commanded by General Cervoni having been beaten at Voltri by the General-in-chief Beau-
lieu, General Rampon, then lieutenant-colonel of the 21st
demi-brigade, (now the 32d regiment of the line,) which

QUESTIONS *continued.*

3. Did General Rampon fight in these positions, before he entered the redoubt?

4. Did General Cervoni's corps returning from Voltri come up during the attack of the redoubt, and take part in the affair?

5. Did the enemy pass the night before the redoubt?

6. Did he remain in his position the next morning?

7. At what point did the battle of Montenotte commence?

8. Did any action take place that day at Montelegino, or only on Montenotte?

9. At what hour did General Massena find himself on the flank of the enemy at Montenotte; and what were at that time the position and progress of General La Harpe and the enemy on Montelegino and Montenotte?

ANSWERS continued.

was at La Madonna di Savona, received orders from the General of division La Harpe, to proceed to the heights of Montenotte with his corps, to protect the retreat of the troops from Voltri. This corps, which consisted of about 900 men, was composed of the 2d battalion of his brigade and of three companies of carabineers, then the 1st light infantry.

3. Having executed this order, Rampon found, on the heights of Montenotte, General Beaulieu, who was advancing to attack him with 15,000 men. He made head against him for three hours, after which he retreated in good order on the redoubt of Montelegino, which was unfinished, and had no artillery.*

This redoubt was situate on a narrow ridge, over which the enemy was obliged to pass.

8. It was there that Rampon made his brave men swear to conquer or die; and it was there that these valiant troops stopped 15,000 Austrians all day.

Beaulieu thrice attempted to carry the redoubt, and was thrice vigorously repulsed: had the enemy succeeded in forcing this point, he would have entered Savona, where were all our magazines, and head-quarters, an hour afterwards.

4 and 12. Neither General Cérmoni, nor any of the above-mentioned troops, took part in this affair.

* Rampon received in the course of the night two 4-pounders and a reinforcement of 700 men; but they were of no use, the affair being over; and General Beaulieu being himself attacked the following morning at Montenotte, whither he had fallen back.

QUESTIONS *continued.*

3. Did General Rampon fight in these positions, before he entered the redoubt?

4. Did General Cervoni's corps returning from Voltri come up during the attack of the redoubt, and take part in the affair?

5. Did the enemy pass the night before the redoubt?

6. Did he remain in his position the next morning?

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8. Did any action take place that day at Monteleghino, or only on Montenotte?

9. At what hour did General Massena find himself on the flank of the enemy at Montenotte; and what were at that time the position and progress of General La Harpe and the enemy on Monteleghino and Montenotte?

ANSWERS continued.

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QUESTIONS *continued.*

10. Had La Harpe's division repulsed the enemy from Montelegino?

11. Had the enemy occupied, from the morning, the positions of Montenotte and Montelegino at the same time; or was it after having been repulsed from the latter that he fell back on the former?

12. Did General Augereau's division arrive during the action, and take part in it?

ANSWERS continued.

5, 6, 10, and 11. The enemy being repulsed from Montelegino, took advantage of the night to retreat to the hill of Montenotte, opposite the redoubt which he had been unable to force, leaving two or three hundred dead upon the field of battle. Rampon having thus maintained himself in the redoubt, the General-in-chief Bonaparte profited by this defence, and in the course of the night settled his plan for attacking the enemy's army at day-break the next morning, 23d Germinal.

7. The action began towards five o'clock in the morning, at the point on which the enemy had fallen back (Montenotte).

9. General Massena was on the flank of the enemy from the commencement of the battle.

The 32d, one battalion of which had just fought so gloriously at Montenotte, gathered its share of laurels, and still commanded by Rampon, kept up its reputation throughout this memorable campaign of Italy.

DIPLOMATIC LETTERS,

ADDRESSED TO NAPOLEON.

Head-quarters of the Piedmontese Army, 7th Floreal, year IV
(26th April, 1796)

BEING informed that the plenipotentiaries to Genoa to treat in the name of the Crown of Spain, I think, General, that the interests of humanity seem to require that hostilities should be suspended on both sides during the continuance of these negotiations.

I consequently propose an armistice, either unlimited or for a definite period, at your option, in hopes of saving the effusion of human blood.

COLLI.

Head-quarters of the Piedmontese Army, 7th Floreal, year IV.
(26th April, 1796.)

I HAVE communicated to the Court of Sardinia, General, the letter you wrote me in answer to that which I addressed to you, informing you that a plenipotentiary had been sent to Genoa on the part of the King, instructed to make overtures for peace, and inviting you, until their result is known, to spare the effusion of human blood by an armistice. I am now authorised by his Majesty to state to you

that the French minister at Genoa, to whom the King's plenipotentiary applied on the subject of the said overtures for peace, declared that he had not, and that no person at Genoa had, any authority to enter into such negotiations; but that application must be made to the Executive Directory at Paris, which alone possessed such right.

Upon which the plenipotentiary said he would make his future applications on the subject in question in that quarter. But in the mean time, until the much hoped-for conclusion of the salutary work of peace between the two States by these means, which cannot take place without some delay, the King, desiring to spare both sides the calamities of all kinds which hostilities necessarily produce, has without hesitation given his consent to the immediate conclusion of the proposed suspension of hostilities, which you have shown a disposition to agree to, upon certain conditions.

His Majesty has consequently ordered me to declare that he will consent to place in your power two of his fortresses; that is to say, those of Coni and Tortona, as you required, during the continuance of the negotiations about to be commenced, and according to the mode which shall be agreed on: so that all hostilities shall cease from this time until the termination of the said negotiations; and in case it should happen, owing to the difficulties which may arise from the present situation of the allied army, that the fortress of Tortona could not be surrendered to you as above-mentioned, his Majesty has determined to offer, instead thereof, the fortress of Demont. Every thing, with the exception of the surrender of these two places, to remain *in statu quo*, as far as regards the countries occupied by the respective armies, which are not to pass beyond the

line of limitation which will be respectively fixed; and the whole to be arranged as may be more specifically agreed upon between us.

COLLI.

Carmagnole, 9th Floreal, year IV. (28th April, 1796.)

I SEND you, my dear General, the King's order to the Governor of Coni to surrender that place to you: I hope you will consider the despatch I have used in this affair, as a proof of my sincerity in all the engagements I have contracted by the convention we have entered into.

I have further to inform you, that in the course of to-morrow, at latest, the Governor of Ceva will receive the official order to surrender the fort to the officer commissioned by you to take possession thereof.

I avail myself, with the utmost eagerness, of this opportunity of repeating to you, my dear General, that I have every reason to flatter myself that our convention is a step to the speedy establishment of a peace advantageous to both powers.

Accept my homage, and the assurance of the highest consideration.

DELA TOUR.

P. S.—I have just been informed of the present state of the magazines of this town: it appears to me that there must still be about fifty sacks of wheat or pulse in it. As I promised to send them to you if you required them, I now offer to fulfil my promise immediately, and only wait to know your intentions.

Carnaguole, 10th Floreal, year IV. (29th April, 1796.)

MY solicitude, my dear General, to fulfil scrupulously every article of the convention I had the honour to conclude with you, affording you a new proof of my veracity, I shall, instead of urging that point, proceed to lay before you a very interesting circumstance, on which the execution of that convention depends: the shortness of the time I had the pleasure of passing with you did not allow of my then entering into it. It is the article of the surrender of Coni, in which it is stipulated that the provisions for the garrison of that place should be exclusively delivered to you; and that the stores of La Madonna de l'Oulme, which, at the period of the occupation of Mondovi by the French army, had been removed to Coni, should remain at the King's disposal.

Being as firmly convinced of your honour as of your merit, I come with confidence, my dear General, to lay the fact before you, intreating you to comply with this just demand: I mean, to have the goodness, verbally or in writing, to acquaint the general commanding at Coni that the above-mentioned magazines of provisions never having formed part of those deemed necessary for that place, we are to be allowed to remove them with such precautions as you will have the goodness to agree on with my aide-de-camp the Chevalier Fabri, who will have the honour to deliver you this letter.

The subjoined note for the Governor of Tortona settles the surrender of that place to be made to you, conformably to the articles agreed upon in this respect, which also determine the line of demarcation. I send you at the same time the King's orders to the Governor of Ceva.

With the assurances of my perfect confidence in a general who inspires that feeling so strongly, deign to accept that of the sentiments which attend the esteem and consideration with which I have the honour to be

DELATOUR.

Carmagnole, 13th Floreal, year IV. (2d May, 1796.)

BEING well assured, General, that you make a point of fulfilling the engagements contracted by the convention, of which we jointly fixed and stipulated the conditions, I approach you with all the confidence due to your merits, to observe that the man of the name of *Bonnafous*, whose misconduct I had the honour to submit to your notice by my letter of yesterday's date, has, under the name of Mayor of Alba, enjoined different commonalties on the left banks of the Stura and Tanaro, (formerly the province of Langhes, but united to that of Turin on the day of the signature of the armistice,) to sequestrate all feudal and demesne property, both moveable and immoveable, as you will see by the schedule my aide-de-camp will have the honour to deliver to you.

Satisfied, I repeat, that it is your constant intention, far from authorizing, under any pretext, the conduct of the said *Bonnafous*, to observe with scrupulous fidelity every one of the conditions of the armistice; I content myself, my dear General, with informing you of the fact, requesting you to give orders for prompt redress.

I have further to inform you that I have as far as possible complied with your request relative to M. Thereny: I leave him to communicate the result of his researches.

I leave it in like manner to the Chevalier Fabri, to propose to you all the arrangements which appear to me equally useful to the two armies and suitable to circumstances ; and I authorize him to do all that may be requisite, in order to give you additional proofs of our sincerity, and to receive testimonies of yours.

I reserve to myself only the satisfaction of assuring you, &c.

DELATOUR.

Carmagnole, 14th Floreal, year IV. (3d May, 1796.)

THE King my master, anxious to send you an answer to the request I made him on your behalf, to allow you to purchase horses in Piedmont, has determined, my dear General, to send the Marquis de Saint Marsan, lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, and an officer of his Majesty's staff, who will have the honour to deliver you this letter, and who is ordered to acquaint you with his Majesty's intentions respecting such purchase, as well as with the different precautions which he has thought proper to take for the safety of his States.

I have therefore to recommend the Marquis de Saint Marsan to your attention, and to inform you, my dear General, that he is authorized to settle with you all arrangements that may be of mutual convenience, in case further information should be necessary.

Have the goodness to forward the inclosed letter to the Count de Massan, colonel of the regiment of guards, and to be assured of the sentiments, &c.

DELATOUR.

Alessandria, 13th Floreal, year IV (2d May, 1796)

ALTHOUGH I am not the commander of the army of the King of Sardinia my master, but the senior general officer of this department, and governor of the city and province of Alessandria, I have considered that I should be doing what was agreeable and advantageous to the interests of the King and the French Republic, as well as to you, Sir, personally, in opening your letter, to see if I could employ myself in any thing which might be an object of your wishes, and on reading its contents I congratulated myself on the execution of my design, finding that I could inform you that not only the Neapolitan troops, but the whole of the Imperial army, except a small rear guard which followed it, have evacuated the town of Valenza and passed the Po, having begun their march nearly at midnight, that the commandant himself saw them file off and pass the Po at ten o'clock in the morning of which I can assure you, as I have it from the King's commissioner to the Imperial army, who was present, and did not leave the Commander-in-chief until he passed the Po

I am happy to have the opportunity of giving you this information, in consequence of which I shall conclude with assuring you of my grateful sense of the expressions you have thought proper to make use of in speaking of the King's troops, and with thanking you for your offer of French troops to fulfil one of the clauses of the armistice which has just been concluded

On receiving the list of the prisoners of war taken by the French army from that of the King, I shall take care to send it direct to Turin, to the War Office, that it may be communicated to the Commander-in-chief of the said army,

by whom it will be laid before the King, who will surely be gratified by the readiness you express to forward to us as speedily as possible those who may be wished for in preference.

SOLARS, Governor of Alessandria.

Alessandria, 14th Floreal, year IV. (3d May, 1796.)

IN answer, Sir, to the letter delivered to me by your aide-de-camp, I am sorry to be obliged to tell you that it is absolutely impossible to supply you with boats to construct a bridge over the Po, because General Beaulieu, as soon as his army had passed, had the bridge destroyed, and carried off to Pavia all the boats which had served for building the said bridge at Valenza, in which had been employed all the craft taken here on the Tanaro, and those on the Po, which had been brought from Casale, and even twenty-five from Turin; besides which, he had all the little boats in the vicinity of Valenza sunk, and there is absolutely not one left. He has, indeed, promised an indemnity for the carrying off of the said boats, and for all the materials taken. I shall presently speak of the article concerning the waggons you want, and which will be furnished to you by some contractor for whom inquiries are making. In the mean time, permit me, General, to recommend the King's subjects to you, and to intreat you to use the greatest determination in carrying your good intentions, of which I am aware, into effect; in order to prevent the ravages of the soldiery, both in the fields and the houses, particularly those in lonely situations; several complaints having already been made on the subject.

To return to the subject of the waggons I have not only declared that I would authorize the King's subjects to enter into contracts with the French army, but I have given orders to enquire for persons whom I thought likely to engage in that business, and on this head I refer you to what your aide-de-camp will tell you

SOLAKS, Governor of Alessandria.

Carmagnole, 16th Floreal, year IV (5th May, 1796.)

I HAVE to inform you, General, that notwithstanding our solicitude to give you satisfaction in every thing that is in our power, and to assist you in procuring subsistence for your army, it is in every respect totally impossible for us to supply you with the draught and cavalry horses which you requested, nevertheless, I find that the persons employed to make purchases for your army succeed in procuring them, particularly as his Majesty has approved of the permission granted by the Governor of Alessandria to the different contractors to enter into engagements with you for the supply of waggons, &c.

Having, moreover, every reason to believe that General Beaulieu is preparing to evacuate the King's territories, and his majesty having even formally required him to do so, as he before required him to evacuate Valenza, I hope what you desired will no longer be necessary, according to your statement to M de Saint Marsan At all events, however, should the army refuse wholly to evacuate the King's territories, I am marching my troops towards No-

vara, Mortara, and Vigevano, to secure those towns: these troops will go by water to Valenza in all the boats that can be collected (there being now none of the King's in existence), and these boats shall afterwards be at your disposal.

The Marquis de Saint Marsan, the bearer of this letter, is authorized to settle with you the particulars of the intended demarcation, and I have given him my orders on the subject.

The consequence is, that the evil-disposed subjects of his Majesty, bordering on the line of demarcation, are doubling their efforts to excite intestine revolutions, boasting at the same time that they are under your protection. This seems wholly contrary to the law of nations, especially during a truce, and I must repeat to you the request already made by M. de Saint Marsan on this subject, relying with great confidence on the instances of your proceedings which have already come to my knowledge

VICTOR EMANUEL.*

Turin, 18th Floreal, year IV. (7th May, 1796.)

IN reply to the letter you sent me by your aide-de-camp, I have to tell you, in the first place, that notwithstanding the burthen which the passage of so large a body of troops must be to the poor inhabitants of the countries they are to march through, I consent with pleasure, according to

* Then Duke of Aosta and brother to the King.

the King's intentions, to the proposed passage of the column you mention by way of Argentieres and Cona to join your army: I shall appoint an officer to accompany it, agreeably to your wishes. As to the column you wish to bring over the Saint-Bernard, I must suggest several considerations to you: First, that it seems far from consistent with the armistice, the line of demarcation, and the pacific views you have had the goodness to profess to me, and of which I am fully persuaded, to demand the passage of troops in so many different points, which cannot but be extremely burthensome to his Majesty's dominions. Besides, the vale of Aosta, through which they are to pass, is a country destitute of every thing, which would find it very difficult to supply your troops with provisions. Canevesara is also a country which is not in a condition to supply the wants of this body of troops, particularly as I must disperse troops throughout it to escort yours, because the inhabitants are extremely impatient and ready to take up arms, which might occasion even serious disputes with your soldiers. In the second place, because Canevesara and the Versalese are both intersected by a very great number of rivers, which on the least increase become impracticable, and might place your troops in great difficulties, by enclosing them between two of these rivers and reducing them to famine; which would oblige them to resort to pillage, and would cause a revolt amongst the inhabitants of the said country. I think it right to lay these observations before you, and, moreover, to remark that by ordering your troops to march through Argentieres, although, in the ordinary course of things, their route would be a few days' march longer, yet they might

run a risk of still greater delay by way of the vale of Aosta, considering the accidents which might be occasioned by the rising of the waters. I am, besides, convinced that in desisting from this passage, you would be doing what would be highly agreeable to the King, and oblige him much.

On my arrival at Turin, I was informed that the followers of your army, when they passed through Tortona, had seized the King's treasures, and had given orders in that city as in a conquered town. I must observe to you, that Tortona having merely been placed in depôt, in the same manner as Coni, where your troops behaved like real friends, I flatter myself, knowing your honourable character and your attachment to order, that you will give directions to prevent every thing that might cause any unnecessary damage to his Majesty or his people. The Marquis de Saint Marsan will have already delivered you my first letter, and explained more fully certain complaints respecting disorders committed by the soldiers, and more particularly by certain Piedmontese, in the endeavour to excite revolutions in Piedmont; intending, probably, to produce a rupture of the armistice which has been concluded, and which will, I hope, be followed by a good and solid peace between the French and us.

I am, Sir, &c.

VICTOR EMANUEL.

EXTRACTS FROM FOUR NOTES FROM THE GOVERNOR OF
ALESSANDRIA.

First Note.

THE Governor of Alessandria demands,

1st. That the sequestration of the effects of persons employed about the King of Sardinia, ordered at Cherasco on the 7th of Floreal, may not be carried into execution ;

2dly. That no *tête de pont* may be constructed on the left of the Stura, opposite Cherasco ;

3dly. He claims the King's money confiscated at Acqui, Tortona, and Voghera.

Second Note.

THE Governor of Alessandria demands,

1st. That the King of Sardinia may be allowed to remove a magazine at Coni, intended for the subsistence of the army : one of his Majesty's commissioners was to have removed it to Madonna dell' Orna, but General Macquart prevented him.

2dly. He claims the forage which has for some time past been collected at the village of Saint Dalmas, that place having only been occupied by the French troops subsequently to the armistice.

3dly. He requests permission for certain purveyors to

the army, to bring away from the vale of Vermeгуena the forage which has been purchased there.

Third Note.

THE Governor of Alessandria demands that, agreeably to the verbal conventions between the General-in-chief and the Marquis de Saint Marsan, the limits of demarcation from Alba to Nizza della Paglia may be the identical limits of the provinces of Alba and Acqui: so that all the lands and villages dependent on the province of Asti, on the right of the Tanaro, and of course those dependent on the province of Alessandria, on the left of the Bormida as far as Cassina exclusively, may be exempt from military contributions.

He gives notice that piquets and detachments are placed on the left banks of the Tanaro and the Bormida, to prevent the disbanded soldiers of the French army from wandering from the roads and line of demarcation fixed by the armistice.

Fourth Note.

THE Governor of Alessandria requests and intreats the French Commander-in-chief to give proper orders for suppressing the commotions at Coni and Saint Dalmas, where there have been tumults against the priests. His Majesty

has seen with satisfaction the restoration of tranquillity at Alba, where some disaffected subjects had raised disturbances. He has the greatest confidence in the good faith and honour of the General-in-chief.

The Governor of Alessandria requests General Meymer to have the goodness to apply to the General-in-chief, in order to obtain an answer.

TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ORDERS OF THE DAY, AND PROCLAMATIONS.

SUSPENSION of HOSTILITIES between **BONAPARTE**, the General-in-chief of the French Army of Italy, and **COUNT LATOUR**, Lieutenant-general in the service of the King of Sardinia.

ARTICLE I. All hostilities shall cease between the French army in Italy and the army of the King of Sardinia, dating from the day on which the undermentioned conditions shall be fulfilled, until five days after the conclusion of negotiations for a definitive peace between the two powers; that is to say: The fortress of Coni shall be occupied by the French on the 9th of Floreal or 28th of April of the present year; the fortress of Alessandria shall likewise be occupied by them, until they can be put in possession of that of Tortona, as soon as possible, on the 11th of Floreal (30th April) at latest; which place of

Alessandria shall only be occupied by the French army until that of Tortona can be delivered to it.

II. The French army shall remain in possession of all it has conquered ; that is to say, the whole of the country beyond the right bank of the Stura as far as its junction with the Tanaro, and thence along the right bank of that river to where it falls into the Po, as long as the French troops shall occupy Alessandria ; but when that place shall be restored to the King of Sardinia's troops, in consequence of the occupation of Tortona by the French, the limits shall continue from the confluence of the Stura and Tanaro, as far as Asti on the right bank of the said river. From that point the high road leading to Nizza della Paglia, and thence to Cassina, shall serve as a line of demarcation ; and from that place, crossing the bank of the Bormida below Cassina, the French army shall be in possession of the Bormida as far as its junction with the Tanaro, and thence to the confluence of the latter river and the Po.

III. The town and citadel of Coni shall be surrendered into the hands of the French troops, as well as the town and citadel of Tortona, with the artillery, ammunition, and provisions in them, of which an inventory shall be drawn up : the same shall be done with respect to the town and citadel of Alessandria, which shall be provisionally occupied by the French, until they are in possession of the place and citadel of Tortona.

IV. The French troops shall be allowed to pass the Po below Valenza.

V. The couriers, aides-de-camp, and other officers whom the General-in-chief may wish to send to Paris, shall be allowed their passage and return by the shortest road.

VI. All the troops, officers, and military equipments in the pay of the King of Sardinia, now forming part of the Austrian army in Italy, shall be included in the said armistice.

VII. The citadel of Ceva, with its artillery, ammunition, and provisions, shall be surrendered: its garrison shall retire into Piedmont.

VIII. In the fortresses of Coni and Tortona, or that of Alessandria occupied conditionally in case Tortona cannot be immediately surrendered to the French, a particular account shall be drawn up of the artillery, arms, ammunition, and provisions, for which the Republic shall be answerable to the King of Sardinia; that is to say, the artillery to be restored, and the ammunition and provisions that may be consumed to be paid for at the estimated price.

Done at head-quarters, Cherasco, 9th Floreal, year IV. of the French Republic; (28th April, 1796.)

BONAPARTE, General-in-chief.

LATOUR, Lieutenant-general.

BATTLE OF LODI.

(MEMOIRS, &c. Vol. III. Chap. VI.)

LETTERS from the DIRECTORY to NAPOLEON.

Paris, 18th Floreal, year IV. (7th May, 1796.)

THE Directory have received, Citizen General, your interesting despatches of the 8th, 9th, and 10th of Floreal, and the duplicates of those of the 7th of the same month, containing the intelligence of the taking of Mondovi, &c. What glorious successes! The joy and hopes of the public are unbounded; one more victory over the Austrians, and Italy is ours!

You have rendered your country important services: your best recompense, Citizen General, will be the esteem of the friends of the Republic, and that of the Directory. They repeat their congratulations, and desire you to congratulate, in their names, the brave army which carries your excellent plans into execution by its intrepidity and boldness. Glory to all the French who contribute by their victories and the propriety of their conduct to establish the Republic on immoveable foundations!

The Directory approve of the provisional armistice which you have concluded with the plenipotentiaries of the King of Sardinia: it is in every respect advantageous; and the Directory cannot but applaud the vigorous measures which you took in granting it, and having its most essential conditions fulfilled on the spot.

They have observed with pleasure that Citizen Salicetti, their commissioner to the army of Italy, was consulted previously to the conclusion of the armistice. Transactions of this kind, in urgent cases in which the Directory themselves cannot be consulted, are peculiarly within the province of the commissioners from Government to the army. The French generals should, nevertheless, be the only direct agents recognized by the generals of the enemy; but it is wished that they should not finally determine any transaction or negotiation under the above-mentioned circumstances, except by order of the Directory, or according to the conditions with which the commissioners of Government will furnish them.

At the writing of this letter, you are doubtless in the Milanese: may the fortune of the Republic have led some of the French columns thither before the flying Austrian has been able to pass the Po! May it enable you to cut off his direct communications with Milan and the Court of Vienna! Your letter of the 9th indicates an intention of marching against Beaulieu on the 10th: you have, no doubt, driven him before you. Do not lose sight of him for an instant; nothing but your activity, and the greatest rapidity in your marches, can annihilate this Austrian army, which must be destroyed. March—no fatal repose; you have still laurels to gather; and the treacherous coalition is at an end, if you avail yourself, as you declare you intend to do, of the advantages which the brilliant victories of the Republican army under your command have given us.

The plan of campaign which you have sketched out in your letter of the 9th is worthy of the French, and the army which you are commanding and leading to victory; but it is attended with difficulties of the first magnitude,

indeed, insurmountable. Believe, however, that the Directory know how to appreciate whatever is grand and beneficial to the Republic. Still they are obliged to confine themselves within a less extensive circle than that in which you propose to engage, particularly on account of the imperious necessity of terminating the war this campaign; they have reason to dread the disasters which a failure might produce. They calculate on the victories of the army of Italy; but what would be the consequences of an invasion of Bavaria by the mountains of the Tyrol, and what hopes would there be of an honourable retreat in case of failure? And how, with the forces you command, and the few thousand men the Directory might add to them, would it be possible to keep in awe so many nations subdued by our arms, and impatient to deliver themselves from the vicinity and the effects of war? And where would be our means of resistance, if the Court of Turin, which we are now forcing to make peace, should again allow itself to be circumvented, and take up arms once more in order to cut off our communications?

The powers of Italy call us to your right, Citizen General, and this march will probably free us from the perfidious English who have so long been masters of the Mediterranean. It will enable us to recover Corsica, and wrest those French departments from the ambitious house of Brunswick Lunenburg, which has so proudly established itself in them. These are the intentions of the Directory.

First effect the conquest of the Milanese, whether it is to return to the house of Austria as a necessary cession to secure our peace with her, or whether it may be advisable to give it hereafter to the Piedmontese in recompense for the efforts we may induce them to make to assist in this

conquest, or as an indemnity for, the departments of Mont Blanc and the maritime Alps constitutionally united to the Republic. Repulse the enemy, to the mountains of the Tyrol, and keep them in fear of being forced even there.

After this, divide the army of Italy into two; let the weaker part remain in the Milanese, and secure the possession of that country by its presence; it will be seconded by the Piedmontese troops, if the King of Sardinia accepts the offensive and defensive alliance,—negotiations respecting which will be immediately entered into with his agents;—and, these troops will be particularly entrusted with the guarding of the defiles of the Tyrol, and directed to push our successes, if circumstances admit of it: it is our interest to allow them to act, and even to encourage them to daring exploits; but the Republican troops will remain in the Milanese, levy contributions there, and live in that fertile country, the possession of which has been so valuable to the Austrians during this war. You will arrive there in harvest time; contrive that the army of Italy may want nothing from home. The Directory intend General Kellerman to command the French forces in the Milanese, when you have effected the separation of the army of Italy, increased by that of the Alps; and it is their intention to leave in force, in this new state of affairs, the resolution they made on the 9th of Floreal, giving the commissioners Garreau and Salicetti authority to require movements of troops. These dispositions would secure union between the two Generals, if the love of the Republic and the desire of effecting the triumph of our arms, did not already unite them still more closely.

The second column, which will be as strong as possible,

will partly coast along the sea-shore. After you have secured a free passage through Gavi, if necessary, or even occupied that place, this column will first advance on Leghorn, and afterwards menace Naples and Rome.

The following is the line of conduct to be pursued towards Leghorn and in Tuscany:—You must arrive there by an indirect route and when least expected. The Republic is not at war with the Grand Duke, and it is important to keep up our connexion with him: his minister at Paris has not concealed the constraint under which the English keep his country, and their tyranny in the port of Leghorn. It is worthy of the Republic to free it from this subjection, and it is of the first importance that the national flag should be respected in the ports of Tuscany. Let the French troops enter Leghorn in the orderly manner which excites confidence, and is indispensable in neutral countries. Inform the Grand Duke of the necessity of our passing through his territories, and putting a garrison in Leghorn. Take care to time the despatch of this courier and the arrival of the Republican troops at Leghorn so that the courier may reach Florence at or a little before the time when the French troops enter Leghorn: take possession of that place with the same formalities as were lately used in occupying Vado: make yourself master of the English, Neapolitan, and Portuguese shipping, and of all other ships belonging to powers at war with France that you may find in that port; in a word, possess yourself of all that belongs to the different States at war with us, and even lay sequestrations on the property of individuals, subjects of those States; have inventories of them immediately drawn up: above all, be watchful, Citizen General, lest this wealth

become a prey to cupidity and speculation. The Grand Duke cannot object to these rigorous measures; the Directory do not expect he will create obstacles that could only be raised by a perfidy which it is our interest to annihilate. You will declare to him, Citizen General, in the name of the Executive Directory, that he must immediately give orders that every thing in his States belonging to our enemies be immediately placed in our power, and that he must guarantee the sequestration, otherwise the French Republic would be under the necessity of treating Tuscany as an ally of England and Austria.

The Grand Duke will be responsible for the success and accomplishment of these measures; you will moreover demand, in this country, the supplies which will be indispensable for the army under your command, and drafts or bills on the treasury, payable after a general peace, shall be delivered in payment for the goods and articles furnished.

The reports you will of course contrive to spread, respecting the number of the French troops in Italy (which you will exaggerate), will increase the fears of our enemies, and in some sense double your resources.

When you cross the territory of the Republic of Lucca, you will declare to that Government, in the name of the Executive Directory, that the French Republic has no hostile intentions towards it.

It will be best to adjourn our discussions with Genoa until after the expedition to Leghorn; let us at first content ourselves with drawing thence, upon vouchers, the provisions and means of conveyance requisite for the French army; the mode of payment to be hereafter arranged. But what has been prescribed to you respecting Leghorn will apply to the Republic of Genoa, although it is our interest

not to drive that State to despair, but to take care to make its neutrality as useful to us as it has hitherto been to our enemies.

Its late conduct towards us has not been calculated to efface from our remembrance the perfidy which led to the destruction of the *Modeste*, at a period less favourable to us. The moment is at hand for us to demand public reparation, and to insist upon having those who occasioned the burning of the *Modeste* and called in the Austrians, brought to trial as traitors to their country.

It may in fact be said to the Genoese—Either you caused that frigate to be taken and its crew massacred out of enmity towards France, or you sacrificed it through weakness. In the first case, we demand the vengeance to which we are entitled; in the second, we have a right to require you to treat our enemies as you treated us. The indemnity granted us must be a sufficient one. The relations of the French who perished on board the *Modeste* must share in it; the reparation of so heinous an offence must be unequivocal and solemn.

Accordingly, after the expedition to Leghorn, we shall endeavour to raise a loan in the city of Genoa, but we shall take care not to oppress that city; we shall make the Genoese feel that we are more generous than our enemies, who had proposed to deliver it up to the King of Sardinia; we shall demand, in such a manner as not to be refused, that every thing belonging to our enemies, particularly to the English, as well in the port and city of Genoa, as in the rest of the territories of that Republic, shall be immediately delivered to us; we shall have the property and effects of merchants and individuals of the countries at war with us placed under sequestration; and the Genoese Government

shall be answerable for its faithful observance. We shall continue to give, in exchange for the supplies we may receive from Genoa, cheques, respecting the payment of which negotiations shall take place on the conclusion of a general peace. Finally, we shall insist on the expulsion of all the emigrants, without exception, from the States of Genoa and Tuscany, as you have no doubt had them expelled from the part of Piedmont which you occupy, if they were so daring as to remain there.

As to the measures we must take with respect to the Duke of Parma, it is just that he should pay for his infatuation in not relinquishing the coalition; his territories ought to furnish us with all we have occasion for, and with pecuniary aid besides. But our engagements with Spain forbid us to commit any useless devastation, and require us to spare these States much more than any of the other possessions of our enemies. The Milanese is the country which, above all others, is not to be spared; levy contributions in money there immediately, and during the first terror excited by the approach of our arms; let the application of them be superintended with the eye of economy. The canals and great public establishments of that country, which we shall not preserve, must feel the effects of the war in some degree; but let us be prudent.

You will find in No. I. an interesting note, which will enable you to take some salutary measures. Do not forget any thing that may contribute to the health of the defenders of the Republic.

Venice shall be treated as a neutral power; but she must not expect to be treated as a friendly State; she has done nothing to deserve our esteem.

If Rome should make advances, the first thing to be done is to require the Pope to order public prayers for the prosperity and success of the French Republic immediately. Some of her fine monuments, her statues, pictures, medals, libraries, silver Madonnas, and even bells, would defray the expenses of the visit you will have paid her. In case the Court of Naples, terrified at your approach, should cause any proposals to be made to France, you must require it to deliver up to us immediately, all the shipping and other property belonging to the powers at war with us. Naples must be answerable for the immediate execution of these measures, and solemnly engage not to receive, during this war, any of the ships of the English, or other enemies of the Republic, into her ports; and particularly not to suffer any of them to enter under neutral colours.

The army of the Alps has orders to send you immediately four demi-brigades, and you will see, by the annexed statement, what arrangements have been made by the minister of war, for the marching of several companies of light artillery to join the army of Italy by the shortest road: they were only to be had where they were stationed; and the Directory are sorry to observe, that some of them will not arrive until a very late period.

The minister at war has likewise given orders for a fourth *commissaire-ordonnateur*, Citizen Foullet, who was with the army of the Alps, to join the army under your command; you will also have Citizens Lambert, Sucy, and Gosselin. In case one of the two latter, or Citizen Foullet should be found more competent than Citizen Lambert to the place of commissary-in-chief, the Directory authorize Citizen Salicetti to appoint any one of these three to that situation.

'If the army of the *Côtes de l'Océan* can supply you with any cavalry, the Directory will have it sent to the army of Italy, and will endeavour to procure you cavalry. They are about to treat for peace with Sardinia, and will regularly inform you of the negotiations: the French Republic will act with generosity, and endeavour to secure an ally who shall be always attached to it both by interest and friendship.

The Directory impatiently await the news of your successes against the Austrian army. Strike, and strike home.

CARNOT.

Paris, 26 Floreal, year IV. (15th May, 1796.)

Your despatches of the 17th Floreal, Citizen General, have been received by the Executive Directory. The possession of the fortress of Tortona gives them new confidence in the success of your dispositions for the passage of the Po: it has enabled you to take the Austrian line of defence in the rear, after having stolen a daring and skillfully-conceived movement upon them, if they persist in keeping the banks of the river on the Valenza side.

The Directory, like yourself, are aware of the obstacles which impede the entrance of the Milanese; but the talent and bravery which win battles, can overcome difficulties of every kind; and the triumphant army under your command ought to look upon the Milanese as a certain conquest, and one which is necessary to the glorious political results which the Republic expects from its victories.

The conduct of Tuscany towards France no longer merits forbearance; and the Directory authorize you, as soon as circumstances appear favourable, to direct a corps on Leghorn, of such strength as you may deem expedient, and by means of which you will cause the arrangements contained in the last despatches of the Directory, with respect to the Grand Duke, to be carried into execution. The reinforcements you will receive from the army of the Rhine, will speedily put you in a condition to order this operation; but you will at the same time remember that your principal object, in your present situation, is to complete the defeat of Beaulieu.

The Directory remind you, Citizen General, that nothing but the maintenance of discipline can secure to an army the results of its courage; and that during the first intoxication of success, there is always a tendency to a relaxation of discipline; you are deeply impressed with this truth, and you will not fail to apply it with the rigour which is equally requisite for the interests of the Republic and for your own glory.

CARNOT.

Paris, 26th Floreal, year IV. (15th May, 1796.)

THE Directory have received, Citizen General, your letter, dated Lodi, the 22d inst. You know how to profit by victory, and this rapid and uninterrupted career of success promises France the conquest of almost all Italy, and the immense resources contained in that great and rich peninsula.

Immortal glory to the conquerors of Lodi ! Honour to the General-in-chief who planned the daring attack of the gate of that town, mixing in the ranks of the French warriors, exposing himself to the murderous fire of the enemy, and making every disposition to secure their defeat ! Honour to the intrepid Berthier, who rushed forward at the head of the undaunted and formidable republican column which broke and overthrew the enemy ! Honour to generals Massena, Cervoni, and Dallemagne ; to Brigadier-generals Saluce, Dupas, and Sugni ; to Adjutant-major Toiret of the third battalion of grenadiers ! Glory to the valiant second battalion of carbineers ; to those victorious grenadiers who decided the fortune of that day ! Glory to the brave division commanded by General Augereau, and to its leader ! Glory to the commissioner from Government, Salicetti !

You have conquered, French republicans ; you have saved your country ; you have established the Republic, and you have annihilated the monstrous coalition which threatened to devour us. You are making peace by the repeated blows you inflict on those senseless Austrians who, through an obstinacy which now proves fatal to them, have hitherto refused to accept it.

It is with pleasure that the Directory become the organ of all the friends of the Republic, and continually bestow on you the praises due to your courage and the daring intrepidity which distinguishes your character.

Yes, General, you know how to profit by victory. Of what importance is the day on which you will reach Milan, since that city belongs to the Republic, and you are hav-

ing its castle invested? Your plan is the only one which is proper to be adhered to; you must never quit Beaulieu until his forces are annihilated and dispersed in such a manner as to render it absolutely impossible for him to make any attempt, or even to appear during this campaign. Continue, then, to pursue him wherever he goes, with the perseverance you have hitherto displayed; and never cease from the pursuit until the Austrian army be wholly destroyed.

The despatches sent you by the Directory on the 18th, 26th, and 27th of Floreal, contain the principles of the movements you will have to make after the total defeat of Beaulieu and the conquest of the Milanese. As soon as that important operation is completed, and the conditions of peace agreed on with the Court of Sardinia are ratified by the Legislative Body and the Court of Turin, you will divide the troops under your command into two corps. You will command the troops which are to complete the conquest of all Italy; and General Kellerman, put in requisition by the Commissioner of Government, Salicetti, will command those of the Milanese, under the name of the Army of the Alps, and will direct some divisions and parties into the gorges of the Tyrol, if the forces you leave him allow him to do so.

Part of the few troops at present composing the army of the Alps, augmented by the reinforcements which the situation of Lyons will allow to be drawn thence, may advance into Piedmont and contribute to the execution of the treaty of peace, by occupying the places which ought to be surrendered to us in conformity to article XII.;

and no troops should be left in Mont Blanc, Hautes-Alpes, Basses-Alpes, and Fausigny, but what are indispensably necessary for the maintenance of the public peace against the attempts of malevolent disturbers.

You will concert the necessary measures for these essential operations with the commissioner of Government Salicetti, and the General-in-chief Kellerman, with whom you will fix the lines of demarcation between the two armies, and the districts appropriated to each of them, and in which they are to do duty.

The Directory have reserved for you the command of the columns destined to chastize the English at Leghorn, considering this an operation of the first importance, because the fate of the island of Corsica depends, in some measure, upon it; because it will make London tremble, and strike a mortal blow at the English, the only supporters and managers of the coalition, which at length seems likely to fall to pieces. They consider the immediate execution of this plan as much more important than the dangerous expedition into the Tyrol; by its execution, you will shake the tiara of the pretended head of the Universal Church, and impose on the King of Naples conditions of peace as advantageous to France as unfavourable to the perfidious English and their allies.

The march which you propose towards the Tyrol is certainly a grand idea, but surrounded with obstacles very difficult to surmount. The Directory have partly pointed out the dangers attending this plan in their despatches of the 18th of Fructidor, to which they refer. They moreover regard this enterprize as absolutely dependent on your new successes in Italy; the following, however, is the me-

thod in which it must be carried into execution. You will take with you, when you march on Leghorn, and the States of the Church, only the troops indispensably necessary to secure your success at Leghorn, Rome, and Naples ; the remainder will be placed, as already mentioned, under the command of General Kellerman, who will hotly pursue the wreck of the Austrians into the gorges of the Tyrol, and push strong parties into Germany, as far as possible, to raise contributions and to disturb the communications of the Austrian armies on the Rhine. If the army you command should want reinforcements, they will be immediately drawn from that which will be under the command of General Kellerman, according to the requisition which will be made by the commissioners of Government. Conjointly with that General, you will leave in the Milanese, to secure your communications with France, no more troops than will be absolutely indispensable for that purpose ; and General Kellerman will dispose the greater part of those under his command, in a military manner, in the mountains of the Tyrol, in order to shelter them from the heats of the plain, and the diseases which they would infallibly produce.

Your marches towards the south of Italy should be brisk and rapid ; the immense resources they will procure you will be immediately expedited to France. Leave nothing in Italy which our political situation admits of our carrying off, and which can be of any use to us. If this plan be executed as the Directory hope, it will afterwards be more possible to resume, towards autumn, the scheme of penetrating into the heart of Germany, with a prospect of success, as our armies of the Rhine will by that time have been able to strike some vigorous blows. The army of Italy has

not only shown them the road to victory, but smoothed it for them. The Austrian, struck with consternation by your victories, has probably already given orders to draw numerous reinforcements from his armies on the Rhine to oppose your progress, whence arises the necessity of giving General Kellerman as considerable a force as possible, that he may constantly be able to act on the offensive on the Tyrolese side.

No action has yet taken place on the Rhine. The army of the Sambre and Meuse finds it difficult to collect its magazines; it has not a fertile plain before it, like the brave army of Italy; it must secure the means of subsistence beforehand in the barren country of Berg and in Northern Wetteravia. That of the Rhine and Moselle is in the utmost distress: its cavalry is a mere nullity for want of horses; and it is in want of cash for its supplies. Abuses and peculations of every kind are at the same time attacking and undermining it. The foot carbineers of the army of Italy, have, by their valour, procured the means of remounting the horse carbineers of that of the Rhine and Moselle. If you can send them, or any other of the cavalry troops of that army, any horses, do it without hesitation, and make arrangements with General Moreau as to the manner of sending them. It is the same in the waggon department, which is in great want of specie.

The moment the enemy draws forces from his armies of the Rhine to oppose ours of Italy, the Directory would seize the opportunity of breaking off the armistice in the North. They are using their utmost efforts to accomplish this, but fear the campaign cannot open before harvest,

which will give the French troops the means of subsistence of which they are now deprived.

If your general-officers of cavalry do not perform their duty, bring them to trial without mercy ; break them, and send them into the rear : purify this branch of the service, and make it worthy of the army of Italy. The Directory have just ordered two cavalry general officers to set out post to join it, who are men of high character : the General-of-division Saluguet, and Brigadier-general Beaurevoir. You will soon give this latter an opportunity of meriting the rank of General-of-division, to which his distinguished services already give him some claim.

If your commissaries are not good, have some new ones appointed by the commissioner Salicetti. The Directory know you place none but honest, intelligent, active men in office. The Republic of Venice may, perhaps, supply us with money ; you might even raise a loan at Verona, where the pretended Louis XVIII. has resided. The Directory leave this subject to your consideration, and entrust its execution to the commissioner Salicetti and yourself.

They write new letters of congratulation to the brave soldiers of the army of Italy ; they expect the plans of your battles and marches ; you ought not to want for draughtsmen in Italy. What are your young engineer officers about ?

The Directory will immediately grant promotion to the persons on whose behalf you solicit, and will bestow new tokens of satisfaction on those who have distinguished themselves.

They applaud the perfect harmony which prevails amongst you, General Kellerman, commissioner Salicetti,

and General Berthier, the chief of the staff. They will heartily rejoice to hear of the total defeat of Beaulieu's army, and the taking of Milan.

CARNOT.

Paris, 9th Prairial, year IV. (28th May, 1796.)

THE Directory have received, Citizen General, your letter of the 25th Floreal, informing them of the taking of Pizzighettone and the possession of Cremona and all Lombardy. They once more felicitate the army of Italy and its commander, who have thus founded the festival of victory, which the whole Republic will celebrate on the 10th of Prairial.

The Directory consider it useless to repeat on this occasion what they mentioned to you in their last despatches respecting the necessity of watching all Beaulieu's motions, and never losing sight of him for an instant. If you are apprehensive of his receiving reinforcements, attack him before he can join them, and take every possible means of preventing this junction; you must not give the enemy time to recover, you must not diminish your strength in his presence; and, above all, you must take care not to give him an opportunity, by an unfortunate separation of your forces,—of beating us in detail and regaining the ground he has lost.

The separation of the army of Italy into two, ought not to take place until Beaulieu is entirely disabled from any enterprise. Your first object, therefore, Citizen General, is to destroy and completely disperse his army. He would

avail himself of any momentary respite you might give him, to recover from the terror with which the arms of the Republic have inspired him, and he would soon endeavour to become daring.

Adjourn the expedition on Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, until you think there is a favourable opportunity ; but let it be rapid, and let its complete success, particularly against the English, enable you to return speedily to make head against the troops which the Court of Vienna may send.

You appear desirous, Citizen General, to continue to conduct the whole series of the military operations of the present campaign in Italy. The Directory have maturely reflected on this proposition, and *the confidence they have in your talents and Republican zeal has decided this question in the affirmative.* The General-in-chief Kellerman will remain at Chambery, and will only superintend the occupation of the fortified places, which by the treaty of peace are to be surrendered to us. The army of Italy will still keep a garrison in that which it entered by virtue of the armistice, as well as in Valenza or Alessandria, provisionally granted to us by this treaty.

After the defeat of Beaulieu, the expedition against Leghorn is the first that is to be undertaken ; the Directory stated the reasons for this in the last despatches. They leave you the choice of the time and means of execution ; and will hear of this triumph over the perfidious English with the most lively satisfaction.

The rest of the military operations towards Germany and in the Mantuano absolutely depend on your victory over Beaulieu. The Directory are sensible how difficult it would be to direct them from Paris, and leave

you the greatest latitude in this respect, only recommending extreme prudence Their intention is, however, that the army shall not proceed beyond the Tyrol, until after the expedition to the South of Italy

CABOT

Paris, 12 Prairial year IV (31st May, 1796)

YOUR despatches of the 28th and 29th Floréal, Citizen General, have been received by the Executive Directory, who anticipated the conquest of all Lombardy as the glorious and necessary consequence of the skilful passage of the Po at Placenza, and the heroic passage of the Adda at Lodi, and they observed, with renewed satisfaction, that you have gathered the fruits of victory by marching to new conquests Their intentions are conformable to the plan you have adopted, of no longer allowing the enemy to recover breath in Mantua to postpone the defeat of a vanquished army, is to hazard the event This principle ought to be strictly observed, for it is perfectly analogous to the national character, and peculiarly applicable to the theatre of war in Italy The reinforcements which Beaulieu has received, cannot free his troops from the consciousness of their inferiority, you will force them in their new positions, and pursue the wreck of them into the gorges of the mountains, whence they must be deprived of all hopes of return, whilst part of your forces will proceed to impose the laws of the Republic on Southern Italy

Annexed you will find a copy of the letter written by the Directory to their commissioner Salicetti, by which you

will see that it is their wish, agreeably to the tenor of the laws, that all armistices, orders of military contribution, and other such acts, concerning both the civil and military authorities, should be authenticated by the signatures of the General-in-chief and of the commissioners of Government. You will moreover observe, that the measures you have taken respecting the administration of the Milanese are approved of.

As to the question you propose relative to the political state of that country, the Directory cannot answer it definitively until they are enabled to judge from the reports you will send them of the disposition of the inhabitants, whether this people be susceptible of independence. In the mean time direct their opinion towards liberty, without losing sight of the fact that the fate of these States depends on the conditions of peace with the Emperor, on the essential conditions of our treaty with the Duke of Parma, and on the part which Spain may take therein. You will also watch over the proceedings of the authorities you have preserved or created, and the clandestine manœuvres of those you have suppressed.

The Directory approve of your intention of sending a million to the armies on the Rhine; they think this mark of fraternal generosity on the part of the army of Italy, will produce a beneficial effect upon them. They will commence their campaign this day, and are about to enter upon a bold plan of offensive operations, which will make the Emperor repent his having broken the armistice, and will retard his impotent efforts to repair his losses in Italy.

Ten battalions of the army of the *Côtes de l'Océan* are ordered to join you; they will pass through Chamberi.

We expect in a few days to receive a courier with the news

of new successes on the Mincio and the fall of the citadel of Milan Rely confidently, Citizen General, on the support to which you are so honourably entitled from us, and maintain the salutary unanimity which prevails between Citizen Salicetti and you, and in which we are particularly interested

CARNOT

Paris, 16th Prairial, year IV (4th June, 1796)

It appears, Citizen General, that whilst negotiations for peace with the King of Sardinia were proceeding, it became known at Turin that one of the conditions of this peace was to secure to the patriots of Piedmont a guarantee for their future tranquillity, upon which the authorities, in revenge for the efforts which some of them had made in the cause of liberty, hastened to deliver them up to the executioner, before the ratification of the peace The terror which the brave army of Italy strikes into the Courts of Rome, Naples, &c, has excited, it seems, similar atrocities in the south of Italy, and they are emptying, by similar executions, the prisons in which men, whose only crime is that of having thought of reclaiming their rights, are now groaning

The Directory wish you to give notice immediately to the petty princes of Italy, that they must put a stop to these crimes, and that they will have to answer for all the blood they may cause to flow

The prohibition to prosecute the Italian patriots must be introduced as a necessary clause in the armistices which may be concluded by the commissioners of Government to the army of Italy and by you

CARNOT

Paris, 23d Prairial, year IV. (11th June, 1796.)

THE new successes which you communicate, Citizen General, to the Executive Directory, in your despatches of the 17th, seem to raise the renown of the army of Italy to the highest pitch; but it has still to acquire the glory of preserving its conquests, which will neither be less brilliant nor less useful to the Republic, and is likewise reserved for the genius which has directed such astonishing operations, and the courage which executed them.

After having expelled all the remains of the Austrian army out of Lombardy, you will no doubt guard all its outlets with the necessary strength and precautions to prevent Beaulieu's entering that country, notwithstanding the reinforcements he is receiving, or is to receive in the Tyrol. The armistices about to be concluded with the Prince of Rome and the King of Naples, by leaving at your disposal the forces which were intended to march against them, will give great latitude to your arrangements for enabling the French to remain in quiet possession of the Milanese, and for preventing the ravages of disease incident to the dog-days in that country. The expedition to Leghorn should not be neglected, but is only to be undertaken when you deem the opportunity favourable; your first object must be to watch the motions of an enemy who will use every effort to repair his losses. The glorious commencement of the campaign on the Rhine will soon strike fresh terror into the Austrians, and operate a powerful diversion in your favour: the left of the army of the Sambre and Meuse has beaten the Duke of Wirtemberg's corps d'armée on the right bank of the Rhine, in two important actions, at

Ukerath and Altenkirchen A force of upwards of 30,000 men, under the command of the brave General Klüber, formed of the left and part of the centre of General Jourdan's forces, is rapidly advancing on the Lahn, and it is probable that the whole of the army commanded by the latter will soon march on the Mein the army of the Rhine and Moselle is in the mean time preparing to act in concert with that of Jourdan, and to execute movements, the object of which is to remove the theatre of war beyond the Rhine, without delay

The minister of finance is about to avail himself of your announcement of six millions at the disposal of Government It is desirable that Government should know precisely where and in whose hands this money is, and whether the four millions mentioned in your former letters constitute part of it The Directory have given orders for escorting the two millions now on the road, from Lyons hither

The noble Quirini, the Venetian envoy, has preferred a complaint respecting the licentious conduct of the French troops in the Bresciano, you will find a copy of this memorial annexed, and you will feel the necessity of repressing such disorders, if they really took place As to the Senate of Venice, there will be no disadvantage in acting with firmness towards it

The prompt and severe measures you adopted to suppress the insurrection of the inhabitants of the Milanese were necessary, the laws of war and the safety of the army will always justify such proceedings under similar circumstances

You will see by our despatches to Citizen Salicetti, what are our intentions with respect to the proposals

APPENDIX.

which have been made to you on behalf of Rome and Naples; it is unnecessary to repeat the particulars here.

The situation of the Southern departments has made it necessary to revoke the orders given to General Chateauneuf Randon to join the army of Italy with the two demi-brigades which were in the first instance intended for you. This general retains the command of the 9th military division, until the complete restoration of tranquillity in that district.

The Directory thank you for your attention in sending them a present of horses.

CARNOT.

LETTERS FROM NAPOLEON

TO THE DIRECTORY.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 22 Floreal, year IV. (11th May, 1796.)

THE battle of Lodi gives all Lombardy to the Republic. The enemy have left 2000 men in the castle of Milan, which I must therefore invest. You may, in making your calculations, consider me at Milan; I shall not, however, go there to-morrow, because I wish to pursue Beaulieu, and take the opportunity of his delirium to beat him once more.

I may possibly soon attack Mantua. If I carry that place, there will be nothing to prevent my penetrating into

Bavaria; in two *decades* I may be in the heart of Germany. Could you not combine my movements with the operations of those two armies? I suppose they are now fighting on the Rhine; for if the armistice were to be continued, the army of Italy would be overwhelmed. If the two armies of the Rhine take the field, I beg you to acquaint me with their position, and to let me know what you expect them to do, that I may be guided by that information, as to entering the Tyrol or confining myself to the Adige. It would well become the Republic to sign the treaty of peace with the three armies united in the heart of Bavaria or Austria. For my part, if it be consistent with your schemes to let the two armies of the Rhine move forward, I will clear the Tyrol before the Emperor have seriously thought of such a thing. Would that it were possible to get a good Commissary-general! the one who is here would do very well as a second, but he has not spirit or judgment enough for a principal.

DONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 25th Floréal, year IV. (14th May, 1796.)

THE courier who left Paris on the 18th, is just arrived. Your hopes are realized; for the whole of Lombardy now belongs to the Republic. I yesterday despatched a division to surround the castle of Milan. Beaulieu is at Man-

tua with his army; he has flooded all the surrounding country; he will find it a fatal place, for it is the most unhealthy part of Italy.

Beaulieu has still a numerous army: he began the campaign with superior forces; the Emperor has sent him a reinforcement of 10,000 men, who are on their march. I think it very impolitic to divide the army of Italy in two; and it is equally contrary to the interest of the Republic to place it under two different generals.

The expedition to Leghorn, Rome and Naples is a very trifling matter; it ought to be executed by divisions in *echelon*, so that they might, by a retrograde march, muster in force against the Austrians, and threaten to hem them in, upon their making the least movement. But for this purpose there must not only be but one general, but nothing to confine him in his march or operations. I have conducted the campaign without consulting any one; I should have done no good if I had been under the necessity of conforming to the notions of another person. I have gained some advantages over superior forces, and when totally destitute of every thing, because, in the persuasion that your confidence was reposed in me, my actions were as prompt as my thoughts.

If you fetter me with restraints of all kinds; if I must consult the Government commissioners at every step; if they have a right to alter my movements, to take away my troops or send me others, do not look for any further success. If you diminish your means, by dividing your forces; if you destroy the unity of military conception, in Italy, I say it with grief, you will have lost the best opportunity that could offer of imposing laws on Italy.

In the present situation of the affairs of the Republic in Italy, it is indispensably necessary that you should have a general possessed of your entire confidence should I not possess it, I should not complain, but should endeavour, by increased zeal, to deserve your esteem in the post you might confide to me Every general has his own way of carrying on war General Kellerman has had more experience, and will conduct it better than I, but both together we should do it very badly

I can do my country no essential service, unless I am entirely and absolutely invested with your confidence I am sensible that it requires a great effort of courage to write this letter, it would be so easy to accuse me of ambition and pride but you who have constantly bestowed on me marks of esteem which I am bound not to forget, are entitled to know all my sentiments

The different divisions of Italy are taking possession of Lombardy. When you receive this letter, we shall be on our route, and your answer will probably find us at Leghorn Your determination on this occasion will have a more decisive effect on the operations of the campaign, than if the Emperor were to send Beauharnois a reinforcement of 15,000 men

BOVAPARTK

To the MINISTER of SPAIN, at Parma.

Head-quarters, Placenza, 17th Floreal, year IV. (6th May, 1796.)

I HAVE received your letter, Sir. As it is neither my disposition nor the intention of the French people to do mischief to no purpose, or to injure the people in any respect, I consent to suspend all hostilities against the Duke of Parma, and the march of my troops on Parma; but the Duke must send plenipotentiaries to me in the course of the night to conclude the armistice.

I am marching several regiments of cavalry and one brigade to within three leagues of Placenza; but this need not give the Duke of Parma the least uneasiness, from the moment he accepts the conditions we agree upon.

I am happy in this opportunity of convincing you of the sentiments of esteem and consideration with which, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the MINISTER for Foreign Affairs to the DUKE
of PARMA.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 24th Floreal, year IV. (13th May, 1796.)

I HAVE received, Sir, the ratification of the suspension of hostilities which you have accepted on the part of the

Duke of Parma. I send General Cervoni to you, in order that you may arrange with him all the particulars of the execution of this treaty.

You will deliver to him in the course of to-morrow the five hundred thousand francs which, according to the terms of the suspension, are to be paid within five days; he will likewise receive the horses, and will take the necessary steps for the execution of the said suspension.

I am happy, Sir, that this transaction gives me an opportunity of expressing the consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the **COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF** of the Army of the King
of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Milan, 29th Floreal, year IV. (18th May, 1796.)

I HAVE just given orders, Sir, to allow the two salt-barges stopped at Placenza to continue their voyage to Valenza.

Perhaps you may think it advisable to send an officer or agent to Placenza, to take care that the boats and other convoys belonging to the King be not intercepted by the army. The moment you let me know your sentiments in this respect, I shall be happy to give such officer the necessary facilities for executing his commission. He might likewise be authorised to visit the different banks of the Po, to obtain restitution of effects belonging to the King which we may have stopped.

'The chief of the staff' is sending orders to the troops expected at Casale, to set out immediately for Milan.

I have looked into the different claims respecting the province of Alba. I am desirous, Sir, to convince you of my readiness to do any thing agreeable to you.

I beg you will send me a list of the officers you wish me to send back in exchange for those whom you have had the complaisance to release on parole.

I have sent an officer of engineers to Valenza, to choose a site for the construction of the bridge at that place; but as I leave to the King the enjoyment of his States on this side the Po, which M. Beaulieu evacuated only on account of my passing the Po at Placenza, I think it would be proper for you yourself to give orders for the construction of the said bridge, which it would be advantageous to me to have within eight days.

BONAPARTE.

TO the AMBASSADOR of the REPUBLIC, at Bâle
(Barthelemy).

Head-quarters, Milan, 1st Prairial, year IV. (20th May, 1796.)

WE are masters of Lombardy. The troops of the Republic, although few in number and in want of every thing, have surmounted all obstacles; the enemy have retired to Mantua; our corps of troops will be here to-morrow. I am in haste to proceed, and beg you to inform me of the movements of the Imperial army in Bavaria and Swabia.

Is the Emperor likely to weaken his army of the Rhine to reinforce that of Italy? What troops can he still send into the Tyrol? I beg, Citizen Minister, that you will communicate to me *all the information* you possess, and send agents in all directions, in order to let me know precisely what forces will march into Italy.

I am much pleased, Citizen Minister, at the opportunity thus afforded me of assuring you, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the same.

Head-quarters, Milan, 23d Prairal, year IV. (11th June, 1796)

IN the beginning of the Revolution, the Canton of Berne confiscated the property of the late General La Harpe; I beg you will interest yourself in getting it restored to his son.

BONAPARTE.

MILITARY LETTERS

ADDRESSED TO NAPOLEON.

Malco, 20th Florcal, year IV. (9th May, 1796)

THE enemy still occupy the town of Pizzighittone. I reconnoitred my centre and my right this morning, and it did not appear to me that any part of the enemy's troops

had evacuated that place, judging from the fire they kept up and the troops they had on the ramparts.

The river Adda is broad and deep. I do not think it can be passed without boats, and all those which might have been used for this purpose are kept on the other side.

The chief of the staff having informed me that General Augereau occupies Casale, I am about to send a detachment of cavalry to form my junction with him.

My efforts to prevent pillage, General, have hitherto been fruitless. The guards I have stationed have been of no service; disorder is at the utmost height. Some terrible examples should be made; but I know not whether I have authority to make them. A man of honour and sensibility is shocked and disgraced by marching at the head of a corps in which there are so many bad characters. Were I not on the most advanced post, I would request you to appoint in my stead some person whose health and talents might be sufficient to produce better effects; but I must not forget, that my business is to endeavour to contribute to the glory of my country.

DALLEMAGNE.

DIPLOMATIC LETTERS

ADDRESSED TO NAPOLEON.

Turin, 2d Prairial, year IV. (21st May, 1796.)

THE boats necessary for the construction of the bridge, are all at the appointed spot. I have already received intelligence, that the column which was to pass at Argentiere

has arrived in the valley of the Stura; that of the valley of Aosta will likewise have entered on the 19th; but I must take this opportunity of mentioning that General Kellerman seems to intimate a second passage through this valley, which was not agreed upon, and would be very injurious to the country through which this second column might pass. My brother, who commands in the valley of Aosta, has written to General Kellerman on this subject, to apprise him that it would not be conformable to the Convention; so that I flatter myself there will still be time to give orders for this second column to take the route of Argentiere instead of that of the Saint Bernard.

I have thought proper to write to you with this information, that you may be acquainted with all our proceedings, having the greatest confidence in your mode of conduct towards me, and being extremely desirous to do every thing that is agreeable to you.

I also thought it best to apply directly to you, to get you to give orders to leave the peasants of the countries occupied by the French armies at liberty to till their lands and sow them for the second harvest, which I believe will be as advantageous to the French army as to the country itself, in which it will make provisions more plentiful. As it is now very near the time at which they ought to begin, I was anxious to point out the circumstance, and am happy to avail myself of this opportunity of assuring you, General, of the distinguished sentiments I entertain towards you.

VICTOR EMANUEL.

TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ORDERS OF THE DAY, AND PROCLAMATIONS.

Suspension of Arms, concluded between the French Army in Italy, and the Duke of Parma and Placenza, by General Bonaparte commanding the French army, with the Marquis Antonio Pallavicini and Signor Filippo Dalla Rosa, Plenipotentiaries of the Duke of Parma, under the mediation of Count Valdeparaiso, Minister from Spain to Parma.

Article 1. There shall be a suspension of arms between the French Republic and the Duke of Parma, until peace be concluded between the two States. The Duke of Parma shall send plenipotentiaries to Paris, to the Executive Directory.

2. The Duke of Parma shall pay a military contribution of two millions of livres, French money, to be paid either in bills of exchange on Genoa, in plate, or coin: five hundred thousand livres to be paid within five days, and the rest in the following decade.

3. He shall also furnish twelve hundred draught horses with harness and collars; four hundred dragoon horses, harnessed; and one hundred saddle-horses, for the superior officers of the army.

4. He shall give up twenty pictures, to be chosen by the General-in-chief, out of those now in the duchy.

5. In the course of a fortnight he shall cause to be delivered into the magazines of the army at Tortona, ten thousand quintals of corn and five thousand of hay; and

shall within the same period, place two thousand oxen at the disposal of the storekeeper general, for the use of the army

6 In consideration of the above-mentioned contributions, the States of the Duke of Parma shall be treated as neutral States, until the conclusion of the negotiations about to be opened at Paris.

Done at Placenza, 20th Floreal, year IV (9th May, 1796)

BONAPARTE

ANTONIO PALLAVICINI—FILIPPO DALLA ROSA

Armistice concluded between the General-in-chief of the army of Italy, and M Frederic, Commander of Est, Plenipotentiary from the Duke of Modena

THE General in chief of the army of Italy grants the Duke of Modena an armistice, to give him time to send to Paris, in order to obtain a definitive peace from the Executive Directory, on the following conditions, which M Frederic, Commander of Est, Plenipotentiary from the Duke of Modena, submits to, and promises to fulfil, that is to say —

1. The Duke of Modena shall pay to the French Republic the sum of seven million five hundred thousand livres, French money, of which sum, three millions shall be immediately paid into the chest of the paymaster of the army, two millions in the course of a fortnight into the

hands of M. Balbi, Banker to the Republic at Genoa ; and two millions five hundred thousand livres into the hands of the same banker at Genoa, within a month.

2. The Duke of Modena shall also furnish goods to the value of two million five hundred thousand livres more, in provisions, and powder and other military stores, at the option of the General-in-chief, who will specify when and where the said articles are to be delivered.

3. The Duke of Modena engages to deliver twenty pictures, to be chosen in his gallery or in his States, by the citizens to be nominated for that purpose.

In consideration of the above conditions, the troops of the Republic, in passing through the States of the Duke of Modena, shall make no requisition : such provisions as they may have occasion for, shall be supplied and paid for voluntarily and as may be agreed on.

Done at Milan, 1st Prairial, year IV. (20th May, 1796.)

BONAPARTE.

END OF THE FOURTH AND LAST

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